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2Abstract
The activity of the Italian Fasci Abroad provides a new perspective on the 
nature of both Italian and European fascism, as well as on Italy’s foreign policy 
during the 1930s. This thesis focuses on the means employed by the Fasci in the 
transformation of Italian communities in Great Britain into Tittle Fascist Italies’. It 
argues that fascistisation of Italian emigrants became effective from 1932 and seemed 
to succeed in creating a corporativist and totalitarian community from 1935-36, until 
the international crisis of 1938-39 brought that Fascist dream to an end. The 
Ethiopian war and Italy’s alliance with Germany were the most crucial events in the 
development of the Fasci in their relationship with both the Italian communities and 
the British government.
The thesis also concentrates on the relationship between Italian and British 
fascism. Until the end of 1934 both the Fasci and the embassy established regular 
contacts with the British Union of Fascists; in the same period, BUF propaganda 
reflected the belief that British fascism was part of universal fascism, and that Rome 
was its origin. BUF’s shift from Italophilia to admiration for National Socialism in 
1935, and the contemporary unleashing of an aggressive anti-British propaganda in 
Italy coincided with a worsening in Anglo-Italian fascist relations. Consequently, the 
Italian Ambassador to London Dino Grandi strengthened his collaboration with 
British Conservative Italophiles, who worked with the Italian embassy in an attempt 
to support the cause of Italy and to improve Anglo-Italian relations.
The divergence between Grandi’s and the Italophiles’ beliefs on the one hand 
and Italy’s anti-British propaganda and foreign policy on the other were evident 
especially from 1938. The attitude of the Fasci Abroad reflected this divergence. 
Despite the increased centralisation of the Fasci under the control of the foreign 
ministry from 1938 onward, the Fasci in Britain continued to share Grandi’s views on 
Italian foreign policy. The Fascist press in Britain, strongly anti-British during the 
Ethiopian war, became pro-British at the beginning of 1938. Grandi saw himself as 
the man who could prevent war, until Mussolini declared his mission in London at an 
end in July 1939.
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7Introduction
This research investigates the relationship between Italian Fascism and Britain 
during the period of Dino Grandi’s ambassadorship in London. It begins with an 
examination of the activities of the Italian Fasci Abroad in Britain as a case study in 
the regime’s attempts to fascistise Italian communities abroad. Education of the 
Italians, from the first achievements of 1932 to the apparent realisation of the dream 
of a Fascist community in 1935-36, to the major crisis at the outbreak of the Second 
World War, is discussed in chapters 1, 3, and 5. A second element, also organised 
chronologically, covers the expansion of Fascism in Britain, Italy’s links with British 
Fascism and with right-wing Conservatives, and the effects of those links on wider 
Anglo-Italian relations. These issues are discussed in chapters 2,4, and 6.
In 1931 about 29,000 Italians lived in Britain, 20,000 of whom had been bom 
in Italy. London constituted the largest community, hosting about 15,000 Italians, 
mostly concentrated in Clerkenwell and Soho. Since the nineteenth century, the 
Italians were mostly employed in peddling and catering. However, during the 1930s 
the number of Italians who worked as peddlers diminished, while the number of those 
who started their own business increased. Second generation immigrants tended to 
achieve social promotion, especially those who acquired British citizenship and could 
enter the liberal professions. Yet those employed in catering and shopkeeping 
continued to be the vast majority. The Soho community, where most Italians worked 
in restaurants and hotels, hosted mainly emigrants from the valleys of Piedmont and 
Lombardy, while those in Clerkenwell mostly came from Emilia, Tuscany and 
Campania and worked as shopkeepers and ice cream sellers.1
Efforts by Fascist institutions to create miniature Fascist Italies took place in 
London and in other British towns, as well as in other countries. News from the 
British ‘Little Italies’ appeared weekly in the newspaper of the Fasci in Great Britain,
1 See Umberto Marin, Italiani in GranBretagna (Rome: Centro Studi Emigrazione, 1975); Terri Colpi, 
The Italian Factor: The Italian Community in Great Britain (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1991); Vittorio 
Briani, II lavoro italiano all'estero negli ultimi 100 anni (Rome: Italiani nel mondo, 1970); Lucio 
Sponza, Italian Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Realities and Images (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1988). The autobiography of Charles Forte, Forte. Autobiography o f Charles Forte 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986), provides information on relatively integrated and professionally 
successful Italians in Britain in the 1930s.
sL'Italia Nostra, which was published from 1928 to 1940. In cities such as Glasgow, 
Liverpool and Manchester, where Italian communities were relatively large, the Fasci 
founded organisations along the same lines of those instituted in London.
Wherever an Italian community existed, the Fasci Abroad sought to transform 
the Italians into Fascists. A few historians have attempted to draw a general map of 
their activity throughout the world.2 But this activity took different forms according to 
a number of factors, such as the size of the communities, the different patterns of 
migration, the social, economic and geographic origin of the emigrants, and the 
attitude of local governments.3
The Fasci Abroad created Fascist organisations in other countries outside 
Italy, founded newspapers, and sought to take control of the administration of Italian 
schools abroad. During the 1920s, they had to face great difficulties, such as the 
existence of established non-Fascist clubs and associations, anti-Fascist propaganda, 
and the assimilation of many Italian emigrants. After ten years in power, thanks in 
part to the favourable international reputation achieved by Mussolini’s government, 
the Fasci Abroad were able to begin the transformation of the Italian communities 
into ‘Little Fascist Italies’ and to re-model the Italians living abroad. The latter had to 
become conscious of the fatherland and of their role: to work for the fascistisation of 
their communities and to be ready to act if the fatherland needed them. Pre-existing 
Italian organisations melted into the Fasci and were now held to obey exclusively the 
orders of the New Rome. This goal was to be accomplished abroad by Italian 
diplomats and by the local Fasci, the first in relation to foreign governments, the 
second in relation to the local Italian communities.
2 Enzo Santarelli, ‘I fasci italiani all’estero (Note ed appunti)’, Studi urbinati di storia filosofia 
letteratura, XLV (1971), 1-2, 1323; Domenico Fabiano, ‘I fasci italiani all’estero’, in Bruno Bezza 
(ed ), Gli italiani fuori d'ltalia. Gli emigrati italiani nei movimenti operai dei paesi d'adozione, 
(Mian: Angeli, 1983), 235; Emilio Gentile, ‘La politica estera del partito fascista, Ideologia e 
organizzazione dei Fasci italiani all’estero (1920-1930)’, Storia Contemporanea, XXVI (1995), 6, 897- 
956; Luca de Caprariis, ‘Fascism for export? The Rise and Eclipse o f the Fasci Italiani all'Estero\ 
Journal o f  Contemporary History, XXXV, 2 (April 2000), 151-183; Nicola Labanca, ‘Politica e 
propaganda: emigrazione e fasci all’estero’, in Enzo Collotti, Fascismo e politica di potenza. Politica 
estera 1922-1939 (Milan: LaNuova Italia, 2000), pp. 137-172.
3 Luigi Bruti Liberati, II Canada, I'Italia e il fascismo (Rome: Bonacd, 1984); Mauro Cerutti, Fra 
Roma e Bema. La Svizzera italiana nel ventennio fascista (Milan: Angeli, 1986); Gianfranco Cresciani, 
Fascismo, cmtifascismo e gli italiani in Australia, 1922-1945 (Rome: Bonacci, 1979); Anna Maria 
Martellone, La ‘questione’ dell’immigrazione negli Stati Uniti (Bologna: H Mulino, 1980); Anne 
Morelli, Fascismo e cmtifascismo nell'emigrazione italiana in Belgio (Rome: Bonacci, 1987); Philip V. 
Cannistraro, Blackshirts in Little Italy: Italian Americans and Fascism, 1921-1929 (West Lafayette: 
Bordighera, 1999).
9The activities of the Italian Fasci Abroad had two principal aims: to ‘remake’ 
the Italians abroad and to expand Fascism in other countries. Until the end of the 
1920s, the principal ambition of the Fascist regime was to build a politically and 
spiritually united nation. Yet the idea of ‘nation’ was too narrow: ‘our purpose is not 
the nation, but the empire’, wrote Camillo Pellizzi, inspector of the Fasci in Britain 
and Ireland, in 1925.4 The concept of empire did not only refer to the question of 
achieving colonies, as it did during the liberal period and according to pre-1914 
nationalist doctrine. After 1930 in particular, the regime developed its ‘revolutionary’ 
belief also in the direction of a ‘universal’ vocation. As Emilio Gentile pointed out in 
a recent work, Italy intended to be the spiritual vanguard of European civilisation. 
The Italian Fasci Abroad were the most important means for the diffusion of this kind 
o f ‘spiritual’ imperial dream.5
From the early 1930s onward, the Fasci Abroad were able to begin the 
enterprise of indoctrinating the Italians abroad, and of transforming the ‘Little Italies’ 
into ‘Little Fascist Italies’. At the same time, the Fasci pursued a double target: 
propaganda among both Italians and foreigners. They attempted to convince the 
emigrants that the Fascio was the only representative of italianita abroad, and sought 
to create a new relationship between them and their fatherland. They presented the 
new Italy as a disciplined, classless nation that would eventually take the leadership 
of European countries under the flag of the corporativist state.
Sometimes, the theme of the ‘education’ of Italians seemed to be linked with 
the attempt to expand Fascism among the native population. This attempt to expand 
Fascism extended to Britain as well. L ’ltalia Nostra seized every opportunity to 
demonstrate that the British parliamentary system was decadent and that British 
politicians were becoming aware of this. The Italian government also established 
contacts with the British Union of Fascists. Yet the role of Count Dino Grandi, the 
Italian ambassador in London from 1932 to 1939, in relation to the expansion of 
Fascism in Britain is still unclear. As Paolo Nello wrote in his biography of Grandi, 
the latter did not seem to believe in the concept of universal fascism.6 Nevertheless,
4 Camillo Pellizzi, Fascismo-Aristocrazia (Milan: Alpes, 1925), p. 172.
5 Emilio Gentile, La grande Italia. Ascesa e declino del mito della nazione nel ventesimo secolo (Milan: 
Mondadori, 1997), p. 182.
6 Paolo Nello, Un fedele disubbidiente. Dino Grandi da palazzo Chigi al 25 luglio (Bologna: II Mulino, 
1933), p. 228.
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until 1935 he held that Mussolini should continue to finance Mosley’s movement, and 
developed personal and political relations with British fascists, although he did not 
appear to have held all of them in high esteem. During the first half of the 1930s, and 
in his letters to Mussolini in this period, Grandi also claimed repeatedly that Fascism 
was expanding its influence in Britain. It is likely that the main purpose behind these 
letters was to flatter Mussolini, and that they did not reflect a belief that Fascism 
would eventually come to power in Britain. Yet this hypothesis needs to be verified.
The thesis also investigates the issue of fascist solidarity during the 1930s, and 
concentrates on the effects of European fascism on Anglo-Italian relations. Since the 
early 1930s, the British Foreign Office appeared to be aware of Mussolini’s speeches 
on European fascism. In November 1933, after the celebration of the anniversary of 
the March on Rome, the British Ambassador to Rome, Eric Drummond, noticed that, 
according to Mussolini, the ‘revolution’ had evolved from a national to a world plan. 
It was evident that the Duce considered that his prophecy that in ten years’ time 
Europe ‘would either be Fascist or fascistised’, was becoming a reality. According to 
Drummond, Mussolini genuinely hoped that in the new era Fascist Italy would 
represent the example for the rest of the continent.7 The attempt to establish a new 
Fascist European order seemed to develop particularly during the years preceding the 
Second World War, but was evident from the beginning of the 1930s. The thesis 
analyses the contacts between Italian and British fascists in Britain as part of that 
attempt. The books published by the ‘Greater Britain Publications’ and the Home 
Office files at the Public Record Office confirm that, in the second half of the 1930s, 
Mosley’s movement drew closer to Nazi Germany than to its first patrons in Rome. 
During the Ethiopian War in particular, Grandi’s relationship with the BUF cooled, 
and the ambassador increasingly became interested in contacts with British 
Conservative Italophiles who supported Italy throughout the 1930s. The thesis 
therefore concentrates on the role of the BUF in seeking to create Anglo-Italian 
fascism in 1932-34, analyses the reasons for its failure, and focuses on the contacts 
between Fascism and the British Italophiles during the following years up to the 
outbreak of the Second World War, with due regard for the effects of international
7 ‘Celebration of anniversary of the March on Rome’, Drummond to Simon, 3 November 1933, PRO, 
FO 371/16800, C9749/163/22.
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events such as the Spanish Civil War and for internal shifts in Italian policy, such as 
the adoption of anti-Semitism.
This thesis also aims to contribute to the existing literature on Anglo-Italian 
relations by analysing the role of Fascism abroad within the context of Italy’s foreign 
policy. A recent work on Anglo-Italian foreign relations during the Fascist period, by 
Richard Lamb, expresses the opinion that Mussolini was strongly pro-British until the 
Ethiopian war, and that he both feared and disliked Hitler.8 Lamb has also insisted 
that the attitude of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, toward Ethiopia and 
the Spanish Civil War threw Mussolini into Hitler’s arms, and that if British 
recognition of Italy’s annexation had been granted, the alliance between Italy and 
Germany would never have happened. An earlier book by Rosaria Quartararo 
advanced a similar interpretation. Quartararo was convinced that Italian foreign 
policy changed after the first half of the 1930s, from a pro-British line to an 
ambiguous position between Britain and Germany which eventually, after any 
possibility of agreement with Britain had allegedly ended, became a pro-German 
stance. Nazi Germany was merely an instrument, a threat, designed to convince 
Britain to accept Italian policy in the Mediterranean; until 1940 Britain remained 
Italy’s ‘only constant point of reference’.9 According to Renzo De Felice, Mussolini’s 
only firm principle was the necessity of imperialism and of war as a means of 
measuring the value of a country - yet Mussolini was never sure about on which side 
Italy should fight in case of war.10
A different line of interpretation of Italy’s foreign policy underlines the view 
that Fascism’s revisionist foreign policy aims could never have been realised through 
an alliance with France and Britain, and therefore the ‘Pact of Steel’ with National 
Socialist Germany in May 1939 was logical and not merely accidental.11 Mussolini
8 Richard Lamb, Mussolini and the British (London: Murray, 1997), p. 96. Lamb’s use of Italian 
sources is extremely sketchy, he is remarkably selective in his use even of documents available in 
English, and his argument is not supported by evidence.
9 Rosaria Quartararo, Roma tra Lortdra e Berlino. La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome: 
Bonacci, 1980), p. 35. As Enzo Collotti has pointed out, Quartararo’s attempts to demonstrate that 
Fascist Italy was a victim of external pressures simply ignore the regime’s grandiose war aims and are 
neither logically nor empirically persuasive. See Collotti, Fascismo epolitica dipotenza, p. 338; p. 475.
10 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936 (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), p. 
340; see in particular the chapters ‘Alla ricerca di una politica estera fascista’ and ‘Mussolini e 
l’Europa’.
11 Collotti, Fascismo e politica di potenza-, Lutz Klinkhammer - Enzo Collotti, II fascismo e I'Italia in 
guerra. Una conversazione fra storia e storiografia (Rome: Ediesse, 1996); Denis Mack Smith,
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knew that an alliance with Germany was not simply a means of putting pressure on 
the British. Germany was clearly preparing for war and Italy intended to participate in 
the conflict; its ultimate target in a new war could only be Britain and France, 
responsible since 1919 of Italy’s ‘mutilated victory’, and especially their domination 
of the Mediterranean.12 Collotti and Klinkhammer in particular have pointed out a 
major weakness in the ‘revisionist’ interpretation supported by the De Felice school, 
the perception of foreign policy as somehow separate from the cultural and 
propagandistic features of the regime. Indeed, a common aspect of both German and 
Italian regimes was the importance of military education and the inculcation of the 
‘fascist spirit’ at all levels of the society, from school to sport to work organisations. 
Both regimes considered war as not merely part of politics, but as the basic element 
of life. This thesis hopes to provide new perspectives on the nature of Fascism, by 
linking the cultural and political history of Italian Fascism in Britain, and by analysing 
the role of the Fasci Abroad within the framework of Italian foreign policy. 
Mussolini’s declaration in 1933 that Fascism could be exported abroad, together with 
the more general expansion of European fascism, transformed the Fasci into a 
fundamental instrument in the attempt to create a fascist international. It seems likely 
that the Fasci Abroad have not been studied carefully in part because the subject of 
universal fascism has not been taken seriously; only a philo-Fascist, Renzo Santinon, 
has published a book on the subject.13 One of the very few studies on universal 
fascism, by Michael Ledeen, does not deal with Fasci Abroad. He took the activities 
of the CAUR (Action Committees for the Universality of Rome) and Asvero Gravelli 
as his main subjects, and mentioned the Fasci as merely one of the means of Italian 
expansion abroad.14 Institutions like the CAUR and newspapers like Giuseppe
Mussolini’s Roman Empire (New York: Penguin, 1977); MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 
1939-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Common Destiny: Dictatorship, 
Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000); H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918-1940 (Westport: 
Praeger, 1997).
12 Knox, Fascism: Ideology, Foreign Policy, and War, in Adrian Lyttelton (ed), Liberal and Fascist 
Italy, 1900-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 110.
13 Renzo Santinon, I  fasci italiani a ll’estero (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1991) is an apologia for Fascism 
abroad without historiographical value.
14 Michael Arthur Ledeen, Universal fascism: The Theory and Practice o f the Fascist International, 
1928-1936 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972). See also Davide Sabatini, L 'intemazionale di Mussolini. 
La diffusione del fascismo in Europa nelprogetto politico di Asvero Gravelli (Grottaferrata: Tuscuhim, 
1997).
13
Bottai’s La Critica or Berto Ricci’s L ’Universale certainly had an influence on the 
young intellectuals who believed in ‘universal’ fascism. Nevertheless, the activity of 
the Fasci Abroad, which maintained a direct relationship with the Partito Nazionale 
Fascista in the 1920s and were an integral part of Fascist foreign policy in the 1930s, 
has been almost entirely ignored, and the relationships between fascist movements 
have not as yet been adequately explored.
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Chapter 1 
The ‘Education of the Italians’ in Britain, 1932-1934
The ten million Italians dispersed around the world are no longer a detached appendix 
o f  the fatherland, but the fatherland itself, which through them expands in the world the 
elements o f  its power and glory.1
This chapter concentrates on the means employed by the Italian Fasci Abroad 
in the ‘fascistisation’ of Italian emigrants, and on the question of the ‘defence’ of 
Italian language and culture in Britain. It focuses on the period between the beginning 
of Dino Grandi’s appointment as ambassador to London and the year preceding the 
Ethiopian war.
The attempt to establish contacts between Italy and its emigrants was not a 
Fascist invention. During the liberal period some institutions sought to safeguard 
patriotic feelings among Italians communities abroad. The Dante Alighieri Society 
was the most thorough, and its activity did not end with the Fascist regime. On the 
particular question of Italian schools abroad, it was necessary for the Fasci Abroad to 
establish a relationship with the two institutions already involved in these matters: the 
Dante Alighieri Society and the Catholic Church. A comparison with the activities 
abroad of liberal Italy can help in understanding the institution of Fasci Abroad as an 
example of the peculiarity of Fascist foreign policy.
The main purpose of the London Fascio was to appear to the Italian 
community as the defender of Italian traditions, and to transform this community into 
a little Fascist Italy. This chapter takes Italian schools and summer camps for children 
as typical institutions for the ‘education of Italians’. In particular, it concentrates on 
the propaganda disseminated by the Fascist newspaper in Britain, and analyses the 
attempt of the Fascio to create the images of a ‘new Italy’ and a ‘new Italian’. The
1 Guida generate degli italiani a Londra (London: Edward Ercoli & Son, 1933), p. 58. Unless 
otherwise stated, translations from the Italian are my own.
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chapter does not deal extensively with the results, but largely with the means of 
Fascist propaganda.
The Fasci Italiani all’Estero and the London Fascio
Differences between liberal and Fascist foreign policies did not arise from 
major contrast in the character of their colonial imperialisms; the Fascist regime 
aimed at similar targets as the liberal state. Mussolini’s ambitions in the Balkans and 
Africa were not particularly Fascist; the Prime Ministers Francesco Crispi (1887- 
1891, and 1893-1896) and Sidney Sonnino (1906, and 1909-1910) had followed 
similar aims.2 Historians generally agree that Italian imperialism began with Crispi, 
and persisted with King Vittorio Emanuele ID and the Foreign Secretary Antonino Di 
San Giuliano, who encouraged the Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti to declare war on 
Turkey in 1911. Moreover, Italian interest in Tripoli dated back almost as far as the 
period of unification.3 Federico Chabod described Crispi as the first opponent, since 
unification, of a peaceful and moderate Italian foreign policy. Yet he underlined the 
fact that Crispi’s imperialism could not be compared with twentieth century 
nationalist or Fascist types. Because of his concern for the greatness of Italy, Crispi 
was a Fascist ‘precursor’, but still he remained a ‘son of the French Revolution’; 
Britain was his chief model, and he had no nationalist ‘doctrine’.4 Mussolini’s politics 
were however formed above all in the Great War. The Fasci di Combattimento were 
created in order to defend Italy’s victory in the Great War and to counter Italian 
socialists and the Allies who had ‘mutilated’ Italy’s victory. They claimed that 
Fascism would build a new nation; Mussolini’s newspaper II Popoio d'ltalia insisted 
on the myth of empire as early as 1920.5
2Rosaria Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlirto. La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome: 
Bonacci, 1980), p. 31; H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918-1940 
(Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. xii.
3Christopher Seton-Watson, British Perceptions o f the Italo-Turkish War 1911-1912, in Enrico Serra- 
Cristopher Seton-Watson, Italia e Inghilterra nelTeta dell’imperialismo (Milan: Angeli, 1990), pp. 
111-145; Enrico Serra, Idiplomatici italiani, la guerra di Libia e Vimperialismo, ibid.., pp. 146-164. 
Federico Chabod, Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896, vol. II (Bari: Laterza, 19653),
p. 600.
5See Giorgio Rumi, A lie origini della politica esterafascista (1918-1923) (Bari. Laterza, 1968).
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The myth of rebirth of Italy meant that once it had seized power, Fascism 
would seek to ‘remake’ the Italians, both within and outside Italy. Unlike the liberal 
state, Fascism succeeded -  at least for some years - in the mobilisation of the Italian 
people and in the popularisation of imperialism, and developed a strong linkage 
between domestic and foreign policy. In an essay on the peculiarities of Fascist 
foreign policy, Enzo Collotti has emphasised the importance of the project for the 
‘fascistisation’ of Europe during the 1930s, and has suggested that the principal 
ingredient of Mussolini’s foreign policy was the relationship between propaganda, 
diplomacy and politics.6
For its use of patriotic propaganda abroad, the Dante Alighieri Society may be 
considered a liberal precursor of the Italian Fasci Abroad. The Society was set up in 
Rome in 1889 in order to ‘sponsor’ Italian language and culture in the terre irredente, 
the lands occupied by Austria. As Richard Bosworth has suggested, their purpose was 
not only cultural, but also political and strongly anti-Austrian.7 The Society did not 
limit its irredentism to the Trentino and Trieste, but aimed to extend it to every part of 
the world where Italian emigrants lived. The speeches of Pasquale Villari, president 
of the Society from 1896 to 1903, were significant for their accent on ‘cultural 
imperialism’. In his opinion, any land where Italians lived had to be considered 
irredenta, at least culturally if not politically.8 From this point of view emigration, 
usually regarded as a negative event because of the loss of vital energies to the 
fatherland, now acquired a positive aspect as a ‘pacific’ form of expansionism, an 
‘imperialism with clean hands’.9 In particular, the Society was interested in the 
expansion of italianita in the Adriatic (especially in Albania), and in the 
Mediterranean; in 1908 it founded branches in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. Italian 
Nationalists promoted similar aims during the years preceding the Great War. One of
6Enzo Collotti, II fascismo nella storiografia. La dimensione europea, in Angelo Del Boca-Massimo 
Legnani-Mario G. Rossi (eds.), II regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995), pp. 
17-44.
7Richard J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least o f the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First 
World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 49.
8See Pasquale Villari, Scritti e discorsi per la Dante (Rome: Societa Dante Alighieri, 1933); curator of 
the book was Felice Felicioni, former ras of Perugia and one of the pricipal champions of the transition 
of the Dante to Fascism. See also Patrizia Salvetti, Immagine nezionale ed emigrazione nella Societa 
‘Dante Alighieri ’ (Rome: Bonacci, 1995), p. 82. On the idea of ‘cultural imperialism’, see the beautiful 
pages by Lucien Febvre on the Roman colonisation of the Rhine (II Reno, Rome: Donzelli, 1998).
9
Beatrice Pisa, Nazione e politica nella Societa ‘Dante Alighieri' (Rome: Bonacci, 1995), p. 286.
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them was Luigi Villari, Pasquale’s son and a future Fascist propagandist in London, 
who argued in 1910 that, although the best outlet for emigration would be colonies, in 
the meantime the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana had to defend the Italian 
language abroad and support Italy’s national prestige among the emigrant 
communities.10 Salvemini’s difficulty, toward the end of the 1920s, in having to argue 
against the son of his highly esteemed professor (he could not even write Luigi’s 
surname without seeing Pasquale’s image praying him to keep silent) showed not only 
how the Fascists exploited Pasquale Villari, but also how italianita was stifled and 
absorbed into the Fascist conception of Italy’s power.11
The activity of the Fasci Abroad was organised along the same lines as the 
Dante Alighieri Society. Yet while the latter saw the Italian abroad principally as an 
emigrant, the Fasci supported a radically different conception. Until Fascism came to 
power, the emigrant was assisted according to his status and needs: the Dante 
Alighieri Society took care of the illiterate, the various Mutuo Soccorso organisations 
assisted the poor, and the religious could find help at the Italica Gens, at the 
Bonomelli, and at the Opera di Don Guanella. As Comelio Di Marzio, general 
secretary of the Fasci Abroad from December 1926 to January 1928, observed, ‘every 
illness had its cure: every poison its antidote’. Here Fascism made the real difference: 
‘no one was ever interested in the healthy, normal, independent citizen’, who, 
however, had ‘to be re-made’. Under Fascism italianita was no longer to be a cure for 
the emigrant’s ailments, but an authentic anthropological revolution.12
Unlike the Dante Alighieri Society and the Nationalists, the Fasci soon 
became an integral part of Italian foreign policy. The first Fasci Abroad appeared in 
1921, and the Grand Council of Fascism officially recognised their existence in 
February 1923. In 1934, a propaganda pamphlet introduced by the General Secretary
10On the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, see F. Gaeta, Nazionalismo italicmo (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 
1981, first ed. 1965); Francesco Perfetti, II movimento nazionalista in Italia (1903-1914) (Rome: 
Bonacci, 1984). The idea that colonies were the solution to the problem of emigration was not 
supported only by the nationalist right, but also by Pascoli and Corradini.
Gaetano Salvemini, Memorie di un fuoruscito, in Scritti vari (1900-1957), edited by G. Agosti e A. 
Galante Garrone, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1978, p. 623.
12 Comelio Di Marzio, Fascisti a tt’estero, in Giuseppe Luigi Pomba (ed), La civilta fascista illustrata 
nella dottrina e nelle opere (Turin: Utet, 1928), p. 646. On the Fascist idea of anthropological 
revolution, see Silvio Lanaro, Patria. Circumnavigazione di un’idea controversa (Venice: Marsilio, 
1996), p. 52; Emilio Gentile, La grande Italia. Ascesa e declino del mito della nazione nel ventesimo 
secolo (Milan: Mondadori, 1997), p. 173.
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of the Fasci Abroad, Piero Parini, reported that there existed 460 Fasci, 269 Sezioni 
Fasciste, 220 Fasci Femminili and 74 Case d'Italia throughout the world with a total 
membership of 173,630.13
In 1925, Camillo Pellizzi, delegate to the Fasci of Great Britain and Ireland 
from 1922 to 1925, wrote that the activity of the Fasci was mainly directed toward 
the ‘fascistisation’ of the Italians abroad, rather than toward convincing foreign 
countries to adopt Fascism themselves. The purpose was to ‘discipline’ the Italians 
and to encourage them to join the ‘great Fascist enterprise of the national 
Risorgimento’. In their dealings with foreigners, the Fasci Abroad claimed that they 
limited themselves to negative actions: to correct false interpretations of events in 
Italy and to promulgate understanding of Italian problems and virtues.14 The 
documents held in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome nevertheless 
demonstrate that Fasci Abroad activity was not really restricted to purely defensive 
campaigns. In 1924 Giuseppe Bastianini (a former squadrista from Perugia, secretary 
of Fasci Abroad between 1923 and 1926 and ambassador to London from 1939) 
addressed a memorandum to the representatives in France and Britain. He insisted 
that Fascists abroad had to create social links with local citizens, especially 
journalists, politicians, industrialists, and intellectuals in order to convince them that 
Fascist ‘style and thought’ was the one that could better fit their aspirations.15
Social and public diplomacy of this kind was exactly what Luigi Villari tried 
to conduct in London between 1926 and 1934. This was quite evident from the 
memorandum he wrote to Mussolini at the end of his term of office. During the 
summer of 1925 the Regio Commissariato dell’Emigrazione had sent him to London, 
where he discovered the existence of a ‘poisonous’ anti-Fascist campaign carried on 
both by Italian and British anti-Fascists. He reported the situation to Mussolini, who 
decided that Villari should relocate to London and counterattack. Villari was to take 
orders directly and only from the Duce, not from the embassy or from the Fascio. As 
Villari described it to Mussolini, his propaganda technique involved letters and
13Murray to Simon, 25 November 1934, PRO, FO 371/18439, R6643/5270/22: ‘Fascist organisation 
among Italians living abroad’.
14Camillo Pellizzi, Fascismo-Aristocrazta (Milan: Alpes, 1925), p. 148.
15 ‘Segreteria Generale dei Fasci italiani all’estero - A tutte le delegazioni dell’Europa centrale con 
particolare riferimento alle delegazioni di Francia e Inghilterra’, 3 June 1924, ACS, SPD, Cart. Ris., b. 
37, f. 242/R: ‘Bastianini Giuseppe’.
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articles in British newspapers, the publication of books, and a well-developed social 
‘diplomatic’ net among the various British clubs.16
The London Fascio had been the first founded outside Italy, in 1921.17 The 
conservative and patriotic newspaper of the community, La Cronaca, founded in June 
1920 by a group of ex-officers (Unione Reduci Militari Italiani), changed its name in 
July 1922 to L ’Eco d ’ltalia, and was bought by the Fascio in August 1926. Some 
conservative and non-Fascist Italians started the publication of L ’Italiano, but that 
paper expired in December 1928. A new weekly fascist newspaper, L ’ltalia Nostra, 
took the place of L ’Eco d ’ltalia in September 1928 and was published until June 
1940; the secretary of the London Fascio was also the director of this newspaper. 
Apart from the communist II Comento, L ’ltalia Nostra remained the only other 
newspaper of the Italian community during the 1930s. News and comment on Italy 
and London normally occupied pages one to four; the fifth reported news from ‘Little 
Italies’ in other British provinces. A sixth page usually contained reviews of Italian 
books and stories about aviation (in which the Fascio informed the community about 
great Italian achievements in the air), and a seventh page, called ‘La Voce d’ltalia’, 
listed Italian radio programmes. The final page was reserved for advertisements, both 
for those looking for work and for Italian products and restaurants.
The development of Fasci in Britain owed much to the former Foreign 
Secretary, Dino Grandi, who became ambassador to Britain in July 1932. His 
presence in London was significant for the establishment of a new, closer relation 
between the Fascist authorities and the Italian community. The previous Italian 
Ambassador to London, Antonio Chiaramonte Bordonaro, had begun his diplomatic 
career during the liberal period, and had been close to the liberal Prime Minister of 
1919-20, Francesco Saverio Nitti. But when Fascism came to power he decided to 
remain in service and was rewarded in 1926 with the appointment as general secretary 
of the ministry, in succession to Mussolini’s would-be diplomatic mentor, Salvatore 
Contarini. In 1927 Mussolini decided that Grandi, at that time Foreign Affairs under­
secretary, should have a free hand in the ‘fascistisation’ of the diplomatic corps, and
16‘Missione di Luigi Villari a Londra 1926-1934’ (no date), ACS, MinCulPop, NuPIE, b. 37, f. 193: 
Villari Luigi.
17For general information on the activity of the London Fascio during the 1920s, see Roberta Suzzi 
Valli, CD fascio italiano a Londra. L’attivita politica di Camillo Pellizzi’, Storia Contemporanea, XXVI 
(1995), 6, pp. 957-1001.
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sent Chiaramonte Bordonaro to London.18 When the latter died, in June 1932, Grandi 
immediately took his place as ‘London exile’, after Mussolini’s press campaign to 
support Hitler during the German elections had nullified Grandi’s efforts to negotiate 
with Laval.19 The growth of Nazism in Germany, the need to act outside the League 
of Nations and to fascistise foreign policy led to the shift of 1932 and to Grandi’s 
dismissal. While for Grandi Fascism remained an exclusively Italian phenomenon,20 
Mussolini wanted to satisfy the requests of the leaders of the PNF, requests which the 
Duce began to see as priorities, from the education of young generations to the 
indications coming from universal Fascist militants.21 At the same time, Grandi’s 
appointment to Britain imposed a radical fascistisation on the London embassy, 
considering not only Chiaramonte Bordonaro’s liberal past, but also the latter’s nature 
as a bureaucrat-diplomat rather than a Party militant-diplomat. That the general 
direction was toward radicalisation, not only within the foreign ministry but also 
among the Fasci Abroad, was evident in the case of the London Fascio. Shortly 
before Grandi’s arrival, when the Fascio needed a new secretary, Chiaramonte 
Bordonaro suggested to Parini that Tullio Sambucetti could be the new secretary. 
Sambucetti was one of the community notables; he contributed to cultural features in 
L 'Italia Nostra, was founder and secretary of the organisation Friends o f Italy and 
organiser of many conferences and trips to Italy. Chiaramonte Bordonaro also 
reminded Parini that Sambucetti, a resident in London since 1901 and a Fascist since 
1922, had been secretary of the Camera di Commercio and was presently the director 
of Italian Studies at the London Polytechnic. But in the year of the Fascist regime’s 
decennale, these qualities were no longer enough. Parini, who had met Sambucetti 
during several visits to London, considered him too old at 58, ‘a nice man’, but ‘a bit 
boring, old-fashioned, the typical language teacher for educated ladies’. His ‘Fascist,
18Fabio Grassi Orsini, La diplomazia, in Del Boca-Legnani- Rossi (eds.), II regime fascista, pp. 278. 
According to Bosworth, Least o f the Great Powers, p. 109, Chiaramonte Bordonaro was a victim of
Mussolini’s desire to ‘fascistise’ the diplomatic service.
19MacGregor Knox, II fascismo e la politica estera italiana, in Richard J. B. Bosworth and Sergio 
Romano, La politica estera italiana (1860-1985) (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991), p. 314. On Grandi’s 
dismissal, see also Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli armi del consenso 1929-1936 (Turin:
Einaudi, 1974), pp. 393-418.
20De Felice, ibid., p. 377; H. James Burgwyn, ‘Grandi e il mondo teutonico: 1929-1932’, Storia 
Contemporanea, XDC (1988), 2, p. 209; Paolo Nello, Un fedele disubbidiente. Dino Grandi da Palazzo
Chigi al 25 luglio (Bologna: II Mulino, 1993), p. 228.
21 De Felice, Mussolini il duce, p. 408.
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therefore modem, sensitiveness’, was ‘rather poor’ 22 Parini thus decided to entrust 
the younger and more intransigent Carlo Camagna with the secretaryship of the 
Fascio in June 1932.
Terri Colpi has suggested that, unlike his predecessor, Grandi regularly mixed 
with the Italian population in London, and that his mission seemed to deliberately 
address the issue of how ‘to turn the British Italian community into a showpiece of 
fascist ‘corporatist’ theory’.23 A careful examination of Grandi’s papers at the 
Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome and of L 'Italia Nostra confirms this last 
statement. In a programmatic letter to Mussolini of 20 August 1932, Grandi told the 
Duce that his intention was to appear as a ‘father’ to the Italian community. He 
described the situation he found in London. In particular, he emphasised the absence 
of an organisation among Italian cooks and waiters, although they numbered many 
thousands and were spread almost everywhere throughout the city. He also promised 
to improve the situation of the Italian hospital, which appeared to have been deserted 
even by Italians because of its poor condition. He also underlined the importance of 
showing Italian movies in London cinemas 24 At the beginning of August, he started 
his London mission with ‘a noble act of cameratismo fascista\ showing up at 
Victoria station, where 200 Italian children from all over the country were gathered 
for the departure of a train to summer camps in Italy. Grandi stressed that his first 
thoughts after his arrival in Britain were devoted to the Italian community there; he 
arrived at Victoria station with 200 bags of sweets, ‘patriotically adorned, each with a 
tricolour flag’.25 In September 1932, the month after Grandi’s arrival in London, the 
London Fascio moved from its previous seat to the Club Cooperativo, where, since 
1909, many of the institutions of the community had been located. With this 
manoeuvre, the Fascio intended to give ‘the first example of the brotherly 
collaboration that, more than anything else, was necessary to the Italian community in
22 Chiaramonte Bordonaro to Parini, 29 Apnl 1932; Parini to Chiaramonte Bordonaro, 9 May 1932, 
ASMAE, AL, b. 775, f. 2, sf. ‘PNF Londra’.
23Terri Colpi, The Italian Factor: The Italian community in Great Britain (Edinburgh: Main Stream, 
1991), p. 90.
24Grandi to Mussolini, 20 August 1932, ACS, Cart. Pers., Archivi privati, Carte Grandi, Fondo E. 
Susmel, b. 9, f. 1.
25‘S. E. 1’ Ambasciatore Dino Grandi inizia la sua missione londinese con un nobile gesto di cameratismo 
fascista - Entusiastiche dimostrazioni d’affetto e di devozione alia stazione di Victoria’, L ’Italia Nostra, 
5 August 1932, n. 186, p. 1.
22
London’.26 Grandi’s intention was to bring together the dispersed forces of the 
community in order to control them and serve as their patron. Indeed, the directorate 
for Italian schools and the most influential community institutions had their seat at the 
Club Cooperativo.27
The Italian Language and Schools in London: 
the Fascio, the Dante Alighieri Society, and the Church
The Fasci Abroad made great efforts and spent huge sums of money on the 
organisation of Italian schools abroad, which were considered the most important 
institutions for the defence of cultural traditions. Parini traced the origins of the 
schools back to the age of Crispi:
the Italian schools abroad, which number today more than 300,000 pupils in 
almost 2,000 schools, may proudly look at the day when a statesman, who had 
been the thoughtful and passionate forerunner o f  a virile Italy, Francesco Crispi, 
created the first and scanty group o f  schools outside the frontiers.28
The stress on tradition was addressed in the first instance to second generation 
emigrants bom in England and more likely to assimilate. Those emigrants were likely 
to care less about sending their children to Italian schools. According to the London 
Fascio, it was an obligation for all Italian families to send their children to Italian 
schools, unless parents wanted them to forget their own language and traditions and 
therefore make them Teel foreigners twice over’, in both Britain and Italy.29
Education of children in Italian schools was in some respects openly Fascist. 
Elena Salvoni remembered that
in the late twenties there was a strong movement towards health and fitness so 
every morning we were out in the grounds doing exercise, all in unison, jumping 
up and down and waving our arms about. At the end o f  each session we had to
26Guida generate, pp. 98-99.
27Among them: Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (veterans association), Associazione Nazionale 
Alpini, Loggia Italia (Freemasonry), Associazione Culinaria (cooking society), Mutuo Soccorso
(workers association), Associazione dei Parrucchieri (hairdressers society), Italian Sporting Club.
28 Piero Parini, ‘La cultura italiana e gli italiani all’estero’, II Legionario, 29 April 1933, n. 17, p. 3.
29‘La riapertura delle scuole italiane’, L 'Italia Nostra, 23 September 1932, n. 192, p. 5.
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march past the doctor and his wife with our right arms raised and fists clenched; 
we did as we were told and had no idea that this was the Fascist salute which was 
to have such sinister significance later in our lives.... For weeks one particular 
year we were drilled for a parade before Mussolini’s daughter.30
The principal subjects taught in the first year of the primary schools were 
conversation, Italian language, recitation, moral education, singing, craftwork, 
drawing, and hygiene. Conversation included discussions about the children’s 
families, their own role in the family, their ancestors, and the cult of dead people in 
their family. The language classes began with simple concepts of grammar. Recitation 
and singing normally focused on learning short poems and songs of a patriotic or 
Fascist nature (for example I  bimbi d ’ltalia si chiaman Balilla). Moral education 
varied from the teaching of religious values to education in the instinct for property 
(the idea of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’), and to various notions such as respect for others and 
parental love. The subjects remained the same in the second year, but fascistisation 
increased. If hygiene lessons were very general in the first year (such as ‘the clean 
child’), they concentrated in the second year on Fascist efforts to improve the Italian 
people’s hygiene (such as summer camps in Italy and in Britain, the Duce’s care of 
public health). Language classes introduced dictation of texts such as ‘Duce, you are 
the Light of Italy’. To some texts, such as ‘I love and respect the Duce’, children were 
asked to make comments and reflections. While first year drawing and craftwork 
lessons required the children to draw or construct images of children, in the second 
year they switched to images of Roman lictors.31 New subjects appeared in the third 
and fourth years, namely history and geography, which were to become more and 
more important throughout the 1930s, especially after the conquest of Ethiopia. While 
after 1935 the teaching of history and geography increasingly focused on Italy’s role 
in the world, between 1932 and 1934 it concentrated mainly on the Italian peninsula 
itself, although with constant references to ancient Rome.
In order to maintain a high level of italianita in the schools, it was 
fundamental that directors and teachers should be Fascist. Every year, on 1
30Elena Salvoni, Elena: A life in Soho (London: Quartet Books, 1990), pp. 32-33. Salvoni
misrepresented the Fascist ‘Roman salute’ by describing instead the communist ‘clenched fist’. Edda
Mussolini Ciano visited Italian schools in London in June 1934.
31Programmes o f the Italian schools in London for the school year 1932-1933, first and second classes, 
ASMAE, AS (1929-35), m/3, b. 814.
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September, Piero Parini met the directors of Italian schools abroad, in order ‘to give 
them the appropriate instructions for the coming school year’. Whenever possible,
<3 <3
Panm organised an appointment for them with the Duce as well. According to a 
British inquiry of 1934, the Italian foreign ministry dealt directly with the 
employment of teachers for Italian schools abroad; this made it clear that the 
intention was propagandistic rather than merely educational. In 1934, the Dominion 
Office observed that the Italian foreign ministry modus operandi was to ‘engage 
teachers sound in the Fascisti faith to proceed to various countries and there organise 
schools for the teaching of the Italian language and Italian culture. These teachers are 
in no sense employed in consular work but in teaching and possibly in propaganda 
work’. The Italian foreign ministry paid their salaries.34 According to the British, 
these teachers were under the orders of the Italian Fasci Abroad, and ‘a special 
appropriation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget’ existed under the heading 
‘Foreign Schools’. The British regarded this method of furthering and maintaining
^  c
Italian culture among Italian colonies abroad as a peculiarly Fascist conception.
In the organisation of schools, the Dante Alighieri Society and the Catholic 
Church assisted the activity of the Fasci. Before 1922, Italian schools abroad were 
under the jurisdiction of these two institutions. A professor of Italian Literature at 
University College, Count Antonio Cippico, had founded the London section of the 
Dante Alighieri Society in 1912. Camillo Pellizzi had been interested in the 
‘fascistisation’ of the Society since 1922. In his opinion, Fascists had to become 
members of the Society in order to form the majority and to preside over its assembly. 
But things turned out to be more complicated. Due to ‘conflicts’, the Society ceased 
its activity until 1932, when Pellizzi finally became its president.36 Although there 
were sometimes problems and conflicts over jurisdiction between the Fasci Abroad 
and the Dante Alighieri Society, the latter now claimed in its statute that its aim was
33Piero Parini to Alessandro Chiavolini, 19 August 1932, ACS, SPD, Cart Ord., b. 13, f. G.3: ‘Fasci 
Italiani all’Estero 1925-1941’.
34Dixon (Dominion Office) to Batterbee (Downing Street), 14 September 1934, PRO, FO 371/18439, 
R5270/5270/22: ‘Contact between Italy and her emigrants’.
35Chancery to Southern Department, 26 October 1934, PRO, FO 371/18439, R6000/5270/22: 
‘Activities in the United Kingdom of Italiani all’Estero section of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.
36‘I1 camerata C. Pellizzi presidente del comitato di Londra della Dante Alighieri’, L 'Italia Nostra, 7 July 
1932, n. 182, p. 4. See also Guida generate, p. 86. By 1932, Italian schools were located in 
Clerkenwell, Oxford Street, Southwark, King’s Cross, Hackney, Marylebone and Stratford (ibid., p. 
89).
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‘safeguarding and spreading the Italian language and culture outside the kingdom and 
maintaining everywhere a high feeling of italianita according to the spirit of the 
Fascist Revolution’. Some of the highest authorities of the regime were part of the 
National Council of the Society - representatives of the National Executive of the 
Partito Nazionale Fascista, of the Ministries of Press and Propaganda and National 
Education, of the National Institute of Fascist Culture, of the Opera Nazionale 
Balilla, of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro and of the Institute LUCE.37 In 1932, at a 
national congress in Rome, Piero Parini applauded the Society for joining the Fasci 
Abroad and re-affirming italianita in the world, and for ‘preparing new and major 
conquests’. The members of the Society appeared to be quite xenophobic in their 
speeches. On that occasion, a member of the Dante, Professor Giulio Quirino Giglioli 
talked about lands that were currently part of other states, but were geographically 
nevertheless Italian; he inveighed against the ‘mania’ of using foreign words in Italy, 
and advocated a law that would finally forbid them.38 By the early 1930s, the Dante 
Alighieri Society appeared completely fascistised, and served thereafter as an 
instrument in the hands of the Fasci Abroad.
In the attempt to persuade Italian families in London to send their children to 
Italian schools, the Fascio could rely on Catholic support as well. Despite the 
occasional friction that characterised Church-State relations within Italy, there 
seemed to be no antagonism between the Fascio and the Catholic Churches in 
London. Funerals, weddings and baptisms amalgamated Catholic tradition with the 
new Fascist choreography. During the first half of the 1930s, the most relevant 
example was the funeral of Chiaramonte Bordonaro, which was celebrated with a 
Catholic-Fascist ritual. But this tendency was also evident in ceremonies for more 
humble Italians. For instance, in 1934, the clerico-Fascist priest Henry Hughes 
celebrated a mass for the death of a young avanguardista. During the mass, a piccola 
italiana made a short speech, and the capogruppo, according to the Fascist ritual,
37Renzo Santinon, I fasci italiani alVestero (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1991), pp. 253-54.
38‘La difesa dell’italianita oltre confine nei voti del congresso della Dante’, L ’Italia Nostra, 7 October 
1932, n. 194, p. 1.
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called the name of the dead. The young Fascists answered: ‘Presenter raising their 
arms in the Roman salute.39
The Fascio organised non-Catholic feast days such as the Befana Fascista and 
the Natale di Roma in order to gain popularity within the community and in order to 
add something new and peculiar of its own to the existing religious ones. Yet at the 
same time, it joined in with Catholic ceremonies and eventually tried to patronise 
them. All in all, affirmed Henry Hughes from the pages of L ’Italia Nostra, Fascism 
had ‘saved’ the Vatican as a result of the Lateran Pacts. The newspaper documents 
the endeavour of the Fascio to assert its authority over the Church’s activities, 
although the stress on loyalty to the Catholic religion seemed to be fundamental for 
Fascism abroad. Indeed it was intended as a way of preserving italianita. Mussolini 
knew that the Catholic emigrant always felt himself to be Italian: ‘the Catholic who 
says his prayers in Italian and believes in the Roman God cannot be dissuaded, and 
remains with us’.40
Henry Hughes was the typical clerico-Fascist, whose ultimate purpose was to 
keep alive in the Italian community in London both the Catholic religion and patriotic 
feeling. He wrote articles and even the occasional moral tale in the Fascio newspaper. 
He told stories about unknown heroes of the Great War who went, along a profound 
and tormented spiritual path (at one and the same time political, literary, and 
religious), from Freemasonry and Internationalism to Catholicism and Nationalism. 
The conclusion (and the purpose) of his tales was a very practical one: how could the 
Italian community preserve the greatest achievement of Fascism, ‘the spiritual and 
religious unity of the Italian people’? Was this possible by sending children to 
Protestant schools, where they would acquire a mentality that was not Italian? ‘No! 
To maintain the Italian community of London strong, respected, admired, we must 
stay all together... and together also spiritually’.41
39‘Fervida giovinezza italiana - H commosso tributo degli italiani di Londra ai fimerali dell’avanguardista 
Michele Ceresa -  l’intervento delle autorita. II solenne corteo attraverso le vie del Soho. H rito fascista. 
Le corone’, L ’Italia Nostra, 2 March 1934, n. 265, p. 1.
^O. Pedrazzi, ‘Un emigrante’, L 'Italia e il mondo, November 1926, p. 6, quoted in Gianfausto Rosoli, 
‘Santa Sede e propaganda fascista all’estero tra i figli degli emigrati italiani’, Storia Contemporanea, 
1986, 17(2), p. 315.
4lHenry Hughes, ‘Chiesa e Patria’, L'ltalia Nostra, 3 February 1933, n. 209, p. 3. See also ‘Per le 
nostre scuole - Cattolicismo e italianita’, ibid., 17 February 1933, n. 212, p. 3.
27
In this crusade against the Protestant school, even the spectre of Moscow 
could be exploited. Britain was said to be at a turning point: Rome or Moscow? 
Fascism or Communism? Catholicism or Protestantism (which would eventually lead 
to atheism)? ‘And the Italians in London... on which side are they? There is no reason 
to ask! None the less, do not forget that Italian children will be men in 25 years’ time. 
And if we go on sending them to Protestant schools, later on... will they be on the side 
of Rome, or of Moscow?’.42
The 'NewItaly’
The existence of two Italies, one in the fatherland and one spread out all over 
the world was not simply a matter of rhetoric or propaganda for the regime. The 
expansion of Fascism within ‘Italy abroad’ required the effort of ambassadors, 
intellectuals, and propagandists, as well as individuals without a clear institutional 
role such as Luigi Villari. Such expansion also encouraged the founding of 
newspapers and the publication of books.
If it was to succeed, the project of ‘fascistisation’ of the Italians abroad had to 
take into consideration pre-existing conditions and cultural patterns. This was true 
also of the experiment to ‘remake the Italians’ in Italy, where Fascist intellectuals 
sought to make the new ideal type of Italian conform with the cultural features of the 
liberal state.43 In the case of the ‘education of the Italians’ outside Italy, the Fascist 
mission became more difficult because of the cultural variations produced by contact 
with foreign countries. But it was still possible to manipulate nostalgic feelings 
through reference to roots and traditions which the Fascists hoped would increase 
national pride.
Many of the tales in L ’Italia Nostra focused on the subject of travels to the 
Fatherland. In ‘Return to the village’, an Italian man on a train journey to Lake Garda
42Hughes, ‘Per le nostre scuole - Roma o Mosca?’, L ’ItaliaNostra, 10 March 1933, n. 215, p. 3.
43From a cultural point of view, see the studies of Mario Isnenghi, L'educazione dell’italiano. II 
fascismo e I ’organizzazione della cultura (Bologna: Cappelli, 1979), and of Simonetta Soldani and 
Gabriele Turi (eds.), Fare gli italiani: scuola e cultura nell’Italia contemporanea. 2. Una societa di 
massa (Bologna: IlMulino, 1993).
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met a 35 year old woman who had lived in Paris since she was a teenager, after 
following her boyfriend there. Although she had become a successful singer in Paris, 
her heart could not bear the distance from her beloved village on the lake, Salo, and 
she decided to return there and live as a peasant. Descriptions of the beauty of the 
landscape were clearly meant to stimulate homesickness especially among emigrants 
who came from the Lake Garda area.44
In another tale, an Italian who had emigrated when a small child travelled to 
Rome and suddenly heard someone speaking the dialect of his region, the Marche. As 
in the case of the Proustian madeleine, he started remembering everything:
it was the voice of my land... I suddenly turned, while a wave of emotion took 
me over. My memory went back to my homeland, to the small mansion on the 
bank of the friendly river, to the small field deprived of the strong arms that used 
to cultivate it, to the little cemetery that embraces and looks after the remains of 
my ancestors.45
In order to emphasise the role of the Fascio as the only representative of 
patriotism in Britain it was necessary to build a new relationship between the 
emigrants and the fatherland. They had to perceive the Fascist government as the first 
Italian regime to take care of its emigrants, and the first to gain both interest and 
respect from other countries.46 They also had to realise that Fascism was an epochal 
event in which they could participate. They had to feel that they belonged to a nation, 
and at the same time that they were also rightfully part of a larger history. Fascism 
could attempt to reach emigrant hearts precisely because it presented itself as a new 
regime that despised the rules of international democracy and appeared to promote 
the emigrants’ own sentiments.
In a book written in 1939, Giuseppe Bastianini gave an idea of the populist 
approach employed by the Fasci Abroad and of the Fascist attempt to present Italy as 
different from any other state. He stated that both the diplomatic work carried on for 
years around the problem of emigration and the efforts made by economists, 
diplomats, and journalists had all been useless. In Bastianini’s view,
44 ‘Ritomo al villaggio’, L ’Italia Nostra, 19 Feb 1932, 3.
45 ‘Cose tristi del passato’, L ’Italia Nostra, 4 Mar 1932, 3.
46See Aldo Berselli, L ’opinionepubblica inglese e I ’awento delfascismo (1919-1925) (Milan: Angeli, 
1971).
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it would have been enough to call an Italian worker who emigrated to America or 
France fifty or forty years ago and ask him to say in his own language what he 
does as an emigrant, to have the precise definition .... To give a definition of this 
man we have to penetrate his soul and listen to the words he thinks and does not 
say when he asks for jobs from foreigners.
Under Fascism the emigrants were to be recognised in terms of their ‘personality’ and 
in terms of their rights as workers. The first indication of this difference, as so often 
with the Fascist regime, was a change in vocabulary: ‘the Duce wanted to eliminate 
the word “emigrant” from the dictionary’, to replace it with ‘italiani alTestero41
The Italian Fascist newspaper in London provided a great many examples of 
this new relationship between the emigrants and their home country, which now had 
to be regarded as a paternal and protective figure. According to Terri Colpi, Italians 
were integrated into the economic and social structure of the host country, but not 
assimilated, since their traditional values, patterns of behaviour, and attitudes were 
still Italian; ‘Mussolini was the first to give them the sense of belonging that they 
longed for’. Except for some anti-Fascists, ‘the vast majority of the Italian community 
in Britain embraced Fascism in a whole-hearted manner. The basic principles of 
Fascism’, honour, family and fatherland, ‘were, after all, the very principles by which 
most of them lived their lives and therefore a slogan and sentiment which they could 
readily identify’.48 Salvemini’s experience among Italians in North America, where 
he arrived in 1929, confirmed such an hypothesis: most emigrants were
hard workers, linked to their families by heroic bonds of sacrifice. Arrived in 
America, illiterate, shoeless and with bags on their shoulders, they had to face 
unheard-of difficulties and suffering, despised by everybody because they were 
Italians. And now they heard, even from Americans, that Mussolini had made 
Italy a great country, where no one was unemployed, where everyone had a bath 
at home, where trains were on time, and that Italy was respected and feared of in 
the world. Whoever challenged this view, not only destroyed their ideal 
fatherland, but also hurt their personal dignity. Italy and the Italian government
47Giuseppe Bastianini, Gli italiani a ll’estero (Milan: Mondadori, 1939), pp. 36-38, p. 45. In 1927 the 
Direzione Generate degli Italiani a ll’Estero took the place of the Commissariato Generate 
dell’Emigrazione (see Mario Isnenghi, ‘Per una mappa linguistica di un “regime di parole”. A proposito 
del convegno “Parlare fascista”’, Movimento operaio e socialista, 2 (1984) and his comments at a 
meeting held in Genova on 22-24 March 1984 about the Fascist use of words: ‘Parlare fascista. Lingua 
del fascismo, politica linguistica del fascismo’).
48Colpi, The Italian Factor, pp.86-88.
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and Mussolini were in their imagination an indivisible whole; to criticise 
Mussolini meant to fight Italy and to offend them as individuals.49
The experiences described in the diaries of three Italians living in London 
during this period are interesting in this connection. Elena Salvoni, bom in London in 
1920 of Italian parents, attended an Italian school, went to the Catholic Church every 
Sunday, and participated in the Italian procession for the Feast of Madonna del 
Carmelo every year. She nevertheless remembered that ‘as working-class families 
none of us in the Clerkenwell vicinity had felt the need of Mussolini’s protection; it 
was more for the elitist professions in Britain, a bit like the Freemasons’.50 The same 
indifference toward the Fascio was perceptible in the autobiography of Charles Forte, 
who was also bom in England.51 It was a different matter for Calisto Cavalli, who 
lived in the countryside in province of Crema, northern Italy, fought in the Great War, 
and emigrated to London in 1920. When he wrote his memoirs, he said he had never 
been a member of the Fascio, although he sympathised with Fascism, because it 
defended principles such as ‘Family’ and ‘Morality’.52
The greatest difficulty for the Fascio was to convert to Fascism those Italians 
who were bom in England. As Piero Parini wrote in L 'Italia Nostra in 1933,
it was said sometimes that one can love his fatherland even without knowing it.
This is not totally true. Men who left the Italian soil thirty, forty years ago can 
well - even if they had never gone back - maintain the image of an old house in 
their soul .... but what about the young ones?.53
The London Fascio made remarkable efforts to attract the Italian working classes in 
particular. Although its diplomatic and social relationships were restricted to its 
Italian and British upper class members, the Fascists insisted on collaboration 
between classes and tried to gain popularity among the working classes with 
expedients such as improvements to the Italian hospital. In 1932, for example, they 
established a surgery for children in need.
49 Gaetano Salvemini, Memorie, p. 625.
50Salvoni, Elena, p. 44.
51Charles Forte, Forte. The autobiography o f Charles Forte (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986), pp. 
22-42.
52Calisto Cavalli, Ricordi di un emigrato (London: La Voce degli Italiani, 1973).
53Piero Parini, ‘La Patria pei figli all’estero’, L 'Italia Nostra, 29 September 1933, n. 243, pp. 1-2.
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The new Italy was thus presented as a classless nation. L'Italia Nostra 
declared that socialist rhetoric was sentimental and old-fashioned compared with the 
practical achievements of Fascism. Thanks to reduced-fare trains, the most humble 
workers could enjoy Italy’s artistic and natural treasures. This was the ‘sole 
dell 'awemre’ that the democratic parties had not been able to realise, a failure that 
Italians living abroad, where democratic parties still existed, could easily perceive for 
themselves.54 In this respect, the corporativist state was the masterpiece of Fascist 
propaganda abroad. It was presented, and was viewed by British fascists as well, not 
simply as an economic system but as a universal idea, as historical evidence of the 
predestined expansion of Fascism abroad. ‘It is not just an experiment; the 
corporativist state is today a living and lively creature that has found in our Italy the 
fertile soil for its expansion’.55 British interest in the corporate system was continually 
emphasised as proof that fascism would replace democracy in England as well.56
In January 1933, the London Italian Fascist Enrico Discoli commented on 
news about the distribution of land to the unemployed in Britain as a ‘significant 
event, which confirms the repercussions of Fascist policy in Britain as well’. He 
interpreted this act as a ‘new direction in British politics, which can possibly move 
toward fascism, once the last doubts surrender to the mathematical evidence of 
facts’.57 In April 1933, the British fascist Harold Goad wrote in the Italian newspaper 
that Britain had a lot to learn from Italy about syndicalism, certainly much more than 
from Russia, ‘not least because the Italian race is, from historical tradition, much 
closer to ours’.58 The Italian government appeared to hold British publications on 
Fascism in high regard. For instance, in 1934, a letter from Mussolini’s press office to 
the Italian embassy in Washington suggested that The Working o f a Corporate State, 
jointly written by Harold Goad and Muriel Currey, was a most appropriate book for 
the diffusion of Fascism abroad. The office sent two copies of it to the embassy.59
54‘Carri di tespi e treni popolari suUe strade d’ltalia - Le realizzazioni del fascismo per la vita spirituale 
del popolo’, L 'Italia Nostra, 29 July 1932, n. 185, p. 2.
55‘Stato e diritto del lavoro’, L 'Italia Nostra, 16 March 1934, n.267, p.l. See also Fausto Pitigliani, The 
Italian Corporative State (London: P. S. King & Son, 1933).
56See Marco Palla, Fascismo e Stato corporativo. Un'inchiesta della diplomazia britannica (Milan: 
Angeli, 1991).
57Enrico Discoli, ‘La stampa inglese ed il fascismo’, L 'Italia Nostra, 13 January 1933, n. 207, p. 2.
58Harold Elsdale Goad, ‘La stampa inglese e TItalia - Un articolo della English Review sul sistema 
corporativo italiano’, L 'Italia Nostra, 7 Aprile 1933, n. 219, p. 1.
59Harold Goad and Muriel Currey, The Working o f a  Corporate State: A Study o f National Cooperation 
(London: Nicholson & Watson, 1932). Ufficio Stampa del Capo del Govemo, Sezione Propaganda, to
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To explain the political meaning of the new system, the London newspaper 
employed intellectuals such as Camillo Pellizzi to expound, among other issues, the 
alleged qualitative difference between the liberal and Fascist concepts of social 
assistance. The notion of state assistance was to replace the liberal one of ‘charity’ 
and ‘philanthropy’; this was regarded as the first step toward ‘national solidarity’. It 
was typical of Pellizzi to insist on the idea of Fascism as a movement towards 
something else, a system in a state of continuous revolution60 The Fascists in London 
frequently emphasised the question of social assistance as a means of promoting 
demographic growth. In 1932, the Party had employed 1.5 million lire for Italian 
mothers living abroad who travelled to Italy to have their children fn  Patria,ei. In the 
same year, the charge d’affaires in Italy, John Murray, reported to the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir John Simon, that ‘much stress was perceptible in regard to birth rate’ in 
Italy, and that this was directly connected with the idea of empire building.62 
Mussolini, in speeches in the 1920s, had made explicit the links between 
demographic growth, the military education of the new Italian, and the concept of 
Italian expansion in the world.63
In 1932, whilst Italy was celebrating the Decennale of the Fascist Revolution, 
the newspaper carried articles and interviews describing the impressions of Italian 
emigrants who had had the opportunity to visit Rome, and also explaining how life in 
Italy had changed after ten years of Mussolini’s government. Bonifiche, treni 
popolari, and family subsidies were among the chief issues, but it was mainly Italy’s 
‘spiritual’ rebirth that impressed Italians abroad. ‘Going back to Rome today’, wrote 
an Italian Londoner and a reader of L Italia Nostra,
one can well say that the Capital has been reborn. One can talk about Mussolini’s 
Rome not only because of its new town planning but also and especially for its 
spirit.... And to day the city has rapidly acquired a new character: not Roman, 
but Italian .... It is destined that Rome must receive its shape from one man. The
Italian embassy, Washington, 26 June 1934, ACS, MinCulPop, NuPIE, b. 27, f. 36: ‘Goad Harold’. The 
file included another book by Harold Goad: What is Fascism?: an Explanation o f its Essential 
Principles (Florence: Italian Mail and Tribune, 1929).
60Camillo Pellizzi, ‘Died lustri di fratema attivita benefica tra gli italiani di Londra - H cinquantesimo 
anno dell’ospedale italiano 1884-1934 - Beneficienza liberale e solidarieta fascista’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 24 
November 1933, n.251, p. 1.
6l‘L’assistenza sociale e l’opera del partito - Un milione e mezzo per le madri italiane all’estero’, 
L 'Italia Nostra, 5 August 1932, n. 186, p.2.
62Murray to Simon, 13 August 1932, PRO, FO 371/15986, C7031/2351/22: ‘Birth rate in Italy’.
63MacGregor Knox, II fascismo e la politico estera, p. 291.
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Rome of Augustus, the Rome of Sixtus V, and now the Rome of Mussolini ....
That is, for those who knew it before, the greatest example of what has been 
achieved in Italy in the last ten years.64
Thanks to the rebirth of the myth of imperial Rome, all Italians, wherever in the 
world they happened to live, could feel a renewed sense of their history. Their new 
destiny would be immediately manifest as soon as they went to see Rome:
Respect and adoration for imperial Rome is a rule in our Fascist character. 
Mussolini has restored the remains of ancient Rome, and has satisfied a desire 
among those Italians who had regained the sense of their history and therefore of 
their destiny.65
In order to understand how the nation was imagined, it is worthwhile 
examining how Fascist Italy presented itself, and in particular its past. It is likely that 
British interest in Fascism (and therefore in Italy) led emigrants to a new curiosity 
about their own country.66 For example, Fascists complained that Italy’s contribution 
to the Great War was regularly underestimated, and Italian authors challenged the 
British version of wartime history in books in English on Italy’s 1915-18 war effort67 
Most of the time, the means used by the Fascio were merely defensive, in an attempt 
to contradict what they considered to be ‘British lies’. L'ltalia Nostra denounced 
what it regarded as deliberate falsehoods presented by some British historians,68 and 
kept its readers informed about Fascist conferences on themes such as ‘how we have 
to reply to our English friends who boast that they have won the war alone’, or about
64‘Roma di ieri e Roma di oggi - Impressioni romane di un italiano a Londra’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 16 
September 1932, n. 191, p. 3. See also ‘La nuova Italia nelle impressioni di un italiano emigrato -  
L’opera costruttiva delDuce’, ibid., 26 August 1932, n.189, p.l.
65‘Roma imperiale e Roma del fascismo’, L ’Italia Nostra, 13 January 1933, n.207, p.3.
66See Alfio Bemabei, Esuli ed emigrati italiani nel Regno Unito 1920-1940 (Milan: Mursia, 1997).
67See Luigi Villari, Italy at War, in Id., The Awakening o f Italy: The Fascista Regeneration (London: 
Methuen, 1924), pp. 24-43; Id., Italy and the World War (1914-1918), in Id., Italy (London: Ernest 
Benn, 1929), pp. 135-146; Id., The war on the Italian Front (London: Cobden-Sanderson, 1932); Gino 
Gario, Italy: 1914-18 (London: T. G. Norris, 1937); Camillo Pellizzi, Italy (London: Longmans Green, 
1939). See the conception of the public use of history suggested by Jurgen Habermas, L ’uso pubblico 
della storia, in G. E. Rusconi, (ed.), Germania: un passato che non passa. I  crimini nazisti e Videntita 
tedesca (Turin: Einaudi, 1987), and by Nicola Gallerano, Storia e uso pubblico della storia, in Id. (ed.), 
L ’uso pubblico della storia (Milan: Angeli, 1995), where it is defined as ‘the activity that regulates and 
settles the relations between memory and oblivion, between what is worth and what is not worth 
remembering’ (p. 22).
68‘I1 contributo italiano alia grande guerra - un nuovo volume inglese di grossolane menzogne’, L ’Italia 
Nostra, 12 August 1932, n.187, p. 2. It concerned a book written by ‘one of the most famous 
sportsmen’ of Britain, Vivian Nicholls: Oars, Wars and Horses, which contained ‘shameless and coarse 
lies and insults against our brave soldiers’.
34
the necessity of demonstrating to British public opinion ‘how Italy had fought in the 
war’. Both military officers and university professors spoke at such conferences. 
Sometimes it was a British fascist sympathiser who lectured on Italian history, such as 
Sir John Marriot (‘a distinguished historian of our national Risorgimento’). He joined 
a series of lectures entitled ‘The Rise of Modem Italy’, and spoke about ‘Domestic 
Problems in Italy: Fascism, the Church and the State’. In one lecture he explained the 
Italian contribution to the Great War and described Mussolini as the ‘saviour of 
modem civilisation’, concluding with a definition of the Lateran Pacts as the ‘greatest 
event of our century’.69
Historical stories in L ’ltalia Nostra built upon this propaganda, usually 
focusing on the Risorgimento and on the Great War. The heroism of unknown 
soldiers and unreserved commitment to the Fatherland were the main themes. In 
‘Doctor Antonio’, a tale written in 1855 by Giovanni Ruffini, an Italian exile of the 
Risorgimento and a friend of Giuseppe Mazzini, which was published in weekly 
instalments in L ’Italia Nostra over several months, a humble Italian doctor attempted 
for many years to conquer the love of a good-natured rich English woman. She 
usually went on holiday to Liguria with her father, a proud English patriot, who had 
many prejudices against the Italians and was therefore the main obstacle to their love. 
Eventually Antonio succeeded in demonstrating to him the qualities of the Italian 
people, and he moved with his daughter to Naples. It was the year 1848 and the 
demonstrations for Italy’s independence had begun. Although she tried to persuade 
him to stay, Antonio decided to take part in the events. With the sound of shooting 
outside the house, he declared his eternal love to her; nevertheless, he said, ‘my first 
love is to the Fatherland’. After the patriots’ defeat, he was put in jail; she became ill 
and died gazing at the castle where he was imprisoned, while inside he suffered and 
prayed for his country.70 A similar fate befell Marziale Bellarosa, a fictitious tragic 
hero of the Great War, who died happy because he was promoted to the rank of 
corporal after having accomplished his last, extremely dangerous, and fatal action.71
69‘S.E. l’Ambasciatore all’University of London’, L 'Italia Nostra, 17 March 1933, n.216, p. 4.
70 ‘II dottor Antonio’, L 'Italia Nostra, 24 Jun 1932-8 Sept 1932. Giovanni Ruffini, Doctor Antonio: A 
Tale (Edinburgh: T. Constable & Co, 1855).
71 ‘Marziale Bellarosa. Novella’, L 'Italia Nostra, 15 Jan 1932, 3-6.
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On several occasions it was possible for the Italian community in London to 
assist at the O.G.I.E. {Organizzazioni Giovanili Italiane alVEstero, Italian Youth 
Organisations Abroad) athletic exhibitions and watch, during the same demonstration, 
in the presence of the authorities, Italian films either on the Great War or on Fascist 
Italy. In 1932, during the Decennale celebrations, the Fascio showed two movies in 
London and in the British provinces. One was about Italian life under Fascism and
79one showed a speech by Mussolini in Turin. The following year the Fascio 
presented Parla il Duce, another film of Mussolini speeches.73 The film given the 
most emphasis was Camicia Nera, a drama written by Gioacchino Forzano and shown 
in London in April 1933. The Fascist authorities in London were delighted that a film 
company in Berlin ordered 50 copies of the film.74 L Italia Nostra published the 
comments from children of Italian schools who were brought to see the film. The 
effects of the invention of the myth is evident in their writings:
Before seeing ‘ Camicia Nera’ I already loved the Duce, but after having seen it I 
love our wonderful Duce even more, who has created so many beautiful works: 
huge hospitals, buildings, bridges, streets and schools. He transformed a village 
afflicted by malaria into a big and beautiful town! Many Italians will live there, 
including some from abroad who wish to return to the Fatherland.
Not only did the children express admiration and love, but also a sort of ‘self 
identification’. One child wrote: ‘the part I liked most is this: when the small child put 
the Italian flag on his door’; another one dreamt of having taken part in the events: 
‘how much I would have liked to be a Fascist at that time, to see the glorious March 
on Rome! One thing I liked most was the first publication of II Popolo d'ltalia and 
the journalists who sold it’. Another one expressed his emotional participation:
72‘Un anno di vita italiana’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 11 November 1932, n. 199, p. 4; ‘Oltre 1500 persone al 
Portland Hall per la film “II discorso di Torino’”, ibid., 16 December 1932, n. 203, p. 1.
73‘Domenica gli italiani di Londra celebreranno l’annuale fascista raccogliendosi entusiasticamente 
attomo ai simboli della patria -  L’orazione di S.E. Fani - II film “Parla il Duce”- Le melodie d’ltalia’, 
L 'Italia Nostra, 26 October 1933, n. 298, p. 1.
74‘Grande attesa per le rappresentazioni di domani del film “Camicia Nera’”, L 'Italia Nostra, 28 April 
1933, n. 222, p. 1.
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When did the miracle happen? Oh, when the image of the Fatherland appeared in 
front of that poor ill soldier. Italy, Italy, he shouted! Oh, I myself answered his 
voice with my voice!75
The British-Italian League was frequently involved in the organisation of these 
events. When the historian George Trevelyan founded it in 1916, the major aim of the 
League, which included both Italian and British members, was to deepen mutual 
understanding and friendship between the two allied countries. The pamphlets 
published by the League during the war years were clearly influenced by Italian 
‘democratic’ interventionism, the irredentism of Cesare Battisti, and the patriotism of 
Leonida Bissolati,76 who had supported the theory of the Great War as the last war of 
the Italian Risorgimento. After the war, unlike Bissolati but like Mussolini, they 
supported Italy’s claims to Dalmatia and the myth of the ‘mutilated victory’.77 At the 
beginning of the 1930s, the former Ambassador to Rome, Rennell Rodd, was 
president of the League; in 1933, when he resigned from his embassy in Rome, 
Ronald Graham took his place. During the first half of the 1930s, the League 
participated in almost every Fascist social and cultural event.
The League was also involved in the celebration of anniversaries such as the 
commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Garibaldi in 1932. On that 
occasion, it organised a ceremony in London which appeared to have had a 
considerable echo in Italy. This suggested a direct relationship between the Italian 
Fasci Abroad and the British-Italian League. As Graham reported to Simon, ‘much 
prominence was given in press to lunch and lecture arranged by Anglo-Italian Society 
in London, and there is no doubt British participation in celebration was greatly 
appreciated in Rome’. What struck Graham particularly was Mussolini’s speech 
during the unveiling of the monument on the Janiculum hill, which presented the new 
Italy as the practical realisation of Garibaldi’s dream, and the blackshirts as the direct 
successors of the red shirts:
75 Gina Cattini, 12 years old, third class, school of St Peter, L ’ltalia Nostra, 12 May 1933, 1. A. 
Capella, third class, St Peter, and Maria Sartori, second class, St Peter, ibid. 19 May 1933, 3. Jolanda 
Bescaglia, fourth class, school of St Patrick, ibid. 26 May 1933, 3.
76See Edward Bollough, Irredentism and the War (London: British-Italian League, 1917), and The 
Trentino (London: British-Italian League, 1917).
77Lucy Re-Bartlett, Italy, the Pioneer o f Peace (London: British-Italian League, 1921), p. 8.
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If the bronze horseman above us could come to life and open his eyes, I am glad 
to hope that he would recognise the descendants o f his redshirts in the soldiers of 
Vittorio Veneto and in the blackshirts who for ten years, in an even more popular 
and fruitful form have carried on his work.78
Since they had presented themselves, in 1922, as the ‘Italy of Vittorio 
Veneto’, the Fascists used the celebration of 4 November as an occasion to show that 
Fascism and the Nation - Fascism and Little Italy in London - were a unique body. At 
the commemoration in 1933 they claimed that the whole community was ‘united in 
comradeship, beating as a single heart for the fatherland and the Duce’. The Great 
War and the March on Rome were celebrated on the same day. The Fascists organised 
a parade through London and a mass in which they paid homage to dead heroes of the 
war and of the March on Rome. The intention was to institutionalise a unique
7Qmemory of both events.
Besides the celebration of Christmas, the Fascio tried to set up new feast days 
in Britain: the Befana Fascista and the Natale di Roma. Even the Befana, the Italian 
traditional occasion for gifts for children at the end of the Christmas holidays, was an 
opportunity for Grandi to appear as the ‘father’ of the community. Every year the 
newspaper published photographs of him among hundreds of children from the Italian 
schools. Children received gifts from the Fascio, and this brought it a certain prestige 
among the families of the community. During the Epiphany of 1933, Grandi reminded 
the children that even the Befana was ‘new’: ‘she no longer has the wrinkled, 
although smiling, face of the old toothless woman coming down from the chimney 
hood, but the fresh young face of a young Italian woman, living symbol of the Italy of 
tomorrow’.80
78Graham’s translation of the speech. Graham to Simon, 7 June 1932, PRO, FO 371/15986, 
C4887/2496/22: ‘Celebration o f 30th anniversary o f death of Garibaldi’.
79‘Una giomata di travolgente passione italiana’, L 'Italia Nostra, 10 November 1933, n. 249, p. 1.
80‘Una cerimonia di fede e di gioia -  L’adunata di oltre mille bambini’, L 'Italia Nostra, 26 January 1934, 
n. 260, p. 1.
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The ‘NewItalians’
From the articles in L ’Italia Nostra, it is possible to perceive a fundamental 
dichotomy between two archetypes of ‘the Italian’. On the one hand, the regime 
called on the emigrant, for the first time, to take his part in history as a son of a reborn 
nation that professed its descent from Imperial Rome and claimed to be initiating a 
new era in world history. The Fascists had to convince the Italians that they were 
themselves unknown heroes of this mythical age; Italians abroad, as well as in Italy, 
had to be educated to accept these myths from childhood. The Italian Fasci in Britain 
not only created the same organisations that existed in Italy (Balilla, Piccole Italiane,
0 1
Avanguardisti), but also ventured to establish a direct connection between the 
Italians and their fatherland. In this sense, the major Fascist contribution was the 
summer camps in Italy for the children of Italian workers abroad. Their significance 
lay less in actual participation (only a minority of the children could join the camps) 
than in the propaganda that derived from those who could. In 1935, the British 
Ambassador in Italy, Eric Drummond, noticed that
those who have been privileged to visit the camps would, I think, agree that the 
work undertaken is of great benefit to the children and reflects much credit on the 
Fascist authorities. It is none the less true, as has been reported in the past, that 
these camps are of very considerable propaganda value, particularly amongst the 
children’s mothers.82
Propaganda from the community newspaper revealed the qualities required of 
the new Italians. After visits and excursions, the month spent in the peninsula came to 
a climax with participation in a major athletics contest in Rome during which the 
Duce reviewed over 40,000 young Italians. The London Fascio underlined the 
military aspect of the education given to Italian children from abroad. Military 
officers acted as trainers at the camps, and the newspaper talked about an ‘esercito 
infantile’ (a children’s army). The final purpose was the creation of ‘comunanza e 
fraternita di vedute’ (agreed views) among Fascist children and to avoid the
81Note that the major authorities o f the London colony were responsible for these organisations. For 
example, Olga Bossi, the consul’s wife, was the head of the Piccole Italiane.
82Drummond to Hoare, 9 July 1935, PRO, FO 371/19555, R4344/4344/22: ‘Italian summer camps for 
Fascist children’.
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‘dispersion’ of the ‘qualities of the race’. The young had to acquire the ‘shape’ of the 
new Italian, the Fascist shape. The Italian Fasci Abroad considered summer camps as 
a kind of ‘factory’, in which the new Italy produced new Italians according to its
83requirements.
Against this military, virile and mythical dimension, the newspaper promoted 
an ideal that brought Italians back to their unexceptional daily and family life. In this 
case, the Fascist newspaper evoked the fatherland only as a distant image, and 
insisted on homesickness (‘nostalgia’). Italians outside Italy had to live and work for 
the sake of their families alone; they had to be religious, honest, and hard-working. 
According to the newspaper, one of the most rooted elements of ‘nostalgia’ which 
afflicted the ‘good Italian worker, quello bonaccione e virtuoso who has nothing else 
in his head but his family, his shop, and his work’, was the Sunday bowls match. Love 
and harmony within the family would enable the emigrants to work hard, conscious, 
‘every day, every hour’, that they were there not to earn great sums of money, which 
would not make them happy, but ‘to secure a carefree old age’.84
The emphasis on this non-political aspect was probably due to the need to 
convince the British that the Fascists believed in and respected the first precept of the 
Italian Fasci Abroad, according to which Fascists abroad had to obey the laws of the 
country in which they lived and to undertake not to interfere in local politics.85 
Moreover, by saying that Italian Fascists were not involved in politics, they intended 
to distinguish the ‘good’ Italian from the ‘subversive’ anti-Fascists. The anti-Fascist 
was represented as irreligious, ‘facinoroso’- a person harbouring criminal plans with 
the deliberate intention of creating disorder, both anti-patriotic and immoral. ‘The 
anti-Fascists are neither workers nor honest people. They act in the darkness, hide and
o r
kill like common criminals’. Almost every week the newspaper published articles 
on the ‘v/7/ armi del fuoruscitismo’ all over the world: murders, assaults, the infliction 
of serious injuries, and so on. In 1932 the Italian Fasci Abroad published a book with
83‘La partenza dei giovani italiani per le colonie estive’, L ’Italia Nostra, 15 July 1932, pp. 1-2.
84‘Spunti di nostalgie - H giuoco delle bocce - D piu democratico e popolare giuoco italiano’, L ’ltalia 
Nostra, 7 October 1932, n. 194, p. 3; ‘La felicita e nella semplicita’, ibid., 4 November 1932, n. 198, p. 
5.
85‘Fascists abroad must pay obedience to the laws of the country in which they live. Every day they must 
give examples o f their obedience, if necessary, to the native citizens themselves’ (from the statute of 
Fasci Italiani all'Estero of 28 January 1928, in Piero Parini, Gli italiani nel mondo, Milan: Mondadori, 
1935).
86‘Le prodezze dell’antifascismo in America’, L 'Italia Nostra, 8 January 1932, p. 1.
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a preface by its secretary Piero Parini listing numerous cases of violence by anti- 
Fascists against Italian Fascists living abroad.87
Another possible explanation for this dichotomy in the representation of the 
Italians abroad is a generational one. While Fascist emigrants had to be an example of 
honesty and morality, their sons, the new generation, had to take action, in order to 
become the pioneers of Fascism and of Italian expansion in other countries. Ideally 
this would begin at birth: their mothers went to Italy to give birth in the fatherland; in 
their childhood they were enrolled in Italian organisations and joined summer camps 
(uniting them with their mother country for the second time since their birth); then 
they would become Avanguardisti and finally blackshirts, soldiers of Fascism abroad. 
Their mission, it seems, was no longer restricted by the need to be loyal to other 
countries’ laws, since from all appearances Fascist education would persuade them 
that they must fulfil a revolutionary duty. Camillo Pellizzi, who promoted the idea of 
spiritual revolution in order to build a new civilisation based on the expansion of 
italianita in the world, stated this in precise terms as early as 1924. Italian Fascists 
abroad were not to be merely propaganda agents but apostles of a new religion.88 This 
aspect was not concealed from British public opinion; the London Fascio also 
organised summer camps in England: the first ‘Mussolini camp5 appeared in 1933 at 
Maidstone in Kent. L'ltalia Nostra announced the news with fervent enthusiasm, 
proclaiming that the children were now ‘called to a new life’. This suggested that they 
were no longer part of the country in which they lived; the Fascist newspaper 
emphasised the presence at the camp gates of a group of curious people as ‘one of the 
many beautiful lessons our youngest give to the British, a lesson that teaches that the 
Italian of today is very different from the old one’.89 Grandi’s decision to visit the 
camp seems to have been planned in order to attract both British visitors and the local
90press.
Both organised tours to Italy and summer camps were significant also for the 
development of the myth of the Duce abroad. As in Italy, the myth of the Duce had to
87Parini, Fasci italiani a ll’estero: 45 morti, 283feriti (Rome: Fasci Italiani all’Estero, 1932).
88See Camillo Pellizzi, Problemi e realta del fascismo (Florence: Vallecchi, 1924).
89‘Una bandiera tricolore nel Kent - Con la cerimonia dell’Alza Bandiera si e inaugurato domenica 
scorsa il “Campeggio Benito Mussolini”’, L ’Italia Nostra, 25 August 1933, n. 238, p. 1.
90‘S.E. Grandi visita il campo Mussolini a Maidstone - la bella iniziativa fascista elogiata 
dall’ambasciatore’, L ’Italia Nostra, 8 September 1933, n. 240, p. 1.
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stimulate ‘fantasies, dreams, expectations, in a word all the thoughts and feelings that 
take the name of imagination and are interlaced with but do not coincide with the data 
of experience’.91 The newspaper published photographs of the Duce swimming, 
jumping difficult obstacles on his horse, and working in the fields. Besides Rome, 
Predappio, the village where Mussolini had been bom, became a station of 
‘ideological tourism’ and pilgrimage.92 In 1933, 1400 Italian children from abroad 
visited both Mussolini’s parents’ graves and the house where he had been bom.93
The newspaper’s accounts of summer camps did not end when the camps shut 
for the winter, but went on for months, covering the impressions of the visitors, as 
well as carrying compositions written by children who had participated in the camps. 
The peak of enthusiasm was reached with the description of the ‘salute to the Duce’ 
during the group’s visit to the Foro Romano. Its purpose was to foment emotion, 
above all love of Italy and of the Duce. This love could blend Italy and Mussolini 
together in a unique body: ‘Talking about the Italian people You have said, Duce, that 
its future is the only reason of Your life. Well, we do not have any other wish than to 
be the very reason of Your life, which means to be “Italy”’. The avanguardisti 
gratefully thanked him for the new country: ‘We have seen fertile lands, reclaimed 
marshland, reborn towns, new great buildings near the ancient ones; assisted 
maternity, protected childhood, people and state in one single body, the beauty of the 
places sacred by work and spirit’. The conclusion was a promise, first suggested by 
Pellizzi in 1924: the promise to be ready to rally to the fatherland in case of need: 
‘Duce, do not forget us: we will not forget You. Duce, if the country needs us, call us, 
we will come!’.94
91Luisa Passerini, Mussolini immaginario. Storia di una biografia 1915-1939 (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 
1991), p. 3. See particularly part HI, ‘L’esplosione della biografia. 1933-1939’, pp. 153-234.
92Massimo Baioni, Predappio, in Mario Isnenghi, (ed.), I  luoghi della memoria. I. Simboli e miti 
deU’Italia unita (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1996), p. 505.
93‘Terra di Leggenda -  Pre’ D ’appio’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 12 May 1933, n. 224, p. 3; ‘Una visita a 
Predappio nuova di 1400 bimbi italiani all’estero’, ibid., 1 September 1933, n. 239, p. 2.
94‘H ritomo dei cento ottanta giovani italiani che hanno trascorso un mese in patria - Entusiastiche scene 
- Racconti e ricordi - Le ultime giomate romane - la visita del Duce’, L'ltalia Nostra, 15 September 
1933, n. 241, p. 1. See also ‘H grande pellegrinaggio delle colonie di Gran Bretagna alia citta etema - 
Come nacque l’idea del pellegrinaggio. L’omaggio al Duce - Manifestazioni e cerimonie. L’entusiastica 
adesione degli italiani di Londra e delle provincie’, ibid., 12 January 1934, n. 258, p. 1.
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Conclusion
Grandi’s appointment to the London embassy in 1932 was the beginning of an 
intense period of ‘fascistisation’ of the Italian community. His attitude toward the 
community was different from that of his predecessor as ambassador, Chiaramonte 
Bordonaro. Grandi acted as a local ‘duce’, seeking to appear as both the highest 
authority and the ‘father’ of the Italians in London. During the first two years of his 
ambassadorship, the London Fascio incorporated most of the Italian community’s 
social clubs and institutions into its own organisation. The two most influential 
organisations that already existed among the emigrants, the Dante Alighieri Society 
and the Catholic Church, both appeared by then to be ‘fascistised’.
The documents held at the Public Record Office and at Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato, and the Italian Fascist newspaper in London suggest that Fascist 
propaganda activities abroad were centralised and directed from Rome. Directors and 
teachers of Italian schools abroad were employed by the Italian foreign ministry. 
Propagandists such as Luigi Villari took the orders directly from Mussolini, and the 
director of L \Italia Nostra was also the secretary of the London Fascio.
The study of the London Fascio activities and the comparison with the 
organisations of liberal Italy abroad demonstrate that Mussolini’s foreign policy was 
fundamentally different from that of previous governments. The London Fascio not 
only attempted to establish a link between Italy and its emigrants, but it also sought to 
convince Italians in Britain that Fascism was a synonym for italianita. Fascist 
‘education’ in the early 1930s primarily involved the organisation of Italian schools 
and summer camps for children where the ‘new Italy’ endeavoured to transform 
Italian children into pioneers of the Fascist Revolution outside Italy. The Fascist 
newspaper insisted on the ‘spiritual’ rebirth of Italy, and the London Fascio organised 
lectures and published books in order to outline a new history of the nation, tracing its 
roots back to the Roman Empire, the Risorgimento and the Great War. They 
presented the corporativist state as a proof of a newly realised classless society which 
they claimed they would also bring into being in the Italian community in London as 
well.
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The number of Italians in Britain that fully embraced Fascism is far from 
certain. According to Roberta Suzzi Valli,95 the London Fascio achieved the greatest 
degree of public support from the Italian community during the Ethiopian war, and 
especially following Britain’s sanctions against Italy. The war can be considered as a 
turning point in Anglo-Italian relations, and its impact will be studied in chapters 3 
and 4, which will focus on Italian propaganda in Britain and on the relationship 
between Italian and British fascists in 1935-1936. However, as the next chapter will 
explain, the Italian authorities in London sought contacts with British fascists even 
before the war, in the attempt to expand fascism in Britain as part of a wider attempt 
to create a European fascist movement.
95 Suzzi Valli, ‘II fascio italiano a Londra’, Storia Contemporanea, p. 957.
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Chapter 2
Anglo-Italian Fascist Solidarity? 
Italy and the BUF, 1932-1934
The historiography of British fascism has usually identified the contradiction 
between its support for fascism abroad and its extreme nationalist propaganda in 
Britain as one of the major reasons for BUF failure.1 This contradiction seemed also 
to have been Mosley’s principal obsession throughout his life, for he underlined in his 
autobiography, published in 1968, that he had not copied Fascism or National 
Socialism. On the contrary, they were ‘in the very air of Europe’.2 Although he had 
copied symbols and attitudes from the Italian regime, the fascist phenomenon had 
characterised an entire period of the twentieth century in Europe, and had emerged 
first in Italy for mainly chronological reasons.3 According to George Mosse, it was its 
emphasis on nationalism, and sometimes on different models of racism, that limited 
the expansion of European fascism.4 Mosley’s autobiography endorsed this idea, 
clearly with the intention of denying any relationship between his movement and 
Italian fascism, and especially German Nazism.5 Mosley’s principal biographer, 
Robert Skidelsky, argued that the BUF leader faced a complex undertaking in seeking 
to introduce his movement as British instead of an imitation of either the Italian or
Robert Benewick, Political Violence and Public Order: A study o f British Fascism (London: Penguin, 
1969), p. 134; see also Mike Cronin (ed.), The Failure o f British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight 
for Political Recognition (London-Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); Andrew Thorpe (ed.), The Failure 
of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1989).
2 Oswald Mosley, My Life (London: Nelson, 1968), p. 91.
3Mario Isnenghi, Intellettuali militanti e intellettuali funzionari, now in L ’Italia del fascio (Florence: 
Giunti, 1996), p. 147. See also S. U. Larsen, B. Hagtvet and J. P. Myklebust (eds.), Who Were the 
Fascists: Social Roots o f European Fascism, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980). The leading idea of this 
work was that Fascism had been a European movement, and that it was not simply an imitation of Italian 
or German regimes.
4 George L. Mosse (ed.), International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches (London: Sage 
Publications, 1979).
5 Nevertheless, when he published his autobiography, he still maintained his position that British 
government should have left free hand to Germany in Eastern Europe. They would have invaded Poland, 
perhaps crashed Communism fighting with Russia, and war would have never happened in Western 
Europe. As well as holocaust, it was not ‘Britain’s business’.
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German model.6 During the Ethiopian war in particular, Mosley’s pro-Italian attitude 
showed that ‘BUF beliefs appeared to derive from ideological sympathy with Italian 
fascism \ 7
This chapter will explore three main points in focusing on Anglo-Italian 
relations between 1932 and 1934: the Italian attitude toward the BUF, and in 
particular the role of Dino Grandi; contacts between Italian and British fascists; and 
the cultural origins of British fascism and its relationship to Italian Fascism and to the 
idea of European fascist solidarity.
Dino Grandi and British Fascism
Grandi’s role and attitude toward fascism in Britain has seemed ambiguous. 
Paolo Nello wrote in his biography of Grandi that the latter did not appear to believe 
in the concept of ‘universal’ fascism.8 Nevertheless, until 1935 Grandi held that 
Mussolini should continue to finance Mosley’s movement. He also developed 
personal and political relationships with British fascists, although he does not appear 
to have held all of them in high esteem. During the first half of the 1930s, in his 
letters to Mussolini, Grandi repeatedly claimed that Fascism was expanding its 
influence in Britain. Of course it is likely that the main purpose behind those letters 
was to flatter Mussolini and inflate his own role, and unlikely that they reflected a 
belief that Fascism would eventually come to power in Britain.9 But this statement 
has to be verified.
‘’Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan, 1975).
7Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918-1985 (Oxford-New York: Blackwell, 1987), p. 
107.
8 Paolo Nello, Un fedele disubbidiente: Dino Grandi dapalazzo Chigi al 25 luglio (Bologna: II Mulino, 
1933), p. 228.
9According to both Renzo De Felice {Mussolini il duce. L Gli anni del consenso, 1929-1936, Turin: 
Einaudi, 1974, p. 377) and H. James Burgwyn {Grandi e il mondo teutonico: 1929-1932, ‘Storia 
Contemporanea’, XIX (1988), 2, p. 209), Fascism always remained, in Grandi’s view, ‘un fatto 
esclusivamente italiano’. On Grandi’s diaries and memoirs {Dino Grandi racconta I ’eviiabile Asse, 
Milan: Jaka Book, 1984; II mio paese. Ricordi autobiografici, Bologna: II Mulino, 1985), see Luciano 
Casali, ‘Tristi rottami di un triste passato’, Italia Contemporanea, 1984 (155), pp. 93-99; MacGregor 
Knox, ‘I testi “aggiustati” dei discorsi segreti di Grandi’, Passato e presente, n. 13, 1987, pp. 98-117.
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The leitmotiv of Italian hopes for a fascist expansion in Britain was that the 
country was on the brink of a political and economic crisis the ‘old ’ parliamentary 
system could not master. The Italian newspaper in London, as well as the Italian press 
in general, repeatedly reported this belief, and Grandi constantly confirmed it in his 
letters to Mussolini. Division within the Conservative Party was indeed a fact, 
especially over the India question.10 In this respect, some ultra-right-wing 
Conservatives went so far as to agree with some fascist claims, namely the need for a 
strong government and the application of a corporativist system both in the mother 
country and in the empire. In a letter to Mussolini, Grandi set forth the example of the 
former governor of Kenya (1925-1931) Sir Edward Grigg, who, at a speech in 
Nottingham, advocated the possibility of also applying the corporativist system to 
colonial government. In his opinion, the existence of a parliamentary system was 
itself an obstacle to the administration of colonies. He adduced two basic reasons in 
favour of his argument: the concept of funzionalita, which meant that only ‘men of 
recognised competence ’ would govern; and the suppression of class war: ‘take the 
example of Kenya. Here class war is becoming a race war; whites, Africans, Indians. 
Why could we not create new harmony and efficiency by adopting a corporativist 
system? \ 11
Assiduous propaganda from Italy matched the interest of those Conservatives 
in the corporativist system. Apart from numerous books on the subject, the Italian 
foreign ministry regularly sent to the London embassy an English edition of a bulletin 
entitled New Notes on Fascist Corporations. It was issued by the ministry of 
corporations in Rome and reported information on budget and syndicates, as well as 
speeches by the minister of corporations, in order to show the “tenacious effort and 
stout resistance of the Italian people in face of the depressing influence of the [world 
economic] crisis \ 12 In particular, Grandi emphasised the renewal of conflict between
10 See Bruce Coleman, The Conservative Party and the Frustration o f the Extreme Right, in Thorpe, 
The Failure, pp. 49-66; Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative Party and 
the 1935 Constitution (London: Oriental University Press, 1986). For the British Fascists’ view, see 
William Joyce, Fascism and India (London: 1933); and, from a contemporary observer, the comments 
on Conservatives and India in W. A  Rudlin, The Growth o f Fascism in Great Britain (London: 1935),
p. 116.
llGrandi to Mussolini, 28 November 1933, ASMAE, AL, b. 805, f. 1: ‘Italia - Pubblicazioni sul 
fascismo’.
12 New Notes on Fascist Corporations, March 1932, n. 3, p. 1. Some issues of the bulletin can be found 
in the ‘Carte Chiaramonte Bordonaro’ in ASMAE, AL, b. 775, f. 1 (Rapporti politici -  Italia), sf.
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Baldwin, Churchill, Lord Lloyd and Beaverbrook in 1933 as ‘a new, serious symptom 
of desease and of disorganisation which is currently afflicting the most popular 
British party’.13 Of course, as was expected from an ambassador, Grandi’s public 
contacts did not include British fascists, but members of Parliament, ministers, 
journalists, and members of the royal family.14 In his letters to Mussolini, he wished 
to appear as a sort of ‘ambassador of the Revolution ’, with three key features: the 
father -  and ‘duce ’ -  of the new fascist Little Italies ’ in Britain described in the first 
chapter; the respectable diplomat who dealt with the parliamentary and diplomatic 
establishment; and the supporter of the British Union of Fascists and of fascist 
revolution in Britain. Even when acting the second role, Grandi seemed to seize every 
opportunity to expound Italy’s greatness -  the advantages of having a Fascist 
dictatorship, and the coming sunset of the parliamentary system in Europe. The fact 
that the most common British attitude toward Fascism in Italy was remarkably 
favourable15 pushed him perhaps too far, as he was generally inclined to offer 
Mussolini an overall picture of Britain as an old country, where traditions were slowly 
but inevitably being challenged by new fascist ideas. In 1933, after a dinner with the 
Home Office Minister John Gilmour and some members of the House of Lords, he 
reported to the Duce a conversation with Lloyd George, who, referring to the Four- 
Power Pact and to a speech by Mussolini at the Chamber, allegedly told Grandi:
‘Either the world decides to follow Mussolini or the world will be lost. Only your 
Leader has clear ideas and walks with confidence on the path marked by His own 
will*. His speech to the Parliament, which I read carefully, is a masterpiece of 
moral and political rectitude. ‘Do you not find it strange’, he told me, ‘that an old 
liberal like myself thinks and says such things about He who is the executioner of 
liberalism?’.
At this point Grandi allegedly replied to Lloyd George that his opinion of the Duce 
was not strange at all, what was strange was the fact that he insisted in believing
‘Propaganda corporativa all’estero. Bollettino informazioni corporative’. This bulletin was also sent to 
libraries, universities, politicians and journalists.
13Grandi to Mussolini, 2 May 1933, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f. 1 (Rapporti politici), sf.3 (Situazione 
politica interna ed estera).
14 It is possible to find detailed accounts o f Grandi’s social life in London in L 'Italia Nostra, and 
Grandi’s comments on such events in ACS, CP, AP, Carte Grandi, Fondo E. Susmel, b. 9, f. 1.
15 Stuart J. Woolf; British Attitudes towards Fascism, 1922-1940, in Inghilterra e Italia m l Novecento 
(Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1973), pp. 185-189; Aldo Berselli, L 'opinione puhblica inglese e I'awento 
del fascismo (1919-1925) (Milan: Angeli, 1971); Elena Fasano Guarini, ‘II ‘Times’ di fronte al fascismo 
(1919-1932)’, Rivista Storica del Socialismo, 1965 (25), pp. 155-185.
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himself an old liberal. In order to show that his propaganda role continued even 
among liberals, Grandi said to have added: ‘it would be the greatest mistake [...] in 
the present revolutionary age [...] to classify our thoughts by using dead political 
terms’.16 The crisis was so evident that no one, Grandi argued, could any longer 
ignore it:
Even the old parliamentarians - MacDonald is probably the only exception -  
have become aware of it. They have recently started campaigning for the defence 
of parliamentarian institutions. Simon in the name of liberalism and Baldwin in 
the name of British tradition. We should not underestimate the fact that even in 
England they need to defend liberalism and tradition! .... This is for England, I 
mean the traditional, slow-moving England, intolerant of novelty, represented by 
The Times, a completely new language. It explains the general sense o f fatigue 
which is spreading throughout the country, not only because of MacDonald’s 
government, but also because of the old party leaders’ policies, because of the 
inadequacy of their mental horizon, because of their methods. As I said, this is 
the real crisis .... What everybody is asking for is leadership, a road to follow and 
a guide.17
The growth of anti-Nazi opinion in Britain after 1933, described by the
ambassador as ‘anti-German hysteria’ which, according to him, drew together
18different classes and parties, had two main effects on Grandi’s policy in Britain. 
Although he frequently mentioned to Mussolini that journalists and politicians always 
distinguished between Germany and Italy, it is evident that the British government 
began, as early as 1933, to worry about the ideological similarities and mutual 
expressions of solidarity between the two regimes.19 Rosenberg’s visit to Britain in 
June 1933 revealed Grandi’s difficulties in having to deal with Britain and Germany
90at the same time. The second aspect was a radicalisation of the fascism/anti-fascism 
dispute in Britain, followed by the intensification of Grandi’s support for British 
fascism, as well as his expectations that some kind of fascist action was possible 
within the country. The Trades Union Congress held at Brighton in September 1933
16Grandi to Mussolini, 22 June 1933, ACS, CP, APr, Carte Grandi, Fondo E. Susmel, b. 9, f. 1.
17Grandi to Mussolini, 9 August 1933, ACS, CP, APr, Carte Grandi, Fondo E. Susmel, b. 9, f. 1.
18 Grandi to Mussolini, 3 September 1933, DDI, 7, XTV, p. 150.
19 See Grandi to Mussolini, 9 March 1933, DDI, 7, XLH, p. 197; Grandi to Mussolini, 10 March 1933, 
DDI, 7, Xm, p. 220.
20Grandi to foreign ministry, 10 May 1933, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f. 1 (Rapporti politici), sf. 3 
(Situazione politica interna ed estera); foreign ministry to embassies in Berlin, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, 
and Brussels, 11 May 1933, ibid.
would have been particularly alarmed by this last aspect, as Grandi anticipated in a 
letter to Mussolini two days before the inauguration o f the Congress:
The old leaders are planning to transform this Congress into an anti-Fascist 
demonstration. Yet rather than against fascism o f the fascists, they want to attack 
the ‘fascism’ o f  the labour anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic youth 
organised by Cripps and Attlee, under whose flags most o f  socialist youth is 
gathering .... This country is the tortoise among the nations o f  the world. But like 
turtles, it will arrive, and I shall not be surprised by seeing tomorrow, perhaps 
after a violent domestic crisis [...] Mosley’s blackshirts, Cripps’ labour-fascists, 
and Lord Lyvington’s young imperialists fighting alongside one another.
As usual, Grandi concluded the letter by emphasising his own revolutionary role in 
Britain: ‘as to my own part, as ambassador o f  the Revolution, be sure that I shall 
never omit anything in teaching this English youth all You have taught me, namely 
everything that is necessary in order to carry out a serious Revolution’.21
The outcome of the Trades Union Congress was indeed a debate focused on 
concepts of dictatorship and democracy, which concentrated its attacks mainly 
against British fascism. The participants believed that Fascism had evolved into a 
genuine political phenomenon in Britain as well, and had a real possibility o f seizing 
power. In particular, they compared British unemployment that in Germany, as the 
principal cause o f fascist support. The Congress also raised the issue o f the origins o f  
British fascist funding, which suggested the existence o f solidarity between British 
fascism and the continental regimes. In his letter to Mussolini, Grandi also quoted an 
article in the Sunday Dispatch of 17 September 1933 by the journalist Jan Coster, 
who warned that fascism, bom a year before as a middle-class movement, was now 
‘snatching vital youth from the ranks o f Labour’. He saw signs o f ‘a fusion o f Left and 
Right’ in Britain: ‘seventy per cent of Britain’s Blackshirts are manual labourers’ .22
In the long letter to the Duce, Grandi made clear that he distinguished two 
main ‘fascist’ types in England: Mosley’s BUF and a segment o f trade unionism. The 
Labour MP Sir Stafford Cripps organised the latter:
The attitude o f the Socialist League and its plan for the establishment o f  
socialism are discussed in a recently published book, ‘Problems o f  a Socialist
21 Grandi to Mussolini, 3 September 1933, DDI, 7, XTV, pp. 149-152.
22 Grandi to foreign ministry, 23 September 1933, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f. 1 (Rapporti politici), sf. 3 
(Situazione politica intema ed estera).
50
Government’. From both this book and the propaganda of the Socialist League it 
seems evident that Cripps’ neo-socialism is anti-parliamentary and anti-Marxist.
Petrie has recently written that Cripps is an ‘unconscious fascist’ and both Time 
and Tide and Evening Standard have called him openly a ‘fascist’.23
L Italia Nostra was also concerned about Cripps, and appeared to be convinced of the 
existence of two principal fronts in British fascism, Cripps and Mosley:
Several Trade Union leaders and intellectuals consider the parliamentary system 
as outdated: this is clear from both Mister Cole’s studies and Sir Stafford Cripps’ 
activity at the House of Commons. Thus the struggle against the parliamentary 
system seems to develop in Britain along two main lines: one led by some trade 
unionists and one by Mosley. It is too early to claim that Fascism, as a concept 
and practice of a new civilisation, is taking over in Britain;
nevertheless, it was understandable that ‘the time will come when it will be necessary 
to adopt a harmonic form of class collaboration which cannot be distant from Fascist 
corporativism’.24
Although the trade unionist-corporatists were certainly useful to the Italian 
propaganda, it was the BUF -  the only British movement organised along the lines of 
the Italian Fascist party -  on which both the Italian government and the embassy 
mostly concentrated their efforts and support. Thus Grandi kept Mussolini well 
informed about the progress of Mosley’s activities in England such as demonstrations, 
speeches, and fights against Communists.25 He was uncertain whether Mosley himself 
would become the future British dictator, but nevertheless saw Mosley as the leader 
of a British version of squadrismo. Although the latter was very weak if compared to 
the Italian squadre of ten years before, Grandi thought it possible to compare the two 
situations. This comparison was evident both from the ‘palingenetic’ aspects of BUF 
propaganda and beliefs and by their practical organisation and activities, such as 
violent attacks on Socialist and Communist meetings and the participation of fascist
23 Ibid.
24 Enrico Discoli, ‘II congresso di Bruxelles -  Trade Unions e Fascismo’, L ’Italia Nostra, 4 August 
1933, n. 235, p. 2.
25 ‘Mosley va dedicandosi con sempre maggiore attivita’ ad organizzazione e propaganda partito fascista 
inglese’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 21 February 1933, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f. 1 (Rapporti politici), 
sf. 1 (Propaganda Mosley).
26 See Roger Griffin, The Nature o f Fascism (London. Pinter Publisher, 1991); id., The Ugly Duckling, 
in Cronin, The Failure, pp. 144-145.
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students in anti-democratic action against the Student Unions at British universities.27 
As reported in an article in a German newspaper which the Italian foreign ministry 
circulated among some of its embassies abroad, it was enough to visit the BUF 
headquarters to find similarities to squadrismo: the room contained ‘training 
instruments, boxing gloves and other tools’. Benches were located near the walls, 
possibly for the spectators; a wardrobe contained ‘swords, masks and fencing clothes. 
Probably here in the evenings they proceed to the training of the blackshirts’. 
According to the German journalist, there was little doubt that a movement organised 
with such energy and enthusiasm could not but triumph.28
In Grandi’s opinion, support for Mosley was a sensible action, especially ‘at 
this moment in which the wave of reaction against German fascism {reaction that, in 
its alarmist hysteria is even ridiculous) makes his propaganda particularly difficult 
[italics in original] ’. He seemed to be conscious that some British friends of Italy did 
not look favourably upon Mosley, apparently judging that he lacked credibility, and 
disliking the exaggerated welcome given to Mosley in Italy \ Nevertheless, Grandi 
reminded the foreign ministry under-secretary, Fulvio Suvich, that ‘since last 
summmer, when Mosley started his movement and no one took him seriously, I dared 
to hold a different opinion ’. Certainly, Mosley had bad qualities. He was ‘naive and 
frivolous ’, and his style of life was much discussed. Still, Grandi held that he also had 
good qualities: he was a great orator; lie hits hard and has plenty of guts \ These good 
qualities outweighed the bad ones. 1 cannot say if it is Mosley who will be destined 
to lead the new English youth which is fermenting its spiritual revolt ’; it was none the 
less clear to Grandi that Mosley had a mission in Britain. At the moment he was a 
kind of ‘political Marinetti ’ surrounded by a mob ’; this fact, rather than discouraging 
him, was seen by Grandi as a proof of his voluntarism, and brought the ambassador’s 
thoughts back to the age of squadrismo:
Is it perhaps the case that Revolutions are made by saints and gentlemen? During 
the punitive expeditions I carried out in Bologna in 1920 those who hit harder 
were not the children of good families. Thus I am not worried by the knowledge
27 ‘Propaganda Mosley per organizzazione partito fascista inglese’, Grandi to foreign ministry, then sent 
to Italian embassies in Paris, Moscow, Berlin, Warsaw, Brussels, and Washington. ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 
6, f. 1 (Rapporti politic!), sf. 1 (Propaganda Mosley).
28 ‘Fascismo in Inghilterra’, Rheinish-Westfalische Zeitung, 6 March 1933, in ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f. 
1 (Rapporti politici), sf. 1 (Propaganda Mosley).
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that part o f  the money w e give Mosley will be spent in the night clubs o f  
London.29
From the papers of the Italian Fascio in London held at the foreign ministry 
archives in Rome it is evident that frequent contacts occurred between the Italian 
Fascio and the BUF. In November 1933, one year after the foundation of the BUF, a 
letter sent by the Secretary of the Fascio, Carlo Camagna, to Piero Parini urged that 
the situation that these these connections had created be remedied. The local Fascio, 
wrote Camagna, maintained that it was necessary to respect the Duce’s guidelines to 
the Fasci Abroad, especially the rule that forbade interference in local domestic 
politics. He had therefore always kept ‘a relationship of friendly politeness ’ with the 
British fascists, ‘without getting involved in intimate and continuous relationships, 
and without having official contacts with the leaders \ A clarification of this issue had 
then become more and more urgent, since contacts between the two fascist parties 
had gone well beyond a formal and respectful relationship. According to Camagna, 
repeated invitations from the BUF had been followed by visits of Italian fascists to the 
British fascists’ headquarters; at the same time, BUF members often visited the Italian 
Fascio. Moreover, both groups participated in one another’s public events. It was 
therefore understandable that Camagna sought ‘precise directives ’ from the general 
secretary of the Fasci Abroad. Parini’s answer was a letter to Grandi, asking the 
latter’s views. Apparently no useful answer was forthcoming, and that fact 
undoubtedly revealed how difficult the matter was. The Italians continued to hold two 
contradictory positions: on the one hand, a formal and apparent lack of interest, and 
on the other, in practice, close collaboration with and even financial support for 
British fascism. Although it is possible to know from Camagna, and sometimes from 
The Blackshirt, that the two fascist institutions often participated in common 
activities, very little mention of such activity appeared in L 'Italia Nostra. The most 
striking example of this emerged during a crucial moment in the history of the BUF, 
in June 1934, after the famous meeting at Olympia at which BUF stewards violently 
counterattacked an anti-Fascist attempt to disrupt Mosley’s speech. Apparently the
29 Grandi to Suvich, 16 May 1933, DDI, 7, XIII, n. 615, pp. 675-677. Proof o f payment to Mosley by 
the Italian government can be found in a letter by Suvich to Grandi, 14 February 1934, ACS, CP, APr, 
Carte Grandi, Fondo E. Susmel, b. 9, f. 1.
30 Camagna to Parini, 6 November 1933; Parini to Grandi, 15 November 1933. ASMAE, AL, b. 805, f. 
2 ‘PNF -  Attivita’ propagandistica in GB’, sf: ‘Fascio di Londra’.
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event brought a decline in the BUF’s support in England, not only because of 
Rothermere’s withdrawal, but also because of the comparison between the BUF and 
German Nazis suggested by the conjunction between the Olympia disturbances with 
Hitler’s ‘night of the long knives9.31 The Blackshirt published repeatedly a series of 
pictures of weapons allegedly used by the anti-Fascists, and argued that BUF 
squadrismo (although it did not call it that) was the only assurance of free speech in 
Britain. Eventually, it suggested that the Olympia disturbance was the end of one 
period and the beginning of another.32 The importance of Olympia for the future 
development of British fascism was immediately evident to the Italian government, 
especially because it had brought Rothermere’s retreat. Yet Italians considered that 
the loss of the Daily MaiTs support was an important step forward toward a genuine 
fascism in Britain:
Sir Oswald Mosley was following with perseverance his genuinely fascist 
propaganda and corporativist programme while the Daily Mail continued to 
support the cause of the old parties and of the traditional system, and to express 
its confidence in parliamentarian institutions.
According to the Italians, it was likely that British fascists would now have greater 
chance of achieving power on their own, rather than ‘under the ambiguous protection 
of a defender of old and outdated democratic regimes’.33 Significantly, LTtalia 
Nostra never mentioned the Olympia incident. Instead, the very next day, it reported 
the news of the first meeting held in Rome by the British fascists in Italy. The Italian 
branches of the BUF gathered also in other Italian towns to celebrate both the 
anniversary of the Italian entry into the Great War and King George’s birthday. Both 
English and Italian sympathisers of Mosley’s movement joined the event; the 
newspaper mentioned the participation of Mr William Jones, head of the BUF Rome 
branch, of his collaborator Mr Anderson, of the leader of the women’s section Mrs
31 See Stephen Me Cullen, ‘Political Violence: the Case of the British Union of Fascists’, Journal o f  
Contemporary History, 1993, 28 (2), pp. 245-267; Vindicator (pseud.), Fascists at Olympia: a Record 
o f Eye-Witnesses and Victims (London: Gollancz, 1934).
32 ‘Olympia had to come sooner or later. It is the real beginning of the struggle for political supremacy in 
Britain’ (The Blackshirt n. 60, 15 June 1934). See also the other articles in issue n. 60: ‘The truth about 
the Olympia disorder - Communist determination to kill Mosley’, p. 1; ‘Reason’s triumph - Red terror 
smashed at Britain’s biggest meeting’, by A. K. Chesterton, p. 3; ‘Leader’s great appeal to Olympia 
audience - The people demand a new creed’, p. 4.
33 Movimenti fascisti esteri (Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1934), pp. 70-71.
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Anna Warig, and of some Italian Fascist authorities. Mr Jones explained the 
programme of the BUF in Great Britain, and the meeting concluded with the Italian 
and British national anthems.34 Although contacts between the two fascisms seemed 
to be natural in Italy, Grandi, as the major sponsor of financial support to the BUF, 
was of course fearful of the possibility of a major scandal. As early as 1933, he had 
already warned Suvich:
To commit [the Italian consul in London] Bossi to give money to Dundas is the 
same, in case of a scandal, as if  the money was given directly by the embassy. I 
would also exclude the Secretary of the London Fascio for many other reasons, 
or any other Fascist who lives in London, who would not be able to avoid a 
police interrogation in case the bomb exploded (which is likely to happen, sooner 
or later).
The best solution would be to send a ‘traveller’ from Italy who would remain in 
London for only few days and therefore would become ‘pratically impossible to 
catch’. Grandi was also concerned about the British fascist Ian Hope Dundas, one of 
the principal connections between Italy and the BUF, and a man of whom Grandi had 
a poor impression:
This Dundas has already come too often to the embassy, showing business cards 
in front of employees, with the title of representative o f the BUF, and even telling 
to those who did not want to hear that he was instructed by the Duce to come to 
the embassy, etc, etc. In general he did not give the impression of a trustworthy 
person.
Grandi believed Dundas’ contacts with the embassy were something about which 
Rome should be concerned. Yet they were nothing compared with his receiving 
money directly from Italian diplomats in London, who would hence appear to ‘break, 
according to these suspicious, susceptible and intractable people, the laws of 
hospitality’.35
34 ‘II primo convegno romano dei fascisti britannici’, L ’Italia Nostra, 15 June 1934, p. 2.
35 Grandi to Suvich, 16 May 1933, DDI, 7, XIII, n. 615, pp. 675-677.
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Contacts between Italian and British Fascists
In 1933 the Italian embassy in Sweden sent the Italian foreign ministry an 
article which had appeared in a local social-democratic newspaper about Mosley’s 
propaganda in Britain and the international aspects of BUF policy. According to the 
article, the most noteworthy factor in the development of the movement was -  
although it boasted it was purely British -  its international character. The Swedish 
newspaper pointed out that Mosley had visited Mussolini the previous year in order to 
learn ‘the forms and methods of organisation adopted in Italy’, and had also recently 
met with Hitler in Munich. It also reported some particulars of his recent visit to 
Rome, and disclosed that he was organising ‘study trips’ for BUF members to fascist 
countries. Grandi also noticed that Mosley had concluded an article in one of the first 
issues of The Blackshirt with the words: ‘forward to World Fascism!’,36 in apparent 
reference to Gravelli’s Verso Vlntemazionale Fascista of 1932. The Stockholm 
Social-Demokrat assumed that British fascism was a proof of the existence of an 
international fascist front. One month earlier, Mosley had indeed admitted, in a 
letter presumably addressed to the Italian embassy in London, that he had again 
visited Italy in order to study Fascism in its birthplace: ‘we even had the honour of 
being received by His Excellency the Head of the government, whose work is now 
universally admired in England, and whom we fascists salute as the origin and 
inspiration of world Fascism’. He added with confidence that ‘the last few weeks in 
Rome have carried a long stage forward the great conception of universal Fascism’.38 
Mosley’s visit to Italy had indeed focused the attention of the Italian press on the 
British movement, and the Italian fascist newspaper in London saw the BUF as an 
interesting ‘incognita’ in Britain’s political life.39 The PNF in Italy also appeared 
eager to maintain connections with Mosley at a local level. For instance, the Milan 
branch of the Party had some contacts with him during the first half of 1933 in order
36 ‘Fascism and Peace’, The Blackshirt, 17 April 1933, n. 5, p. 1.
37 ‘L’intemazionale fascista e la Gran Bretagna’. Regia Legazione d’ltalia in Svezia to foreign ministry, 
12 May 1933, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f. 1 (Rapporti politici), sf. 1 (Propaganda Mosley).
38 ‘Atti Mosley’. Letter by Mosley, addressee unknown (probably the Italian embassy), 26 April 1933, 
ASMAE, AL, b. 800, f. 2 (Rapporti politici, GB, BUF).
39 ‘La visita di Sir O. Mosley a Roma - Interessanti dichiarazioni sul fascismo inglese’, L ’Italia Nostra, 
21 April 1934, 221, p. 2.
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to discuss the possibility of Italian publications on British fascism. And in summer 
1933 the same branch asked the Italian embassy in London to forward Mosley an 
invitation to address an Italian Fascist gathering in Milan.40
Political and social contacts between the Italian government and the BUF were 
fairly regular throughout 1933 and 1934. Apart from the official visits paid by some 
BUF figures to Italy (in particular, Mosley and Ian Hope Dundas),41 organised 
numerous meetings both in Italy and in England. Even more than the exchanges 
between Mosley and Mussolini, it was probably the social encounters between 
members that had real consequences for British and Italian fascists in terms of their 
adherence to the concept of universal fascism. Meeting fascists from other countries 
was presumably an exciting experience especially for young Italians who had been 
brought up in the most nationalistic environment and subject to nationalist 
propaganda. Moreover, the knowledge that those fascists, although foreigners, were 
ideological brothers, and the Italians’ belief that they were an example to others, 
probably contributed a good deal to the spread of a fascist European spirit among 
young Fascists during the 1930s.
The BUF arranged tours to fascist countries for its members and for interested 
non-fascists; those pilgrimages lasted about a fortnight, and their purpose was to ‘see 
something of the Hitler movement at first hand, as well as to see in Italy the actual 
working of a Corporate State’.42
In April 1933 in Rome the Duce received a group of two hundred British teachers, 
who were examining the Italian educational system and observing the working of 
Italian schools. Professor Vaughan Johnston greeted Mussolini on behalf of the 
participants and allegedly added that they were glad to meet ‘the leader of the new 
Italy in Rome, which had always been the common mother of all nations and is today 
re-establishing its place of prestige and responsibility in the world’. The British 
fascists and the London Fascio had apparently organised this tour jointly, and an 
Italian fascist stationed in London, Gino Gario, who was also a reporter for L ’Italia
40 Ferri to Vitetti, 29 August 1933, ASMAE, AL, b. 800, f. 2 (Rapporti politici, GB, BUF).
41 See HO 144/20147. Ian Hope Dundas, ‘chief of staff of BUF, ‘left England for Rome on 27/4/36 to 
act as liason between Italian fascists and BUF. Used cover of Daily Mail correspondent’ 
(MF674216/227); ‘Unesponente del BUF a Milano’, L ’Italia Nostra, 19 January 1934, n. 259, p. 2: J. 
H. Dundas, ‘capo di stato maggiore dei fascisti britannici’, presenzia a una riunione di fascisti britannici 
dimoranti a Milano’.
42 ‘Tours to Fascist countries’, The Blackshirt, 1 April 1933, n. 4, p. 4.
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Nostra, accompanied the group to Rome.43 One week later, Mr De Liege, official 
representative of the BUF in Italy, paid a visit to the Secretary of the PNF, Achille 
Starace, to transmit to him the greetings of the British Fascists.44
Invited by the BUF, during the summer of 1933, twenty-seven students from 
the universities of Aosta and Florence spent 15 days in London, where they stayed at 
Mosley’s property in the countryside. As Grandi wrote to the Italian foreign ministry, 
the students had called on him at the embassy, accompanied by two representatives of 
the BUF. Although Mosley had been outside London as a consequence of his first 
wife’s death, he soon returned to town in order to spend time with them during their 
last days in England, to offer them a lunch and to give a speech. Grandi considered 
these exchanges (a group of 30 British fascists had been in Aosta a few months earlier 
and another group was soon going to Florence) extremely useful; they established 
contacts and strengthened friendships.45 Yet Grandi did not see, or did not want to 
give too much weight to, the fact that Mosley acted as a local ‘duce’ for the Italians, 
not only giving a speech but also reviewing them in a military fashion as Mussolini 
did in Italy. This was noticed by L ’Italia Nostra, which set aside its usual precautions 
in talking about the BUF, and gave two enthusiastic accounts of the event.46 The 
British Home Office also expressed concern over the relationship.47
The Catholic authorities in London also helped in the organisation of a tour of 
Rome for British unemployed workers. The visits consisted of three days. On the first 
day, a visit to the Foro Mussolini, where they could attend mass demonstrations by 
dopolavoristi and avanguardisti', on the second day, a visit to a Dopolavoro facility; 
on the third, the Colosseum and homage to the grave of Italy’s unknown soldier.48 
One week later, the London headquarters of the BUF announced to the Italian 
embassy their intention to send a team of boy members of the BUF to Rome to play a 
football match against a team of the Italian Balilla.49
43 ‘Duecento insegnanti inglesi ricevuti dal Duce’, L ’Italia Nostra, 6 April 1933, n. 270.
44 ‘Omaggio dei fascisti inglesi a S. E. Starace’, L ’Italia Nostra, 14 April 1933, n.220, p.l.
45 Grandi to foreign ministry, 11 August 1933, ASMAE, AL, b. 800, f. 2 (Rapporti politici, GB, BUF).
46 ‘Una iniziativa del GUF per lo “Scambio d’ospitalita” -  Studenti italiani in Inghilterra -  La visita 
all’ambasciatore ed al fascio’, L ’Italia Nostra, 11 August 1933, n. 236, p. 4; ‘Gli universitari fascisti 
rendono omaggio al milite ignoto e sono passati in rivista da Sir Oswald Mosley’, ibid., 18 August 1933, 
n. 237, p. 5.
47 ‘British Union o f Fascists and Italian Fascist Students in London’, PRO, HO 144/19069 (486825/51).
48 ‘Pellegrinaggio operai inglesi disoccupati’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 24 October 1933, ASMAE, 
AL, b. 800, sf. ‘GB. Pellegrinaggio a Roma disoccupati britannici’.
49 BUF to Italian embassy, 3 November 1933, ASMAE, AL, b. 800, f. 2 (Rapporti politici, GB, BUF).
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The British fascists’ attitude to these events was sometimes ambiguous, since 
they had to claim to be above all a nationalist party. Yet their belief that Britain 
would be great again only in a fascist Europe encouraged these meetings. The BUF 
newspaper often claimed that Britain would be the next country to go fascist, and 
regarded the meetings as a guarantee of future peace in Europe once this had 
occurred; The Blackshirt continued to repeat the slogan of ‘international fascism’. In 
the summer of 1934 a group of British blackshirts walked six miles to Bristol docks to 
exchange fascist greetings with the officers and crew of an Italian ship, the Monte 
Bianco. This meeting was followed by a second later in the same week. When two 
German vessels also arrived at Bristol, a reunion of Nazis and Italian and British 
Fascists took place. The Blackshirt stated that informal gatherings such as these 
strengthened ‘the good understanding’ that already existed between fascists of 
different nations.50
A completely blank page in the history of British fascism is the one regarding its 
activities abroad. Information on BUF branches in Italy can be found mainly in the 
Foreign Office files at the Public Record Office and from Italian newspapers. 
Between 1933 and 1934 the BUF founded branches in Genoa, Turin, Bordighera, 
Milan, Rome, and Florence. Most of the members appeared to be subjects of both 
countries, either British bom in Italy or individuals with dual nationality, although 
some were British fascists sent to Italy for propaganda purposes. The Genoa BUF 
branch was probably the largest, because of the large number of British citizens who 
traditionally lived in Liguria. The branch boasted some dozen adherents, although the 
British consul in Genoa found it difficult to discover either the exact number or the 
identity of most of them.51 Their local leader was a youth called Browne, while John 
Celli was believed to be at the head of the national movement. The latter was of 
Anglo-Italian origins and used to live in Genoa but, in 1934, resided in Milan and 
spoke English with a ‘slightly foreign accent’. When Browne had visited England a 
couple of years previously, Mosley had encouraged him to organise the BUF in Italy. 
The financing of the party in Italy seemed to come mostly from the BUF headquarters
50 ‘Blackshirts meet Fascisti’, The Blackshirt, 1 June 1934, n. 58, p. 9.
51 Ministero degli Esteri, II fascismo inglese (Rome: 1934), p. 72; British consul in Genova to 
Drummond, 20 March 1934, PRO, FO 371/18436, R1929/1929/22.
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in London.52 In the view of Drummond at the Foreign Office, it seemed likely that it 
was easier for an Englishman to secure employment in Italy if he were a British 
fascist than if he were not.53 These BUF members, it is important to note, saw 
themselves as British fascists who chose to offer their loyalty primarily to Mosley and 
only secondarily to Mussolini. When they met, they usually sent a telegram of 
greetings to both leaders. The most striking distinction between them and Italian 
Fascists was that they were Anglicans. As will be shown in chapter 4, this was the 
main distinction also between BUF members -  either in Britain or in Italy -  and the 
British Italophiles, who were mostly Catholics but not BUF members, and simply 
found Italian fascism appealing.
The main duty of BUF members in Italy was to support the struggle of their 
fellow-countrymen in Britain for the rise of fascism in that country, by seeking to 
fascistise British subjects living abroad. Although they did not have the chance, or the 
time, to have a British Pellizzi, the BUF in Italy perhaps fit the Italian conception of 
the pioneer abroad, working for his fatherland and for the expansion of fascism from 
outside. While in Italy, BUF members not only gathered at Anglican churches, but 
also ‘enjoyed’ the fascist atmosphere of the State in which they had the ‘good fortune’ 
to live: they dressed in black shirts, paid homage to Italian martyrs of the revolution, 
and sang fascist songs. The Italians observed BUF use of the black shirt within Italy 
with obvious pride: ‘it was not without emotion that we saw the old black shirt of our 
revolution worn by subjects of a country so far away, with such deeply based and 
jealously guarded traditions, and with such a severe sense of protocol’.54 At a meeting 
in Genoa in 1934, after the morning service at the Anglican Church, black-shirted, 
they visited a plaque in memory of a dead hero of squadrismo, for fascist martyrs had 
no nationality, and afterward they visited a war memorial.55 The First World War was 
another common memory for Italian and British fascists, for their countries had been 
allied during the war; indeed, Italian Fascist university youth groups in London had 
paid homage to the Whitehall cenotaph the previous summer.
52 ibid.
53 Drummond to Simon, 23 March 1934, ibid.
54 As reported by Drummond to Simon, 8 June 1934, PRO, FO 371/18436, R3343/1929/22.
55 British consul in Genova to Drummond, 20 March 1934, ibid., R1929/1929/22.
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The BUF had contacts with Germany as well as Italy, through visitors from 
Britain and permanent residents abroad. They had a liaison officer to the Nuremberg 
Nazi Partyu rally, and some of them were frequently travelling to both Italy and 
Germany.56 Although Mosley claimed in his autobiography that he personally went to 
Italy only twice and that he was hardly acquainted with Hitler, it is obvious that the 
continuous travels of BUF members to fascist countries, as well as the frequent visits 
of his second wife and of his sister-in-law to Hitler, Goebbels and Goering in Munich 
were not merely accidental, nor unconnected with the organisation of fascism in 
Britain.57 Moreover, as MI5 records revealed, the BUF in Britain had contacts not 
only with the Italian Fasci Abroad, but also with the Nazi Auslandsorganisation. The 
British security service indeed began to watch the BUF from 1934, primarily as a 
result of its contacts with Italians and Nazis. MI5 enquiries, started in April of that 
year, ‘very soon showed that there was close sympathy and some personal contact 
between the members of the Ausland Organisation [sic] in London and some of the
CO
principal personalities at Mosley’s headquarters’.
The reports of the Italian press regarding British fascism in Italy and the more 
general relationship with the BUF were sometimes ambiguous, and reflected the 
difficulties of the Italian government in dealing at the same time with British fascism 
and the British embassy. Nevertheless, as the British ambassador noticed, enthusiasm 
for British fascism was the main approach. In 1934, to the surprise of the British 
consul in Turin, an Italian journalist described Lloyd George as ‘at heart a fascist’.59 
In the same way, Rome considered the ‘conversion’ of John Beckett, a distinguished
56 Murray Stuart to Foreign Office, 11 September 1934, ibid., R5040/1929/22.
57 See Diana Mosley, A Life o f Contrasts: The Autobiography o f Diana Mosley (London: Hamilton,
1977); D. Pryce-Jones, Unity Mitford. A Quest (London: 1976); PRO, HO 144/19069 Metropolitan 
Police, Special Branch, Scotland House, 31 August 1933: ‘Regarding the departure o f Captain J. H. 
Holliman, o f the British Union o f Fascists, for Germany today (Thursday), he was accompanied by other 
members of the B.U.F. It is also understood that a member named THOMPSON, author of 
‘Civilisation’, who is married to a German, left for Germany yesterday (31st o f August). On Friday, 1st 
of September, a party of about 15 fascists is due to leave for Germany. Captain HOLLIMAN, who had a 
special uniform made for the occasion, is being accredited as “O.C., Storm Troops”. At Nuremberg the 
British fascists will attend a review of the Nazi troops, and will later go to Berlin’. (486825/53).
58 PRO, MI5, KV4/1, The Security Service. Its Problems and Organisational Adjustments 1908-1945, 
Vol. I (March 1946), Part 2. The Nazi Threat, 1933-1939, (a). The NSDAP and its Ausland 
Organisation, p. 77.
59 Leonard Parish to Drummond, 20 April 1934, PRO, FO 371/18436, R2563/1929/22. The Italian 
foreign ministry also gave a considerable prominence to some interviews with Lloyd George, seeking to 
show that he believed it was time for a ‘new system of government’ in England {Movimenti fascisti 
esteri, p. 67).
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former Labour MP, to fascism, as an important political event, an example of the 
prospects of fascist success in Britain.60 At the same time, Drummond emphasised an 
article by the London correspondent of II Giornale d ’ltalia, Franzero, who appeared 
to take, in the ambassador’s opinion, the only objective stance on the subject found in 
Italian newspapers. Franzero saw the results of the London City Council elections as 
the image of British popular discontent with the present democratic regime; however, 
those who affirmed that England would go fascist in a few years ‘showed an absolute 
incomprehension of English political feeling’. The main reason was that the British 
fascists were trying to ‘transplant a political theory without first adapting it to its 
surroundings’. A major obstacle was the ‘British detestation of any form of militarism 
and uniforms’, while it was ‘superfluous (and hence irritating) to preach discipline to 
people who by nature were the most disciplined in the world’. According to Franzero, 
this did not mean that fascism would not take root ‘in some form or other’ in 
England. On the contrary, this possibility was evident, but thanks more to the 
influence of ideas on the corporativist state and to popular disappointment with 
democracy than to Mosley’s efforts.61 Some British fascists who were not BUF 
members shared this criticism of Mosley; the so-called Italophiles, who were in 
favour of the establishment of a corporativist state adapted to the British tradition. In 
general, the Italian government keenly supported Mosley’s movement, although 
Italian fascists, Mussolini included, had personal contacts with the Italophiles as well. 
As will be explained in the next chapter, Italians, Italophiles, and BUF members had 
some opportunities to meet together, especially in London. However, admiration for 
Mosley continued to be the main attitude of the Italian press, included Franzero, who 
a few months later paid a tribute to the fascination that Mosley allegedly exercised 
over the crowds that he addressed.
The public meetings organised by the BUF in Italy rendered the Italian 
government particularly uncertain of the attitude it should maintain. Drummond 
noticed this in a letter to Simon in which he gave details of the meeting organised by 
the Roman branch of the BUF in June 1934 to celebrate the King’s birthday. About
60 Again, the Italian foreign ministry was fairly impressed by the fact that a politician already 
authoritative within the Labour Party became one of Mosley’s closest collaborators (ibid).
61 Drummond to Simon, 23 March 1934, PRO, FO 371/18436, R1929/1929/22.
62 Drummond to Simon, 6 July 1934, ibid., R3879/1929/22.
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115 people attended that meeting, ‘over half being women’, and, according to the 
ambassador, only a few were regular members of the British community in Rome. 
The organiser of the Roman branch of the BUF, Mr William Jones, chaired the 
meeting. Representatives of the PNF and a considerable number of other Fascists and 
journalists also attended. Although the British embassy was obviously not present at 
the ceremony, they must have sent an observer; Drummond was indeed informed that 
the Italian authorities ‘did not appear altogether comfortable during the meeting’. As 
the unknown observer suggested, this
was due to the fact that they had attended on the assumption that the meeting was 
an official one to celebrate His Majesty’s Birthday: they may consequently have 
been under the erroneous impression that His Majesty’s Embassy would be 
officially represented.
The proceedings opened with a speech by Mr Jones in broken English (subsequently, 
reported Drummond, repeated in perfect Italian) expressing loyalty to the King and 
alluding to the aims and objects of British Fascism. The reading of a message of 
encouragement to the Rome Branch from the London Headquarters of the BUF 
followed. The event ended with a concert and the singing of ‘Giovinezza’ and ‘God 
Save the King’. Although according to the embassy’s observer the atmosphere was 
‘flat in the extreme’, the Italian journalists spoke ‘of an “impassioned meeting, full of 
inaugural gentilezzd” and of the “very cordial camaraderie which characterised this 
significant event and again united the faithful followers of Sir Oswald Mosley and 
Italian Fascism’” .63
The ‘Roman ’ Roots o f British Fascism and the Fascist International
The British fascists began to write their own history shortly after the 
foundation of the Party. The two main examples of BUF history-writing were a book 
by James Drennan published in 1934, and one focused on the leader, by Chesterton,
63 Drummond to Simon, 8 June 1934, ibid., R3343/1929/22.
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published three years later.64 These works have to be seen as histories of a pre­
revolutionary age, written by men who seemed to believe that a revolution was shortly 
to come: ‘we march forward to a victory which is inevitable’, wrote the biographer of 
Mosley 65 Drennan emulated the structure of Italian histories of the Fascist revolution 
by Chiurco, Balbo, Farinacci, and (in Britain) Villari.66 As well as those Italian 
accounts, which began by describing the transition from the ‘old’ Giolitti-Nitti- 
Facta’s Italy to Mussolini’s ‘new’ age, Drennan’s book traced an ideal path that was 
to lead from the England of Baldwin and MacDonald to that of Mosley. Once they 
had demonstrated their political skills, both Mussolini and Mosley had emerged from 
the chaos of democracy in order to rescue their own countries. As in the Italian books, 
much of Drennan’s narrative consisted of quotations from the leader’s articles and 
speeches. Chesterton pointed out that Mosley, as Mussolini did in Italy, ‘was planning 
the greatest adventure of his career, and the boldest move in the history of British 
politics’. His tasks were ‘more tremendous than any body of men or women had ever 
been called upon to shoulder in British political history’.67 The Blackshirt also aimed 
to appear as a sort of II Popolo d'Italia during the years preceding the March on 
Rome. The faith that fascism would come was reinforced by the notion of universal 
fascism: The Blackshirt frequently reported fascist successes in other countries, and 
put forward the examples of Italy and Germany. Mosley was often called simply ‘the 
Leader’ and presented as the British ‘duce’.68
However, although during the first half of the 1930s the BUF’s main model 
was Italy, the first step for British fascism was to establish a British tradition. As with 
all fascist movements, the BUF aimed to appear as quintessentially national, and 
Mosley stated that ‘if our policy could be summarised in two words, they would be 
“Britain First’” . At the same time, the ‘Modem Movement’ could not be confined to 
Great Britain: ‘it comes to all the great countries in turn as their hour of crisis
64 James Drennan, B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (London: John Murray, 1934); Arthur 
Kenneth Chesterton, Oswald Mosley: Portrait o f a Leader (London: Action Press, 1937).
65 Chesterton, Portrait, p. 127.
66 Italo Balbo, Diario 1922 (Milan: Mondadori, 1932); Roberto Farinacci, Squadrismo (Rome: Ardita, 
1933); G. A. Chiurco, Storia della rivoluzione fascista, 1919-1922 (Florence: Vallecchi, 1929); Luigi 
Villari, The Awakening o f Italy: the Fascista Regeneration (London: Methuen, 1924); id., The Fascist 
Experiment (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1926); id., Italy (London: Fisher, 1929).
67 Chesterton, Portrait, p. 108; p. 95.
68 ‘Mosley! Leader of thousands!/ Hope o f our manhood we proudly hail thee!/ Raise we this song of 
allegiance,/ For we are sworn and we shall not/ fail thee!/ Lead us! We fearlessly follow/ To conquest 
and freedom - or else/ to death!’ (‘Mosley!’, The Blackshirt, 15 June 1934, n. 60, p. 6).
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approaches, and in each country it naturally assumes a form and a character suited to 
that nation’. According to Mosley, if the British crisis had happened to precede the 
Italian, Fascism would have been a British invention, and Italy, followed again by all 
other countries, would have taken the British case as the example.69
A journalist from the Rheinish-Westfalische Zeitung who interviewed Mosley 
in 1933 asked the first question that every non-English person, according to Mosley, 
was likely to ask: ‘is not the fascist idea too non-English, and will it be able to 
overcome the parliamentary tradition?’. Mosley made clear that belief in an 
unchanging traditional English model was a misconception, based on the fact that the 
English nation had always been identified with the average middle-class Englishman. 
Yet history had shown that the English aristocracy ‘had always produced people of 
daring spirit, who yearn for new adventures. It has given birth to men who have been 
able to overcome petrified dogmas’. Some changes in English history, asserted 
Mosley, confirmed his argument exactly: from the lively and prosperous Tudor age, 
Stuart decadence had allegedly followed. But from this decadence, the people of 
England had been saved by Cromwell, ‘whose appearance can be considered as the 
first fascist age of England’.70
In order to demonstrate that Fascism had some sort of roots in the British 
tradition, Mosley’s most important and first act was to look for a usable past older 
than the age of Cromwell. On the first page, even before the contents list of both the 
1932 and 1934 editions of The Greater Britain, he published a drawing of the fascio 
littorio, and gave the following explanation:
Fasces are the emblem which founded the power, authority and unity of Imperial 
Rome. From the Rome of the past was derived the tradition of civilisation and 
progress during the past two thousand years, of which the British Empire is now 
the chief custodian [my italics].71
The Roman colonisation of the British Isles was thus regarded as the origin of British 
civilisation, and the fact that the Romans came from the Italian peninsula did not 
mean that it was a foreign civilisation, for the British Empire now constituted the
69 Mosley, The Greater, p. 13.
70 ‘Fascismo in Inghilterra’, Rheinish-Westfalische Zeitung, 6 March 1933, in ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 6, f.
1 (Rapporti politici), sf. 1 (Propaganda Mosley).
71 Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain (London: BUF, 1932).
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continuation of the Roman Empire and of its mission in the world. Mosley insisted on 
these same points in a small book published in 1936, in which he sought to explain 
fascism through ‘100 questions asked and answered’. The fifth question in particular, 
explored once again the problem of the ‘foreign’ roots of British fascism:
‘If you do not copy foreign ideas, why do you (1) wear a black shirt, (2) use the 
Italian Fascist salute, (3) use the Italian Fasces?’: ‘We wear a black shirt because 
the colour Black best expresses the iron determination of Fascism in the conquest 
of red anarchy. Symbolism in itself is nothing new in British politics .... The 
salute is not Italian nor is it German, but the Germans also use it. It is the oldest 
salute of European civilisation and was used in early Britain many centuries 
before a Fascist Party was created in Italy. The Fasces, too, are a symbol used in 
Britain for the last 2,000 years and are to be found on most of our great 
monuments. The symbol was brought to Britain by our Roman ancestors, who 
were here for four centuries and their stock remained for ever. The Fasces are the 
symbol of the Roman Empire. What more fitting than that they should be used by 
the Empire which succeeded and surpassed the Roman Empire?72
Mosley’s explanation in The Greater Britain continued: ‘The bundle of sticks 
symbolises the strength of unity. Divided, they may be broken; united, they are 
invincible’. Since Mosley explained his theory of the origins of British fascism as a 
legacy of the Roman empire, which he saw as the only common root of European 
civilisation, it seems plausible to argue that he did not simply copy Italy, nor did he 
merely seek a new symbol for Britain, but for Europe too. The ‘Italy of the fascio’ 
was in his view not simply a ‘Britain’, but a ‘Europe of the fascio\ which would be 
led by Britain because the British empire was evidently the major successor of the 
Roman one. The fact that this exercise was not very successful, that it did not 
appear persuasive to public opinion, and that those Roman roots might only be 
invented roots -  an invented tradition - ,  does not make it simply ‘laughable’.74 First 
because, although unsuccessful, the BUF had been able to attract followers, and it 
would be difficult to understand why they had been attracted without assuming that 
they truly believed in the message of the book they considered their ‘bible’. And
72 Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions Asked and Answered (London: BUF, 1936).
73 Mosley’s interest in Europe carried on even after the war, and is well documented in his writings. See 
in particular My Answer (Ramsbury: Mosley Publications, 1946); The European Situation: the Third 
Force (Ramsbury: Mosley Publications, 1950); Automation: Problems and Solution. The Answer o f  
European Socialism (London: Sanctuary Press, 1956). See also chapter 23 (‘The Post-War European 
Idea’) in My Life, pp. 432-446, where he wrote about Europe ‘as a nation’.
74 As defined by Richard Thurlow, The Failure o f British Fascism 1932-1940, in Andew Thorpe, The 
Failure, pp. 72-73.
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second, the British appeal to a Roman tradition involved the idea (and the invention) 
of a common European ‘fascist’ past -  and future -  which is crucial not only in the 
study of the ideological roots of universal fascism, but also in terms of the cultural 
and political relationships between fascist movements, and fascist countries, during 
the 1930s.
A BUF member who left four volumes of memoirs75 likewise suggested that 
Mosley was influenced by the knowledge that ties between his country and Italy were 
ancient ones. They were not limited to the Romans, but had continued throughout the 
centuries thanks to commerce and cultural exchanges, from the Christian missionaries 
of the Dark Ages to the humanists of the Renaissance. Although ‘the spiritual 
regeneration of the young Germans who followed Hitler won his [Mosley’s] firm 
approval’, according to Bellamy, the roots of British fascism were Italian and not 
German: ‘some aspects of Nazism, such as the rising tide of hatred against the Jews 
on the one hand, and the revival of the worship of Thor and Odin and the old 
Teutonic gods [...] evoked no response in him’.76 Asvero Gravelli showed a great 
understanding of both the appeal of fascism in Britain and the difficult conditions in 
which the ‘British comrades’ were acting: ‘foreign fascists are brothers who carry on 
fighting in a sceptical and ambiguous world, who often sacrifice ther own youth and 
shed their young and patriotic blood’. It was indeed moving, in Gravelli’s view, that 
men all over Europe were fighting for an idea that was bom in Rome, ‘proclamed by 
Mussolini who is the spiritual father of the whole movement’. Gravelli considered it a 
duty for Italian fascists to support those foreign fascists ‘who profess, as we do, their 
faith in the universality of Roman ideas’.77 The first book issued by the ‘foreign 
fascisms collection’ of the publishing house ‘La Nuova Europa’ was one on British 
fascism. The main reason for this was not the degree of BUF success (on the contrary, 
the Italians often underlined the difficulties of the struggle for change within British 
parliamentary traditions), but precisely the fact that, in contrast to other fascist 
movements such as the German, fascists in Britain gave their movement the name of 
BU of ‘Fascists’, and adopted as their symbol the fascio littorio, ‘traditional symbol
75 Richard Reynell Bellamy, We Marched with Mosley, 4 vols., Holt, Norfolk, 1968: typescript, xeroxed 
copy, SUL, Special Collections and Archives, BU Collection, Memoirs o f Members o f the BUF, 5/6.
76 Ibid., p. 261.
77 IlFascismo inglese (Rome: La Nuova Europa, no date, but probably 1933), p. 6.
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of the Roman civilisation, which they are proud to continue’.78 Although their slogan 
was ‘Britain First’, they nevertheless recognised the universality of Italian, or, better, 
Roman, Fascism. In 1934 L ’ltalia Nostra proudly reported an opinion expressed by 
the British press magnate Rothermere in the Daily Mail, where he reminded his 
readers the alleged historical debt that Britain owed to Italy:
if  the British of the past had been as foolish as they are now, England would not 
have a banking system, a Roman law and would not even know about football, 
since all these necessary elements of civilisation are of Italian origin.79
One of the organisers of the BUF women’s branch, Mary Richardson, not only 
underlined the ‘parallels between this new imperial Rome and the old Rome worthy 
of the notice of every Britisher’. She also emphasised the parallel between the Roman 
and the British empires, both of which would eventually be saved by fascism: ‘old 
imperial Rome fell, to be rebuilt again by the power of Fascism. Britain shall not
Q A
‘fall’, for fascism has come before it is too late...’. However, the major admirer of 
Mussolini within the BUF was probably Francis J. Burdett. He was only 15 years old 
when he wrote a school essay dedicated to the life of the Duce.81 The 16 page essay, 
which his teacher judged ‘a very thorough piece of work’, was then sent -  it is not 
clear whether by him or by the school -  to the Italian embassy in London, and 
rewarded with a signed and framed photograph of Mussolini. Burdett soon became a 
productive journalist, and wrote in the BUF press as well as in the British-Italian 
Bulletin, a supplement to L 'Italia Nostra that began to appear in 1935. In his essay on 
the Duce, Burdett saw a
curious analogy in connection with the fortunes of Rome and those of the 
Mussolini family: once Rome was mistress o f the world, she was reduced by civil 
wars to ‘a mere geographical expression’, and a member of the Mussolini family 
is rapidly restoring her to her ancient glory. A Mussolini was once podesta of 
Bologna, the family was reduced by civil wars until one of its members became a 
village blacksmith, Benito Mussolini has risen to be the ruler of Italy and the 
‘strong man of Europe’,82
78 Ibid., p. 7.
79 ‘Fascismo in Gran Bretagna -  Un’importante conquista’, L 'Italia Nostra, 19 January 1934, n. 259, p. 
2 .
80 ‘Mary Richardson writes on - New Rome and Old’, The Blackshirt, 28 September 1934, n. 75, p. 8.
81 A Modem Stateman and His Work: II Duce, unpublished essay, SUL, Special Collections and 
Archives, BU Collection, Memoirs o f Members o f the BUF, 5/10/(b).
82 Ibid., p. 2.
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Burdett was particularly impressed by the way in which Fascism, through squadrismo, 
faced the post-war chaos. He not only dedicated a few pages in his essay on this 
subject, but also insisted on it in his articles in The Blackshirt, where he liked to 
remember how
the blood-red banner of the Soviet arose from the ruins o f this once glorious 
people. The sinister red star of world chaos and destruction appeared to be 
directing the destinies o f the nation .... All seemed lost, all was hopeless 
confusion, and Italia Bella, the land of the poets, the land of the arts, the home of 
genius and romance was crushed and dying.
The ‘old men’ in power were unable to cope with red terror, and
Europe mourned the approaching destruction of the mother of her civilisation ....
But a new spirit stirred among the mountains of the North. Like a faint and hardly 
perceptible breeze, springing from out the soil of the Romagna it spread to every 
part o f the land. Wherever it appeared the rain and smoke was cleared away [my 
italics].
Twelve years later, according to Burdett, Italy and Mussolini were ‘one indivisible 
whole’, and it was ‘impossible to think of one without thinking of the other’. 
However, the dictator’s tasks were not necessarily confined to Italy: ‘this new and 
greater Caesar has arisen in the twentieth century to lead his country, and who knows, 
perhaps Europe, to her highest plane of civilisation’.83
John Beckett, another BUF leader who wrote his memoirs,84 revealed that he 
had became a fascist thanks to his visit to Italy in 1929. He claimed to have found in 
the Fascist State the realisation of the Labour programme he had unsuccessfully 
sought to establish in England. Influenced by Labour propaganda, he had previously 
regarded Fascism ‘as merely a brutal last resort of Capitalism, and did not, therefore, 
expect to be impressed by it as a social system’. He recalled that he met in Italy 
Anglo-Italians, Fascists, labour leaders, railway men, and dockside workers:
There was no doubt that die working people looked upon Mussolini as their man, 
and seemed quite certain that, in any reasonable dispute with the employers, the
83 F. E. Burdett, ‘Giovinezza... Giovinezza’, The Blackshirt, 16 November 1934, p. 8.
84John Beckett, After My Fashion: Twenty Post-War Years (London: 1940): typescript, SUL, Special 
Collections and Archives, BU Collection, Memoirs o f Members o f  the BUF, 5/1.
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Fascist decision would always go in their favour. The Anglo-Italians confirmed 
this. They admitted that Fascism had made the Italians a different people, but 
they were not altogether friendly to Mussolini, considering that his working-class 
sympathies were too great.85
A following visit to Italy in autumn 1933 confirmed the impression that ‘here was a 
great new conception of civilisation’; nationalism for him brought no disadvantages. 
Like Mosley in his autobiography, Beckett decided to remove those parts of his text 
concerning links with the Nazis, although they are obviously evident in his 
unpublished draft manuscript:
The conception of national unity in the interests of all classes, combined with the 
abolition of class privilege and the drastic severing of national credit and money 
power from international standards -, -o f the German National Socialist 
movement, seemed to me to provide a basis for the use of the enormous 
potentialities of the twentieth century productive power to organise a life of 
reasonable comfort for the whole of its citizens.86
He generally deleted, either in pen or pencil, racist concepts, remarks about Hitler, 
and criticism of Mosley:
When one- thinks of Genaaany-ene thinks-ofHitler, but also-ofGoering,-Goebbels;
Hess and a dozen- otheHirst -class m en who have-built theh r^eputations with the 
growth of their movement.-Mosley, Forgan and Allen had all made their 
reputations in the old parties, and Joyce was the first new man I had seen
• . 87occupying a prominent position.
In general, at the beginning of the 1930s, British fascists described the German 
experiment as merely a Teutonic form of fascism. It was not as perfect as the Italian 
Corporative State, but nevertheless a step forward toward European fascism. In 1933 
British fascists seemed concerned by the fact that the issue of fascism had been 
obscured in Germany by the ‘irrelevant Jewish question’, which simply complicated
85 Ibid., p. 283.
86 Ibid., p. 345 (strikethrough in original).
87 Ibid., p. 349 (strikethrough in original). After the Ethiopian war both Beckett and Joyce left the BUF. 
Beckett launched a National Socialist League, close to Germany and strongly anti-Semitic. See Gisela C. 
Lebzelter, Political Anti-Semitism in England, 1918-1939 (London-Basingstoke: Macmillan Press,
1978), p. 98; Francis Beckett, ‘The Rebel Who Lost His Cause’, History Today, 1994, 44 (5), pp. 36- 
42. On Joyce, see Colin Holmes, “‘Germany Calling”. Lord Haw-Haw’s Treason’, in Twentieth Century 
British History, 1994, 5 (1), pp. 118-121.
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the access to power of the Nazis.88 On the contrary, the Jewish issue was unknown to 
the Italian, perfect form of Fascism:
If we must look abroad -  as all the world look to-day -  let us recall the single- 
mindedness of the Italian leader, who avoided conflict with Jews, with Church, 
with sectional interests of any kind, and thus established on unshakeable basis the 
Power of Fascism in Italy.89
The Italian foreign ministry could not but notice that ‘The Blackshirt does not 
normally devote much attention to Hitler and admires only Mussolini, of whom
Q A
Mosley continuously claims to be a follower5. It also recalled that Mosley once told 
the correspondent of II Corriere della Sera that the BUF program was Mussolini’s, 
adapted to the local situation and to racial differences; ‘Different fascisms cannot 
exist - he said - only one can; Mussolini’s5.91 James Drennan agreed in his history of 
the BUF, saying that Mussolini had been able to invoke the myth of Rome ‘to 
obliterate the memories of centuries of Italian disunity’. On the contrary, ‘the Nazis 
can only turn upon the nearest aliens in the streets to find consolation for the past and 
assurance for the future’.92 Germany, unlike Italy and Britain, allegedly did not 
possess a Roman past. Still, choosing fascism, it chose to belong to a European 
tradition:
Fascism -  National Socialism -  whatever we like to call it, is essentially a 
European movement -  a political and spiritual transformation, having its roots 
and taking its expression from the oldest seats of European culture.93
The sense of being part of a unique new spirit was indeed stronger than national 
distinctions. In an article in The Blackshirt in 1933, Mosley quoted a letter sent from
88 ‘Anti-Semitism is no issue of Fascism, and is unknown to Fascism outside the Teutonic races. In 
Germany, anti-Semitism is a symptom, not of Fascism, but of Germany’ (‘Editorial’, The Blackshirt, n. 
7, 16 May 1933, p. 2).
89 The Blackshirt, 1 April 1933, n. 4, p. 1. However, the British fascists always underlined that anti- 
Jewish propaganda was not merely a German fault, for ‘it must also be remembered that in Germany, 
Jews are conspicuously associated at one extreme with the Communist and the Socialist movements, and 
at the other extreme with International Finance’. According to The Blackshirt, the Germans should have 
distinguished those German Jews ‘who have proved in the past their love o f Germany and not their love 
of Moscow’ (ibid).
90 Movimenti fascisti esteri, p. 64.
91 Ibid., p. 65.
92 Drennan, BUF, p. 220.
93 Ibid., p. 16.
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a German Nazi to a BUF member, as it reflected not only the spirit that had saved 
Germany, but also a more general awakening:
the victory of Fascism! .... At every moment our policy will be misrepresented 
and our supporters vilified. Nevertheless, we shall advance to power quicker than 
the Germans. We have advanced more quickly than any Fascist movement in the 
world in so short a space of time, and we shall continue that rate of progress.94
A. C. Miles, former director of industrial propaganda and senior propaganda 
officer of the BUF, saw the influence of both Italian and German fascisms on the BUF 
as stronger than the nationalist aspect. He claimed that this apparent disparity 
between the declared ideals and the actual practice of the organisation had been the 
main reason for his leaving the Party in 1936.95 He also wrote that he realised 
thereafter the danger of fascism to democracy and to the future of the country, and 
that he became a member of a democratic group, which included both Catholics and 
Protestants, Jews, Conservatives, Liberals, Labourists, Socialists, and even 
Communists, all determined to ‘destroy the evil of fascism’ on a non-sectarian basis. 
As an example of his main complaint against the BUF, he reported the case of a 
young British fascist, by profession a waiter, who, after learning that 1,800 Italian 
waiters were coming to London for the Coronation celebrations, ‘conceived this to be 
a glorious opportunity for the Fascist Movement to demonstrate the sincerity of its 
slogan that British jobs should be given to British workers’. ‘In his innocence’, Miles 
recalled, the young man rushed to the headquarters and obtained an interview with 
Alexander Raven Thomson. He suggested him that the BUF should have started a 
campaign to retain those jobs for British waiters, ‘more than 2,000 of whom were 
signing the unemployment books at the Catering Trades Employment Bureau in High 
Street, Soho’. To his surprise, Thomson replied that ‘Italians were not aliens, the only 
aliens the Fascist knew were the Jews in the East End o f London’.96 After that rebuff, 
Miles wrote, the waiter left the BUF. According to Miles, many of Mosley’s assistant 
directors were foreigners, especially Germans, and dozens of Germans and Italians 
held official positions in the British movement.
94 The Blackshirt, March 1933, p. 2.
95 A. C. Miles, Mosley in Motley (London: 1937), p. 5.
96 Ibid., p. 6. Italics in original.
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The British fascists, in defending themselves against such accusations, insisted 
that their relationship with the Italians was due to friendship rather than to a surrender 
o f British independence to Italy. A friendship between men who had in common ca 
vast conception and a great ideal’ raised ‘no question of subordination’, since fascism 
would one day ‘unite Europe in a new civilisation’.97 If Mosley claimed such an 
egalitarian alliance between fascist nations in 1933, his views appear to have changed 
a good deal between then and 1939, when he stated that although ‘National Socialist 
and Fascist creed’ was universal, the British did not borrow ideas from foreign 
countries. They had no models abroad ‘for a plain and simple reason’: ‘we are proud 
enough of our own people to believe that, once Britain is awake, our people will not 
follow, but will lead mankind’.98 Only Germany retained a complementary role to that 
of Britain, due to the fact that it did not need an empire, since the new German 
believed that ‘racial deterioration will result from such racial intercourse’, and had 
‘another mission in the world rather than to elevate savages’.99 Germany had another 
duty, the ‘germanisation’ of Eastern Europe and the elimination of the Jews. The 
question of hierarchies within the hypothetical European fascist new order, which 
became acute during the Second World War, was nevertheless already perceptible, 
despite the frequent appeals to fascist solidarity, in the first half of the 1930s. In fact it 
had been present since the first attempts to constitute a fascist international at the 
congress in Montreux in December 1934, and at the three following meetings in Paris, 
in Amsterdam, and again in Montreux, in 1935. The project of dissolving nationalistic 
principles into a sw/?ra-national vision not only appeared to be a difficult target, but 
also seemed to be obscured by the question of the relationship with Germany. The 
most striking fact was perhaps that neither the British nor the Germans joined the 
congresses.100 This fact raises a central question, namely, whether Anglo-Italian
97 ‘Visit to Rome - The “immense majesty” of Fascist peace’, The Blackshirt, 1 May 1933, n. 6, p. 1. R. 
Gordon-Canning so described the imagined future Europe: ‘Before you can build a nation, you must 
have villages, districts and towns, each with their local patriotisms. Out of these one welds a unified 
country where these local patriotisms give way before the greater patriotism to the unified country. 
Similarly, before building a united Europe or an united world, it is necessary to create a series o f nations, 
each o f whose basis are sound and well-balanced from the economic point of view’ (‘The authority of 
Fascism - Blackshirts principles that lead to world peace’, The Blackshirt, 29 June 1934, n. 62, p. 2).
98 Mosley, Tomorrow We Live (London: BUF, 1939), p. 2.
"Ibid., p. 72.
100 Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and France did. See Gisella Longo, ‘I 
tentativi per la costituzione di un’intemazionale fascista: gli incontri di Amsterdam e di Montreux 
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fascist relations changed in 1935. This issue, which involves the problem of the 
nature of fascism in Italy and Britain, will be developed in the following chapters, but 
it is possible here to advance a few hypotheses.
Secondary work on the BUF has generally suggested that from 1935 the 
British were shifting their main allegiance from Italy to Germany. At the same time, 
the National Socialists had already developed their own idea of a German new order 
in Europe which had very little to do with solidarity, even with fascist countries. The 
BUF also took up the Jewish question in October 1934; the Jews had basically come 
to be regarded as the enemy because they were anti-German. The BUF indeed did not 
consider the Jews merely an internal enemy, but a European anti-fascist enemy, the 
core of the anti-fascist international.101 It would be none the less misleading to think 
of an Anglo-German fascist alliance faced by a ‘tolerant’ and anti-anti-Semitic 
‘fascist international front’, led by Italy, politically and ideologically opposed to
i  mNazism. Such interpretation could not explain why Gravelli and most of the 
supposedly ‘anti-Nazi’ young intellectuals, who allegedly wanted to build a tolerant 
fascist international during the 1930s, happened to adopt anti-Semitism in 1938 and 
to fight on the German side in the Repubblica Sociale Italiana. According to Roger 
Griffin, the participants at the CAUR congress in December 1934 did see common 
features that linked their ideas with the practical achievements of the Italian regime, 
which must have represented for them the example for a future fascist Europe. But he 
also assumed that Mussolini had ‘cut the Gordian knot’ of international fascism with 
the invasion of Ethiopia and the consequent alliance with Germany.103 In this way, he 
seems to share the view of Ledeen, according to which, after the failure of the Four 
Power Pact, feeling isolated by the British and the French, Mussolini gave a new 
direction to Italian foreign policy, that led him to accept anti-Semitism and alliance 
with Germany. The ‘new course’ in Mussolini’s foreign policy would have destroyed 
the projects for a fascist anti-Nazi Europe. A recent critic of this view, based on
101 Only in 1939 did British fascism accept the German biological explanations that the Jew was a 
foreigner, simply because he ‘comes from the Orient and physically, mentally and spiritually, is more 
alien to us than any Western nation’ (Mosley, Tomorrow, p. 65).
102 As Michael Ledeen has suggested in Universal Fascism: The Theory and Practice o f  the Fascist 
International, 1928-1936 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972). It is possible to find a similar approach in 
a recent study on Gravelli, Davide Sabatini, L ’intemazionale di Mussolini. La diffusione del fascismo in 
Europa nelprogetto politico di Asvero Gravelli (Tusculum: Grottaferrata, 1997).
103 Roger Griffin (ed.), International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus (London: 
Arnold, 1998), p. 2.
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Grandi’s diaries and on German sources, has demonstrated again how Mussolini had 
started his search, as early as 1922, for allies for a revolutionary foreign policy 
destined to create a new European order. The ‘community of destiny’ with Germany 
was thus clearly in Mussolini’s mind well before 1935.104 Moreover, it is possible to 
find in Gravelli’s literature how Gravelli himself clearly included Germany in his 
plans for the Fascist International before 1935. In 1933 he saluted Hitler’s success, the 
first act of which had been to declare friendship with Italy, destroy Marxism and a 
Reichstag that was ‘ready to ally with France’. Indeed the only obstacle that disturbed 
peace in Europe, according to Gravelli, was France: ‘it is France that obstructs any 
development of German and Italian actions, and that sought with its allies to gain 
from Italo-German losses’.105 Gravelli also praised Hitler, and asserted that Italy and 
Germany had the same enemies and a common mission to work for the cause of 
civilisation. The two countries were so close that, in Gravelli’s view, a German in 
Italy would never feel like a foreigner:
Not only is German taught in Alto-Adige, but everywhere in Italy. It is no longer 
exceptional to German tourists to hear pure Italians speaking their own language 
all over Italy. Is it not the case that the common feeling of National Socialism and 
Fascism has linked as brothers the purest Italians with Italians o f German 
language?106
Some of Gravelli’s later anti-German articles should probably be seen as a product of 
fear of German leadership rather than of any anti-racist ideology. Although Gravelli 
did not stand, during the first half of the 1930s, for anti-Semitism, he basically saw it 
as resulting from the particularities of Germany’s situation: ‘Judaism has had in 
Germany a pernicious importance, especially because of its relations with
107international finance and with freemasonry’. As Emilio Gentile has pointed out, 
racism, as a new ideology, was widespread among young fascists who believed in
104 MacGregor Knox, ‘In the Duce’s Defence. Unconvincing Efforts to Blame the British for 
Mussolini’s Alliance with Hitler’, in The Times Literary Supplement, 26 February 1999, pp. 3-4. See 
also Giorgio Rumi, Alle origini della politico estera fascista (1918-1923) (Bari: Laterza, 1968); Denis 
Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire (New York: Penguin, 1977); Knox, II fascismo e la politico 
estera italiana, in Richard J.B. Bosworth and Sergio Romano (eds.), La politico estera italicma (1860- 
1985) (Bologna: II Mulino, 1991); Lutz Klinkhammer and Enzo Collotti, II fascismo e TItalia in 
guerra. Una conversazione fra  storia e storiografia, (Rome: Ediesse, 1996); H. James Burgwyn, Italian 
Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918-1940 (Westport: Praeger, 1997).
105 Asvero Gravelli, Europa, con noi! (Rome: Nuova Europa, no date, but 1933).
106 Ibid., p. 79.
107 Ibid., p. 138.
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universal fascism even before 1938.108 An interesting example was the publication in 
1923 in Rome of two racist and anti-Semitic bulletins that stood for universal fascism 
and were thus published in different languages: Romana and Veritas. According to 
those bulletins, the major role of international fascism was to fight not simply against 
Bolshevism, but also against the ‘Jewish-Masonic world organisation’.109 Gravelli’s 
position toward Germany became less favourable in 1935, and appeared to include 
the British fascists as well, perhaps because the BUF did not join the Fascist 
International congresses and seemed to come closer to Germany. Behind all this, he 
could not hide what was likely to have been his real dread: ‘opinions exist in 
Germany which seek to suggest that Berlin wants to replace Rome as the centre of 
Western civilisation’.110
As far as Anglo-Italian fascist relations are concerned, and despite Gravelli’s 
fears, plans for a fascist Europe did not die out with the invasion of Ethiopia. The 
BUF built a whole campaign (the ‘Mind Britain’s Business’) in support of Italy in 
Ethiopia. However, the BUF’s increased closeness to Germany played a role in 
convincing Grandi that British Conservative Italophiles were now more useful than 
the BUF to the Italian cause. The British-Italian Bulletin attached to L ’Italia Nostra 
saw the collaboration of many British Italophiles who were not BUF members.
Conclusion
Although a Fascist International never came into existence, plans for it did 
exist. It is possible to study those plans, and ideas, not only in relation to the 
Congresses held in 1934 and 1935, but also by investigating the relationships between 
fascists from different countries and studying the newspapers and books they wrote. 
Until 1935, the BUF not only regarded Italy as the main model, but also decided to
108 Emilio Gentile, La Grande Italia. Ascesa e declino del mito della nazione nel ventesiomo secolo, 
Milan: Mondadori, 1997, p. 204.
109 ‘Profils et grimaces’, Veritas. Bulletin hebdomadaire de la defense social, IX (1932), n. 1-2, p. 3.
110 Gravelli, Panfascismo (Rome: Nuova Europa, 1935), p. 183. During the Second World War, the 
same fear brought Pellizzi back from the idea o f European fascism to the concept o f Nation: it was 
necessary, at that point, to fight for ‘Italy’s spiritual supremacy over Germany’, ‘otherwise even victory 
is useless and harmful for us’ (quoted in Gentile, La Grande Italia, p. 208).
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refer to a common origin: the Roman Empire, Its ideologues and publicists 
distinguished between a Roman and a Teutonic form of fascism, and claimed to 
belong to the first. Contacts between Italian and British fascists were frequent both in 
Italy and in Britain. Dino Grandi, even though fears of a public scandal made him 
cautious, supported the BUF from the beginning. It may be that his letters to 
Mussolini were not always trustworthy especially when he claimed that the British 
parliamentary system was in crisis. Yet it is possible to show that his role in Britain 
was in fact in some sense revolutionary, since he did not behave simply as an ordinary 
ambassador. At the same time, helped by the activities of the London Fascio, he 
sought to convert the Italian community into a Fascist nation within a foreign society, 
and supported the creation of a British revolutionary movement within parliamentary 
Britain. Relationships between Italian and British fascism were however complicated 
by the advent of Nazi Germany, which raised the issue of the rank order of the 
(future) fascist countries. That problem was already perceptible before 1935, but 
loomed ever larger from that year onward.
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Chapter 3
Toward a Corporativist Community 
The Fasci Italiani all’Estero in Britain, 1935-1937
An unsigned, hand-written note of 1935, now in the Gabinetto files of Italian 
foreign ministry, anticipated Italy’s plans for Mediterranean domination, and for a 
future alliance with Germany:
From now onward Britain will always be our most stubborn and dangerous 
enemy, because we challenge its supremacy over the Mediterranean .... They are 
resolute in preparing to wage war on us. Therefore we must not trust their 
friendly proposals .... On the other hand, Italy will never be great and powerful 
unless it is free in its own sea .... Consequently we should, if  possible, take the 
opportunity at this favourable moment [...] to provoke the British until they 
declare war on us [...] and to expel them from the Mediterranean and its adjacent 
territories. In order to do this, we first need to neutralise France, and I believe this 
can be done, considering its fear of Germany, only by offering our alliance and 
by explaining that it is also in its interest to humble British arrogance and expel 
the British from the Mediterranean, which is also a French sea. In case [...] France 
wanted to remain allied with Britain and our enemy, we must withdraw from the 
League of Nations and ally with Germany. It is urgent that we approach Germany 
so that we do not remain isolated in case of an Anglo-French coalition against us.
The present unfair sanctions, wanted by Britain, demonstrate all this even more.1
The plan consisted of three main phases: preparation for war with Britain, ‘the 
real enemy’;2 an attempt to turn France against Britain; and if this did not work, 
alliance with Germany and withdrawal from Geneva. Some histories of Anglo-Italian 
relations during the Fascist period have suggested a different interpretation, arguing
KAppunti’, November 1935, ASMAE, Gab 243 (‘Corrispondenza relativa al conflitto italo-etiopico’), 
1935, n.
2Fortunato Minniti, ‘II “nemico vero”. Gli obiettivi dei piani di operazione contro la Gran Bretagna nel 
contesto etiopico (maggio 1935-maggio 1936)’, Storia Contemporanea, XXVI (August 1995), 4, p. 
592, stated that plans for a war against Britain concentrated especially in August 1935. After that date, 
Mussolini’s intention was to create a political conflict with Britain rather than a direct military conflict 
(pp. 601-602). In Fino alia guerra. Straiegie e conflitto nella politico di potenza di Mussolini 1923- 
1940 (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2000), Minniti brought this thesis further as to suggest that 
Mussolini’s policy toward war was not constant, and apart from some periods (1935 and 1940 in 
particular) the Duce had no interest for war.
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that Italian foreign policy until the outbreak of the Second World War was pro-French 
and pro-British, and that it became pro-German only at the very end, as a result of 
British pressure on Mussolini.3 The propaganda and policy of the Fasci italiani 
all ’estero in Britain and their relationship with both the Italian government and the 
London embassy can contribute to the resolution of this controversy.
The Ethiopian war and the conquest of empire had a major impact on the 
activity of the Italian Fasci in Britain. It determined a change in the structure and also 
in the role of the Fasci Abroad, which reflected the main directions of Italian foreign 
policy and of Anglo-Italian relations in those crucial years. This chapter attempts to 
link three main aspects: diplomatic relations between Rome and the London embassy, 
the creation of an anti-British tradition in Italy, and the activity of the Fasci in Britain. 
These aspects seem to be tightly bound together: the new image of Britain in Fascist 
Italy reflected - and at the same time influenced - Mussolini’s decisions in foreign 
policy, and the activity of the Fasci Abroad, especially in Britain (a country that both 
Rome and the London embassy already appeared to consider as the enemy), expressed 
those policies. In their attempt to achieve a further transformation of the Italian 
community, the activity of the Fasci thus contributed to the development of Anglo- 
Italian relations.
Italian Fascism and Britain during the Ethiopian War
As described in the first chapter, until the end of 1934 the Fasci in Britain did 
not engage in direct anti-British propaganda, but focused on the fascistisation of the 
Italian communities as well as on the creation of a relationship with the British Union 
of Fascists. Even the problem of Malta provoked only one article of protest against
3Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli cmni del consenso (1929-1956) (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), p. 
602, claimed that after the conquest of Ethiopia Mussolini’s policy was pro-British and anti-German. He 
also wrote that until 1940 Mussolini did not make a decisive choice between France and Germany (p. 
340). Rosaria Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino. La politico estera fascista dal 1930 a l 1940 
(Rome: Bonacci, 1980), p. 35, argued that until 1940 Britain remained Italy’s only constant reference 
point. Richard Lamb, Mussolini and the British (London: Murray, 1997), p. 15, accused the British, and 
in particular the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, of having rejected Mussolini’s friendship and of 
having thrown him into Hitler’s arms.
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British policy in L ’ltalia Nostra, and even then it was Lord Gerald Strickland’s 
governorship that the newspaper attacked, rather than the policy of the British 
government.4 The links with the BUF, although very numerous during those years, 
rarely appeared in the newspaper, which dealt with foreign policy issues only to extoll 
the Duce’s diplomatic achievements and to create the myth of Mussolini as Europe’s 
principal leader.
At the beginning of 1935 L 'Italia Nostra was still celebrating the Four Power 
Pact of 1932 as the basis of the European balance of power. It supported an 
agreement between the Anglo-French-Italian triangle and Germany, through the 
elimination of the alleged ‘injustice of Versailles’ that purportedly condemned 
Germany to a permanent inferiority. It was now Germany that had to make the moves 
toward peace indicated by the Duce.5 The London Fascio thought that Germany was a 
threat to European stability, although it usually blamed the British government for 
this, arguing that British politicians lacked Mussolini’s grasp of the situation and had 
failed to adopt firm policies toward Germany. Grandi also appeared to share this 
opinion, drawing a parallel with British indecision in 1914; and it was precisely that 
indecision, he argued, which brought Europe into war. Hitler, as well as the Kaiser in 
1914, expressed the passions rather than the interests of the German people, while 
John Simon represented the lazy and superficial optimism of a ruling class in decay.6
Nevertheless, at least until the Stresa conference of April 1935, L ’ltalia 
Nostra continued to warn that Germany was a real danger for Europe. The symbol 
and promise for the future was the Duce, who arrived at Stresa, ‘fearless pilot’, on a 
Savoia-Marchetti sea-plane and made a ‘bold landing’ on the lake.7 However, the 
national newspaper of the Fasci Abroad, II Legionario, suggested that uncertainty still 
dominated Anglo-Italian relations. First of all, despite Mussolini’s spectacular 
landing, peace depended mostly on those who had not gone to Stresa, namely 
Germany and the Soviet Union, and secondly, the three powers who met at Stresa did 
not share the same views. It was especially important to note, continued the journal,
4 ‘La lingua di Dante bandita da Malta’, L ’Italia Nostra, 9 November 1934, n.300, p. 2.
5‘Dopo il convegno di Londra - Le tre tappe’, ibid., 8 February 1935, n. 313, p. 1.
6Grandito Mussolini, 28 March 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
7 ‘ Stresa’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 12 April 1935, n. 322, p. 1.
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the persistant and typical British inclination to remain isolated, which made 
collaboration difficult.8
The attitude of the Fasci Italiani alVEstero in general and of the Fasci in 
Britain in particular changed sharply from neutral to anti-British between June and 
July 1935. The sudden change might suggest that a decision had been taken at the 
general secretariat in Rome, and followed by the Fasci in Britain. However, anti- 
British articles appeared in L Italia Nostra one week before those in II Legionario, 
and the London paper soon became far more anti-British than II Legionario.9 This 
might seem surprising in a newspaper that had always avoided criticism to British 
politics and society, that might have created problems for Italians living in Britain. 
Grandi suggested the need for a shift at the beginning of June, when he made it clear 
to Suvich that British policies were likely to change in response to two major 
developments soon expected from the Italian government: attack on Ethiopia and 
withdrawal from the League of Nations.10
The ministry prepared for these developments by organising pro-Italian 
propaganda. The most important channels were: a section of the ministry of 
propaganda in Rome under Luigi Villari; a group of Italians in London under Camillo 
Pellizzi, president, and Luigi Gario, secretary, of the Dante Alighieri Society; the 
Italian embassy in London; the Stefani News Agency; the British Union of Fascists; 
private circulation of propaganda material. According to MI5, Villari played an 
important role in the dissemination of propaganda in Britain, both by post and by 
English-language broadcasts from Rome. He corresponded regularly with a number of 
English people who were ‘prominent in literary and. political circles’ and wrote 
articles in British right-wing periodicals. The Dante Alighieri Society also distributed 
material in English. MI5 acknowledged that Italian couriers were arriving from Rome 
at the embassy in London at frequent intervals, carrying ‘large suitcases or parcels’ 
which they apparently delivered to Pellizzi.11 Generally, Villari sent propaganda
8‘Mussolini costruttore della pace dei popoli’, II Legionario, 20 April 1935, n. 16, p. 4.
9cD viaggio di Eden’, L ’Italia Nostra, 28 June 1935, n. 333, p. 1; ‘I volontari del Negus’, II Legionario, 
6 July 1935, n. 27, p. 3.
10Grandi to Suvich, 5 June 1935, ASMAE, Gab 248.
n ‘Italian Propaganda in the U.K.’,MI5 to Home Office,7 November 1935, PRO, HO 144/21079, 
699617/5. However, MI5 reports must be taken cautiously. For example, according to them, ‘Ezio 
Garibaldi was in England for about a week from 20th to 26th October, when in Grandi’s opinion he did 
excellent work in connection with propaganda among the English, who venerate the memory of the 
great Garibaldi. Grandi has urged the Duce to approve of his returning to continue this propaganda until
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material from Italy and Gario selected and edited it. If the embassy approved it, the 
material was printed and dispatched within Britain. Ultimate control was in Grandi’s 
hands.12
The anti-British propaganda of the London Fascio reflected the contemporary 
production of massive quantities of anti-British books, pamphlets and newspaper 
articles in Italy.13 At the same time, the Fascists in Britain claimed to have a 
particularly deep knowledge and understanding of the British, since they lived among 
them. ‘Everybody now attacks Britain’, L ’Italia Nostra acknowledged in July 1935; 
although it was impossible to expect ‘absolutely upright conduct’ from Britain, those 
in Italy who did not know the British well ‘used to repeat the usual commonplace 
which accused the British of hypocrisy’.
We [...] know well that what appears abroad as hypocrisy and deliberate 
incomprehension is in fact caused by the peculiar intellectual haziness which is 
the main aspect of the British mentality .... The lack of rational [...] coherence 
means that the Anglo-Saxons, almost in good faith, are not exactly aware of their 
own political incoherence .... The lack of sense of criticism and of self-criticism 
means that they regularly confuse their own convenience with the universal 
morality, and that they believe themselves to be invested with some pedagogic 
mission toward the rest of the world, without realising that the rest of the world 
has had enough of it; and eventually that they carry with fatuous ease the burden 
of such a fraught conscience which would bend any other people under the 
load.14
L ’Italia Nostra became more and more bitterly anti-British toward the end of 
July and started considering itself as a Fascist newspaper published in an enemy 
country. It now insisted on the typical themes of Italian anti-British propaganda, 
attacking the ‘cunning financiers of the City’ who were at the same time ‘greedy arms 
dealers’. Britain was the ‘paese bottegaio’ already described by Napoleon, a country 
ready to conduct business even with the enemy, because the British, by nature, had no 
scruples when it came to money. The newspaper also emphasised the alleged racial
the Election takes place’ (ibid). On the contrary, after Garibaldi’s visit, Grandi wrote Mussolini begging 
him to keep Garibaldi in Italy because he was only causing troubles to the embassy (Grandi to Mussolini, 
28 October 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
12 ‘Italian Fascism in U. K. - Forward note on the organisations’, MI5 to Home Office, 19 May 1936, 
PRO, HO 144/21079, 699617/7.
l3See Denis Mack Smith, ‘Anti-British Propaganda in Fascist Italy’, in Italia e Inghilterra nel 900 
(Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1973); Luigi Goglia, ‘La propaganda italiana a sostegno della guerra contro 
l’Etiopia svolta in Gran Bretagna nel 1935-36’, Storia Contemporanea, XV (1984), 5, pp. 845-908.
l4‘A proposito dell’Abissinia - II “Leghismo” britannico’, L Italia Nostra, 12 July 1935, n 335, p. 1.
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and cultural inferiority of the Ethiopians. It put forward the typically colonialist 
argument according to which only the Europeans could civilise Africa, and went on to 
joke about the absence of hygiene among the native population, arguing that defence 
of a non-European, non-white country was an indication of deterioration of the British 
race as well.15
It was exactly this allegedly obsolete British mentality, which was due to 
Britain’s spiritual decadence, that hindered a real understanding of what Fascism was, 
and therefore prevented any possibility of a friendly Anglo-Italian relationship. That 
conviction was not simply expounded by the Fascio in London but seemed to be 
shared by Italian diplomats as well. The Italian delegation at Geneva wrote in its 
report to the Italian foreign ministry during the summer 1935:
Stationary for thirteen years, this mentality still refers to Mussolini, to the Fascist 
regime and to Italy as divisions of one of the usual political doctrines, blind in 
front of the reincarnation of this glorious race into a new civilisation due to the 
work of the Duce.16
According to Grandi, the Foreign Office under-secretary Sir Robert Vansittart 
was a remarkable example of such a mentality, since he was still linked to pre-Fascist 
conceptions. At this stage Grandi seemed very pessimistic about the state of Anglo- 
Italian relations. He worried that sanctions against Italy were a trial run for an Anglo- 
French alliance and would be used in the near future against Germany if they proved 
successful against Italy. His words to Mussolini in the summer of 1935 were 
particularly revealing of his feelings during the months of the Ethiopian war and 
reflected way in which anti-British propaganda was describing the military campaign, 
as a war between Italy and Britain:
The criminal British policy against us has transformed our African military 
undertaking into a historical revolutionary conflict between Fascist Italy and the 
democratic reaction personified by die British imperial despotism .... You will 
give Italy an Empire in Africa, but You will first give the Italians something that 
is as precious as an Empire: the consciousness of their final liberty against the last 
myth the new Fascist generation had not yet destroyed: [...] the idea that Italy’s 
greatness could not become reality without Britain’s permission. You have 
challenged the dragon, and You are winning. And the world will acknowledge
15‘La questione abissina - 1 mercanti all’arrembaggio’, ibid., 26 July 1935, n. 337, p. 1.
16Aloisi to Mussolini, 2 August 1935, DDI, 8 ,1, 654, p. 671.
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that, before conquering the Ethiopian Empire, You have won and subdued the 
British Empire.17
According to his letters to Mussolini, Grandi was working on the front line of 
a war that was not only fought on the Tigrai but on the river Thames.18 The Embassy 
was no longer a headquarters of diplomacy, but ‘un ufficio di Stato Maggiore di un 
esercito in guerra\19 The Italians were besieged by a hostile population, and the 
Embassy was working day and night to contribute to the work done in Rome. In 
November 1935 Grandi reported in his diary a meeting with Mussolini in Rome, 
where the Duce gave him the following instructions:
return to London and consider yourself as if  you were in a concentration camp, as 
the representative of a besieged nation. Avoid contacts. Do not go to the Foreign 
Office unless requested. You must give the plain impression that at the moment 
we are not looking for encounters or negotiations.20
Grandi continuously received foreign journalists at the embassy, inventing 
news when he had not received any and relying on help from the British Union of 
Fascists when he needed to counteract anti-Italian demonstrations.21 His perception of 
the Ethiopian war as a war between the Italian and British empires seemed to have 
influenced his diplomatic work, which, in contrast to his own account in his 
memoirs,22 was not focused on finding an agreement with the British establishment 
but rather on fighting on until Britain was defeated. His attitude was of course 
dictated from Rome, where the regime had unleashed a fierce anti-British campaign 
and whence Mussolini supplied him regularly with directives. In particular, during the 
second week of April 1936 the Duce instructed his embassies in London, Paris and 
Berlin on how to act at a local level, since the situation had reached crisis point, with
17Grandi to Mussolini, 17 August 1935, ibid., 8 ,1, 765, p. 782.
18Grandi to Mussolini, 5 October 1935, ibid., 8, II, p. 240.
19Grandi to Mussolini, 28 October 1935, ibid., 8, n, p. 469.
20Grandi, Diario di Londra, entry for 20 November 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 
2 .
21Grandi to Mussolini, 7 October 1935, ibid., b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
22Dino Grandi, II mio paese. Ricordi autobiografici (Bologna. II Mulino, 1985), p. 397. The original
version, I  sette cmni a Londra, which Grandi wrote in Lisbon after 1943, is now in ASMAE, DeF, CG,
b. 153, sf. 1, ins. 3.
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a dramatic increase in anti-British feeling among the Italian masses23 and Italian 
troops on their triumphal march to Addis Ababa:
A deep hatred against Britain has spread among the masses of the Italian people.
The tension is huge .... The British regime has within itself the solution of the 
problem: Eden’s resignation. We must suggest this way out to our friends .... 
Within ten days we shall be at Dessie: 200 kilometres from Addis Ababa. Our 
army is untouched: we have exactly 400,000 men available in the heart of Africa 
.... Do spread the rumour that we have built submarines and aircraft more than 
was previously announced. This will give them food for thought. We are now 
launched and we shall overthrow whoever will attempt to stop us, either by force 
or diplomacy.24
Mussolini likewise ordered the Ambassador in Paris, Vittorio Cerruti, to bluff about 
Italian forces in East Africa: he was to inform the French that the Italian army was 
untouched, that the air force would become in a few weeks the ‘first in Europe’ and 
that Italy possessed ‘an impressive fleet of submarines’. However, Mussolini did not 
seem to consider France as a serious enemy; fundamentally, Cerruti’s lies to the 
French were aimed at convincing Paris to dissociate itselves from London.25
Mussolini made a last attempt to cow the French a week later, when he 
informed the Paris embassy that Pompeo Aloisi, head of the Gabinetto of the foreign 
ministry, was leaving for Geneva where he was willing to accept negotiations with the 
Negus, and even to tolerate a League observer. Yet he added: ‘this is for the 
procedure. As to the facts, I believe that we shall not achieve any result, because no 
one, and therefore not even the League supporters, is able to square the circle’. After 
that, Italian troops would arrive at Dessie, which was clearly ‘a stage toward Addis 
Ababa’, another event that was likely to ‘exasperate the British’. At that point the 
British might propose an escalation of sanctions, after which ‘Italy will leave the 
League of Nations and prepare for any war, while concluding the Ethiopian one’. The 
main line of action toward the French was therefore to spread panic about a war 
allegedly wanted by Britain and of a possible alliance between Italy and Germany, in 
order to achieve an end to sanctions.26
23Evidence o f anti-British feelings in Italy had started worrying the British Foreign Office as early as 
October 1935 (see FO 371/19555, R6168/4276/22, R6183/4376/22, and FO 371/19553, J7559/1/1, 
R6651/4376/22).
24Mussolini to Grandi, 6 April 1936, DDI, 8, HI, p. 660.
25Mussolini to Cerruti, 6 April 1936, ibid., 8, ID, p. 661.
26Mussolini to Cerruti, 13 April 1936, ibid., 8, IQ, p. 701. Italic in the original.
85
On 13 April a number of telegrams from Mussolini arrived on Grandi’s desk 
at the embassy. No negotiation was requested there and expectations of an imminent 
war with Britain did not seem far from reality:
For your knowledge for the week starting tomorrow, which will be important:
1) considering the Anglo-French attitude, we shall not sign the pro-Locamo letter 
nor shall we participate in the [Locarno] staff talks;
2) Aloisi will go to Geneva but the negative chances are 98, the positive ones are 
2;
3) to any aggravation of sanctions we shall respond by withdrawing from the 
League of Nations;
4) we are ready to gamble everything. Accordingly, your activity must intensify 
to the highest level as indicated in my previous telegram, namely to reassure our 
conservative friends, to stir up the anti-sanctionists and disseminate alarm against 
Eden’s policy: he has barked too much to give up biting, but to bite means war in 
the Mediterranean and therefore in Europe.27
Although the ‘key word’ was to ‘calm down’ nationalist and imperialist elements, 
Mussolini told Grandi to ‘disseminate panic about an imminent Mediterranean war 
among the gregge pacifortdaio\ In the meantime, the second telegram concluded, ‘we 
will have arrived at Dessie, the last stage but one’.28
A telegram to the Berlin embassy on the same day also indicated the intention 
of leaving the League of Nations:
To direct Your Excellency’s activity in the next few days:
1) Italy has not sent and will not send the pro-Locamo letter to Belgium and 
France;
2) Italy will be absent at the conversations between the general staff;
3) Italy will send its delegate to Geneva in relation to the Ethiopian question, 
without any illusions;
4) once the conciliation attempt has failed [...], if  they vote for any escalation of 
sanctions, they will provoke Italy’s withdrawal from the League of Nations.
Mussolini also intimated to the German embassy that war was likely in the 
Mediterranean. That step suggested that he was not merely bluffing to divide the 
French from the British or to create panic among pro-sanctionists: ‘to military 
sanctions - such as the closure of the Suez Canal - Italy will respond with total war, in 
the air, in the sea and on the ground’. Finally, Mussolini suggested that the League’s
27Mussolini to Grandi, 13 April 1936, ibid., 8 ,1U, p. 702.
28Mussolini to Grandi, 13 April 1936, ibid., 8, m , p. 707.
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hostility to Italy was at the same time an attack on the ideological foundations of 
Nazism as well as those of Fascism:
During this week I shall study carefully the attitude o f German official and non­
official spheres, to which it must now be evident that the anti-Italian action is 
dominated by elements hostile to Fascism as well as to Nazism.29
Ideas of a war against Britain gave rise to dreams of a renewed Roman Empire 
in Italian publications and in L Italia Nostra, which printed articles on the Roman 
conquest and colonisation of the British isles, while Italian institutions in London 
organised lectures on the topic. Ironically, the Mazzini and Garibaldi Society in 
particular, which had its roots in Anglo-Italian friendship during the Risorgimento, 
increasingly became a focus for anti-British propaganda. In April 1936 it hosted a 
lecture by Professor Franzero, who spoke o n 4 When Britain was a Roman province’ at 
a meeting chaired by the Fascist publisher Edoardo Ercoli. Many young Italians from 
the Youth organisations and the Piccole Italiane were present. The orator reminded 
his audience of the superiority of the Roman empire over all modem imitators and 
evoked the ‘eternity of ancient Rome while the legions of the new Rome were 
entering [...] into the towns of the African land’, which was to become a new province 
of Mussolini’s Rome.30 The Dante Alighieri Society likewise became a channel for 
anti-British propaganda, both as a cover for the ‘Centro P. (propaganda)’ of the 
London embassy and for pro-Italian publications in the English language.31
The London ‘Trench ’
During the Ethiopian war, London was in Grandi’s parlance both Italy’s most 
dangerous ‘trench’ and the headquarters of the enemy. London was also the main 
centre of Italian resistance to sanctions between 1935 and 1936 and the symbol of
29Mussolini to Attolico, 13 April 1936, ibid., 8, III, p. 703.
30 ‘“Quando la Britannia era provincia di Roma” alia Mazzini e Garibaldi’, L Italia Nostra, 24 April 
1936, n. 377, p. 4.
31Grandi to Mussolini, 28 April 1936, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 2. See also Luigi 
Villari, Italy, Ethiopia and the League (Rome: Dante Alighieri Society, 1936).
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Italian power in 1937, when the embassy and the Fascio proudly witnessed the 
emergence of a miniature corporate state in the capital. The resistance was organised 
at every level of society: from schools to churches, from catering workers to 
university professors, from the ambassador to the organ-grinders. It fascistised the 
community and radicalised the Fasci in Britain in the way that had been suggested by 
revolutionary fascists such as Pellizzi and Bastianini, and drew together both 
revolutionaries and moderates such as Grandi and Parini. It also demonstrated how 
important the role of summer camps and youth organisations had been, now that the 
fatherland needed the Italians from abroad. The organisation of volunteers from 
abroad was the practical realisation of the theory of the Fasci Abroad as an 
aristocracy ready to give their lives for the fatherland when the latter was in danger.
The word ‘soldiers’ indicated not only the volunteers who went to Ethiopia 
under the leadership of Parini. According to II Legionario, whose insistence on the 
revolutionary mission and export of the ideals of the Fasci Abroad increased 
markedly from mid-1935, Italian women who lived abroad were also mobilised for 
the war. The women’s section of the Berlin Fascio sent to the newspaper the ‘ten 
commandments of the Italian woman abroad’ as a contribution to anti-sanctionist 
propaganda:
1).... a woman who, in public, hearing the hymns of the Fatherland, does not join 
the men by clapping her hands, may arouse the suspicion that her heart does not 
beat.... 6) after two months of war, let us examine our consciences: against the 
offer of life made by thousands of men, how much have we given? .... 8) a 
woman must be an apostle of faith and propaganda, must read the newspapers 
and be informed about the events in order to challenge false information which 
could damage the Italian cause .... 10) any woman who, in time of war, does 
nothing for the war, is a deserter, whose guilt is even greater because of the 
certain impunity.32
Teachers in Italian schools were also treated as soldiers; Parini addressed a 
mobilisation circular to them before his departure for the war. This meant in 
particular the mobilisation of teachers who lived in the countries which imposed 
sanctions, and if they did not fulfil their duty they were to be considered traitors and 
deserters:
32cIl “decalogo” della donna italiana aU’estero’, IILegionario, 47, 10 December 1935, p. 10.
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The school must become a cittadella of the spiritual resistance of the Italians 
abroad .... Teachers .... are mobilised from today and I shall consider any 
weakness, negligence or absence as a real treason, which I shall punish in an 
exemplary way.33
In October 1935 the Istituto Italiano di Cultura moved to a luxurious building 
in one of the richest areas of London, Kensington Park. It was also organised as a 
school and included a library and a refectory. Classrooms were large and newly 
furbished; the programmes covered courses from primary school to high school level; 
and buses brought students from home to school and back. Among the first students to 
register at this school were Franco and Simonetta Grandi, the children of the 
ambassador.34 This building, clearly different from the traditional buildings of ‘little 
Italy’, soon became one of the symbols of the Italian empire in London. An album of 
Italian pictures at the National Gallery was displayed in the school, symbolically 
representing Italian primacy in the greatest of Britain’s art collections.35 According to 
a British Intelligence report of 1937, the Institute had two main purposes: maintaining 
the italianitd of children while ‘fitting them to obtain a good position in this country’, 
preparing them for both Italian or British universities.36
Schools thus became centres of imperialist propaganda, as well as of open 
anti-British agitation. Not only were teachers directed by Parini and books chosen 
from Rome, but students’ homework and other initiatives were also decided by the 
Direzione Generate degli Italiani all'Estero. During the 1936 celebrations of the 
Natale di Roma, students in every Italian school in London participated in a 
competition, organised again by the Direzione Generate in Rome, for the best essay 
on the topic ‘Illustrate the sacrosanct right of Italy to its colonial expansion’. For 
several weeks the newspaper published the students’ essays, carrying the names of the 
authors as well as their schools. Most essays concentrated on Britain’s envy at Italy’s 
civilising mission, a legacy of the Roman Empire, or on the need of the Italian
33ASMAE, AS (1929-1935), b. 1024, f. ‘Affari generali, 1934-35’. Parini to the directors and teachers of 
Italian primary schools abroad, no date but Autumn 1935.
34‘Un’affermazione nobilissima della cultura italiana all’estero - L’lstituto italiano di Londra’, L ’Italia 
Nostra, 11 October 1935, n. 348, p. 3.
35‘Sabato prossimo al Westminster Hall la premiazione alle Scuole Italiane’, ibid., 21 June 1935, n 332, 
& 1'‘Italian Fascism in U. K. - Forward note on the organisations’, MI5 to Newsam (Home Office), 19 
May 1936, PRO, HO 144/21079, 699617/7.
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population for land as opposed to Britain’s fear of Italian expansion.37 The idea that 
‘we are here because there is no space in Italy’ led to the expectation that ‘many, 
almost all the Italians abroad will move to East Africa to work there’.38 Shortly 
afterwards, another competition asked for a sentence explaining ‘Why the territories 
of the Empire must be loved and defended as those of the Fatherland’. The main 
reasons the children gave were: 1) they are part of our fatherland; 2) our soldiers are 
buried there; 3) Italian families will live there.39
The expectation that ‘many Italians will live there’ was probably shared by 
many working-class emigrants, who envisaged a concrete prospect of returning to 
their country - to its new colony - in order to live a better life there.40 This idea 
probably seemed stronger than the dream of empire itself, although the latter did 
appear to play a role, at least in Britain, in the creation of a new identity for the Italian 
community in opposition to the host country. Many articles in the Italian newspaper 
in Britain claimed that the status of the emigrant was to change because of the 
empire: from being exploited by other countries to becoming exploiters themselves, 
directors and supervisors of African workers in their own colony.41
Once Italy had conquered Ethiopia, the attitude of the Italians abroad to 
conquest and to the future enterprises of the regime had to become one of total 
commitment. Practical help from the emigrants began as early as the end of 1935, 
when Italians who lived in Madrid started to collect money for the war. The money 
was raised in pesetas, which could be used to purchase materials for the war which 
Italy might need from Spanish sources. Shortly afterwards, the initiative was extended 
to other countries (although this resulted in difficulties in Britain because it was a
37‘0GIE - Gara d’onore XXI aprile fra gli alunni delle scuole italiane di Londra’, L 'Italia Nostra, 24 
April 1936, n. 377, p. 5.
38Giovanna Servini and Anita Dichiara, school of King’s Cross, ibidem, 8 May 1936, n. 379, pp. 5 - 6 .
39tI bambini e l’impero’, ibid., 7 May 1936, n. 431, p. 3.
“^ See also Simona Colarizi, L ’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, 1929-1943 (Rome-Bari, Laterza, 
1991), p. 188-189.
41 See for example the letters of Nicola Gattari, former emigrant who volunteered to serve in Ethiopia as 
a lorry driver, La stradaper Addis Abeba. Lettere di un camionista dall’impero (1936-1941), edited by 
Sergio Luzzatto (Turin: Paravia, 2000). See also Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientate. La 
caduta dell’impero (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1982), p. 185.
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country committed to sanctions) thanks to the Fasci Abroad, which, starting from 
Berlin, organised it with the help of Italian embassies.42
The Ethiopian war had an impact not only on Italian schools but also on 
summer camps. During the summers of 1935 and 1936 in particular, the newspaper 
published articles about the camps and about the war on the same pages. The Italian 
word colonia denoted both: colonia estiva and colonia italiana in Africa. New 
summer camps opened in 1935 for the children of Italians abroad: at Tirrenia for the 
Piccole Italiane and at Alpe del Vicere for the Balilla, who also continued to go to 
the summer camp opened in 1934 at Cattolica, the one most celebrated by the regime. 
Parini organised the camps in a new ‘autarchic’ way: all products consumed at Alpe 
del Vicere were produced by Italians abroad. For example, emigrants from Brasil 
provided coffee and those who lived in Argentina provided wheat and jam. A factory 
near Rome, especially built for the Italian Fasci Abroad, provided the furniture for the 
buildings. At Cattolica, a casa colonica behind the buildings of the camp cultivated 
all the products consumed by the children.43 Victoria Station in London became the 
meeting point for the departure both of children to summer camps and of volunteers 
for Ethiopia.44
Finally (at least in theory) these pioneers, who had been practising their duty 
since the time they were children through summer camps and youth organisations, 
had the chance to demonstrate their loyalty to the fatherland in a real war. The 
centralisation Parini had imposed on the Fasci since 1928, which seemed to clash 
with the intransigent and voluntaristic concept of the first Fasci, revealed during the 
Ethiopian war that the original role of the Fasci was not over and that their 
revolutionary aspect in fact had never ceased to exist.45 Articles by Parini in L 'Italia 
Nostra no longer reminded the Italians abroad of their duties toward host countries, as
42‘Appunto per l’ufficio’, note of the foreign ministry, 26 November 1935, ASMAE, Gab 243, 
‘Corrispondenza relativa al conflitto italo-etiopico’, 1935, n. Sent as a telegram to all principal 
embassies.
43‘H re soldato inaugura a Tirrenia una nuova colonia marina dei fasci italiani alTestero’, L 'Italia Nostra, 
12 July 1935, n. 335, p. 1 (also Parini and Ciano participated in the event); ‘Aria e sole per i piccoli 
italiani all’estero. Dopo la colonia di Tirrenia s’inaugura quella di Alpe del Vicere’, ibid., 19 July, n. 336,
p. 1.
^ ‘Duce siam prontif, ibid., 13 September 1935, n. 344, p. 1.
45 When Parini brought them under the control o f the foreign ministry, they became more efficient and 
successful within the communities, but they never gave up their main revolutionary mission, as Luca De 
Caprariis argued, on the contrary, in ‘Fascism for export? The Rise and Eclipse o f the Fasci Italiani 
all’Estero’, Journal o f Contemporary History, XXXV, 2 (April 2000), pp. 151-183.
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they did at the beginning of the 1930s. The emigrants were now purely Italian 
citizens, since the ‘present times’ were characterised by conflict and sacrifice and 
Italians were gathering everywhere, ‘as an aristocracy’, with their volunteers. He now 
told them that Italy was too small, but was becoming larger since Mussolini had 
restituted them, ‘immeasurable treasure, the greatest pride of the greatest Italy’.46
The Fasci in Britain insisted during the war on the universal mission of Italian 
Fascism. They implicitly suggested that if the conquest of an Italian empire meant the 
beginning of a new European order, Rome was to become the centre of that new 
order. The article by Parini mentioned above was followed by one by Pellizzi on the 
universal contribution of Italy to history. A few pages later, an article on Italy in 
Ethiopia was signed by Guido Piovene, one of the most distinguished Italian 
intellectuals who lived in London, who had, significantly, began writing for L ’Italia 
Nostra in 1935.47
The primacy of Rome, it was argued, stood in contrast to the inefficiency and 
corruption of Geneva; among the fifty-two countries that had imposed sanctions, 
Britain was the most hated. While Italy’s colonisation in Africa was due to 
sentimental reasons of prestige and civilisation, Britain’s colonisation was only based 
on economic motives. A frequent theme in Italian propaganda was that no great men 
had appeared in British government for a long time; on the contrary, women were 
increasingly taking part in politics and had began to dominate a country that had once 
been dominated by soldiers, adventurers and courageous merchants.48 At the 
beginning of 1936 Pellizzi attacked the idea that Geneva, behind which stood London, 
could claim a role as a new international tribunal:
Now, it is not possible to create a new universal legal system without Rome, 
against Rome. Without Rome or against Rome only the happy compromises of 
the Common Law can be created, which are longlasting and efficient only in their 
own island. Outside the island, [...] these compromises no longer exist. Even in
Marini, ‘Gli italiani all’estero’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 27 December 1935, n. 359 (‘40° giomo dell’assedio 
economico’), p. 1.
47Pellizzi, ‘La lingua italiana in Gran Bretagna’, ibid., p. 2; Piovene, ‘Le materie prime’, p. 6. On 
Piovene see Renato Camurri, II ‘lungo viaggio ’ di Guido Piovene nell'Italia fascista, in Guido Piovene 
tra ideali e ragione, edited by Stefano Strazzabosco (Venice: Marsilio, 1996). See also Piovene’s works 
Italy (London: 1956) and In Search o f Europe (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1975).
48 Emilio Canevari, La conquista inglese dell’Africa (Rome: Istituto Grafico Tiberino, 1935), p. 307; p. 
59.
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Scotland the Roman Law triumphs; from Louisiana to Argentina, from the North 
to the South of Europe, it still remains the most universal existing legal system.49
The image of France in the Italian press was generally that of a bourgeois, 
corrupt and decadent country (this was demonstrated also by the high number of 
Italian anti-Fascists who found refuge there), neither feared nor admired.50 On the 
contrary, the British empire remained a model to be admired and therefore hated. This 
created at the same time a sense of inferiority, wounded pride, and a desire for 
revenge.51 The number of anti-British books published during the years 1935-36 has 
no equal in respect to France or to any other country.
L ’Italia Nostra concentrated on issues in the life of community, claiming to 
defend the rights of Italians. The ‘traditional friendship’, according to L ’Italia Nostra, 
had died forever in October 1935. During that month a group of British waiters 
gathered in a club in Soho and sent a petition to the Labour Exchange asking for 
sanctions against Italy to start in London, by giving those jobs that Italian waiters held 
in restaurants and hotels all over Britain to unemployed British waiters. That hostile 
act not only confirmed Grandi’s impression that London was the most dangerous 
‘trench’, but also indicated the increasing isolation of the Italian community, which 
risked sanctions although its members lived outside Italy. If in 1936, and even more 
in 1937, that isolationism was to become the basis for a corporativist community, the 
Fascist newspaper had already begun to establish the basis of such a stance in 1935, 
by seeking to create anti-British resentment among the Italians in Britain. When the 
present crisis ended, L ’Italia Nostra warned, the British could, if this suited them, re­
discover the ‘traditional friendship’: until then the Italians had to be vigilant and 
‘keep their nerves under control’. They had to remember that they were hated because 
they were feared:
49Pellizzd, ‘Esperimenti e compromessi gmevrini’, L 'Italia Nostra, 3 January 1936, p. 1.
50 Enrico Serra, Appunti sull 'immagine della Francia nella propaganda fascista, in II vincolo culturale 
tra Italia e Francia negli anni Trenta e Quaranta, edited by J. B. Duroselle and E. Serra (Milan: 
Angeli, 1986), pp. 21-27. See also Virginio Gayda, Italia e Francia (Rome: Stabilimento Tipografico 
del Giomale d’ltalia, 1939), pp. 131-150; Maurizio Claremoris, Noi e la Francia, foreword by Roberto 
Farinacci (Cremona: Cremona Nuova, 1939).
5lMack Smith, Anti-British Propaganda, pp. 87-117, insisted on the salience of decadence and pacifism 
in the Fascist image of Britain. But until the conquest o f Ethiopia, these aspects could not conceal 
Fascist admiration of the British empire and consequently hatred and envy. See also Mario Borsa, Gli 
inglesi e noi (Milano: Fasani, 1945), p. 71.
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It is fair that we Italians who live in this country [...], who have refined the habits 
of these people, by teaching them how to eat decently in decent premises, and 
have replaced their old, dark and filthy inns with modem hotels provided with the 
refinements of continental civilisation, it is fair that we [...] express our 
permanent indifference in front of the foolish show of mean and impotent envy 
by those who have never been and will never be able to take our place. They hate 
us because they envy us, they envy us because we are strong, and because we are 
strong they fear us.52
The English waiters who protested were simply a ‘gang of unemployed’, who 
deceived themselves by thinking they would ‘be able to replace our fellow- 
countrymen in an activity which requires skills the English have never demonstrated 
they possess’. For the first time, the newspaper published advertisements such as 
‘smoke Italian tobacco’, ‘one glass of Italian wine is worth ten glasses of beer’ and 
‘do prefer Italian tea-shops’.53
At the beginning of December the ‘collection of gold’ began, apparently 
assuming a ‘totalitarian rythm’ especially from the second week onward. Grandi’s 
wife Antonietta contributed to the creation of the myth of the ambassador as a sort of 
duce of the Italians in London. As the queen had done in Italy, she made an example 
for Italian women by donating one of her most precious gold possessions to the 
Fascio.5* Lists of donors with names and surnames were published in the newspaper 
every week, to celebrate the discipline, loyalty and sense of sacrifice of the 
community. Offers of gold in every British town were also reported in the newspaper 
every week. Italians who had apparently integrated into British society and lost 
contact with Italy appeared to have come back: the newspaper quadrupled its 
circulation.55 The number of distinguished contributors also increased, including 
university professors and well-known intellectuals as well as bankers and scientists.56 
This reflected an increase in support from British Italophiles, some of whom were 
well known in British society and began contributing to the British version of L ’Italia 
Nostra, the British-Italian Bulletin. In January 1936 the representatives of the Fasci 
from all over the country met Grandi in London to deliver their communities’ gold.57
52‘I camerieri all’arrembaggio’, L ’ItaliaNostra, 11 October 1935, n. 348, p. 1.
53cI camerieri all’arrembaggio’, ibid., 18 October 1935, n. 349, p. 4.
54‘Date oro alia Patria’, ibid., 6 December 1935, n. 357, p. 1.
55‘Le contro-sanzioni degli italiani a Londra - La raccolta dell’oro ha raggiunto le 10,000 sterline - 
ininterrotta prova di fede italiana alia sede del Fascio’, ibid., 3 January 1936, n. 361, p. 1.
56Their names were published in L ’ltalia Nostra, 10 January 1936, n. 362, p. 1.
57‘La nostra risposta alle sanzioni: 18,480’, ibid., 17 January 1936, n. 363, p. 1.
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The transformation of the Club Cooperative) into a Fascist club, which began 
in 1932, culminated in 1936, when the massive Italian propaganda effort was 
followed by successes in the war.58 At a meeting in April 1936 to change the 
presidency of the Club, most members present wore black shirts. The same spirit 
pervaded the Catholic churches; at S. Peter in Clerkenwell the Dominican priest 
Carlo Adelaide, himself the brother of a priest who had fallen as a martyr in Ethiopia, 
held evening prayers and sermons for the ‘liberation’ of Ethiopia by Italian troops.59 
The same happened in other societies, which seemed to become societies representing 
the communities as a whole rather than simply the members. This was evident for 
example during the ‘veglia degli alpini’, described for the first time as a feast day of 
the whole community, and at the same time as a Fascistised day, since the songs most 
often sung included not only the traditional Mazzolin di fiori but also Giovinezzam A 
new song was added, the imperialist Faccetta nera, with words and music printed in 
L ’Italia Nostra.61
The Italian empire in London (May 1936-December 1937)
You [...] have helped me much more than you can imagine. By walking with your 
head up among the British [...] each of you has been, in his own circle, an 
ambassador of Italy.
With these emotional words Dino Grandi welcomed the Italian crowd at the 
embassy assembled to celebrate Italy’s victory in the Ethiopian war. He spoke as a 
Fascist ambassador, as a man who had fought for the fatherland ‘one of the most 
obstinate diplomatic battles in history’.62 The myth of Grandi as ‘duce’ of the Italians 
in Britain benefited markedly from victory. At the conclusion of a ceremony for the 
leva fascist a, organised two weeks afterwards by the Youth Organisations, he left 
surrounded by a clapping crowd who followed him as a procession. The newspaper
58See for example ‘La marcia fantastica nel cuore dell’Etiopia - L’avanzata trionfante’; ‘Le ali vittoriose 
d’ltalia’; ‘D tricolore ed il fascismo in marcia’, ibid., 3 April 1936, n. 374, p. 1.
59‘Chiesa italiana di San Pietro in Clerkenwell’, ibid., 3 April 1936, n. 374, p. 5.
60‘Quel mazzolin di fiori...’, ibid., 27 March 1936, n. 373, p. 4.
61 Ibid., 24 January 1936, n. 364, p. 1.
62 Ibid., 8 May 1936, n. 379, p. 1.
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published a photograph of him reviewing the Piccole Italiane and called him the 
‘soldier ambassador’ and the ‘representative of the Fascist Revolution, prelude to the 
inevitable formation of the Italian Empire’.63
For the proclamation of the empire Grandi was in Rome, where the Duce 
praised his activity in London and allowed him to stay all night in his company in the 
Sala del Mappamondo at the Palazzo Venezia. The bitterness of having been sent to 
London four years before now seemed alleviated by the belief that his work there had 
been crucial and that the Duce had acknowledged it:
No award and no prize could have been more pleasant to my blackshirt heart than 
Your praise, addressed to me in that great moment, for the work I have done in 
this London trench.64
In a letter that he never sent, he reminded Mussolini of the war period, a chapter 
which opened on 14 February 1935 and closed on 18 June 1936, when the House of 
Commons voted the end of the sanctions. On that occasion, according to Grandi, the 
British empire confessed ‘without reticence and dissimulation’ to have been defeated 
by Fascist Italy:
To the African victory against Ethiopia, today You have added, Duce, the 
diplomatic, political and military victory in Africa, in the Mediterranean and in 
Europe against the British Empire.
The British decision to end sanctions had allegedly brought a period in Anglo-Italian 
relations to an end, that had stretched from the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy to 
the foundation of the Fascist empire. Fascist empire and British empire were now 
facing each other, in a completely new balance of power, in a relationship that Grandi 
described as one of military and political equality, ‘nemici potenziali che si 
sorvegliano e si misurano in Europa, nel Mediterraneo e in Africa1. The pax 
Britannica had ceased to exist in the Mediterranean as well as in Africa. A state of 
peace could only exist between a strong nation and a weak one. Between two strong 
nations, Grandi claimed, there could be no peace, but rather an armistice. He wanted 
to remind Mussolini of his efforts and of all the dangers he had faced in dealing with 
British politicians and journalists:
63tLa sagra della gioventu’, ibid., 29 May 1936, n. 382, p. 1.
64Grandi to Mussolini, 22 May 1936, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 2.
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You knew perfectly well that, during the toughest and most difficult days, the 
British, while seeking to scare me and to defeat me, had always largely utilised 
material provided to them by [...] the caporettismo of pseudo-fascisti in Italy, 
among whom the Intelligence Service used to work. During those eighteen 
months [...] the number of communications on the Ethiopian question sent from 
London to Rome was 5151. About 30,000 pages written by myself and by my 
collaborators. About 3,000 night hours .... At day and at night, without 
timetables, without breaks or rest, in an atmosphere which was effectively the 
atmosphere of a trench.
At the beginning of the conflict, Grandi continued, the British had believed 
they could trust him, but they suddenly realised they had been wrong: ‘I was nothing 
but the enemy ambassador of an enemy country’.65 The fact that Grandi decided not to 
send this letter may show his uncertainty, not simply about how to deal with 
Mussolini, but also about how to deal with the British. On the one hand, he almost 
certainly believed he had worked as an internal enemy in Britain; on the other hand he 
worried about the consequences of a perpetuation of this state of affairs after the war.
That relations with Britain were not returning to normal became more evident 
at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, which followed almost immediately on 
Mussolini’s success in Ethiopia, and led to swift Italian - and German - intervention. 
The Non-intervention Committee was, according to the Fasci in Britain, typical of the 
democracies, which at every crisis started founding international committees, usually 
in London, where they could waste time ‘with avalanches of words without 
concluding anything’. Conversely, Fascism proclaimed that ‘silence was golden’ and 
that only deeds mattered. While democracy was paralysing government action, Italy 
continued its ‘upright conduct’.66
At the end of 1936 the Fasci in Britain refused to consider the Spanish Civil 
War as an ideological European civil war. Europe’s problem was not the Spanish War 
itself but the attempt made by France and Britain to see the war as one between 
ideologies, fascism and democracy, instead of a simple civil war within Spain.67 The 
Fasci insisted that the democracies had attempted to transform the conflict into an 
ideological war between themselves and authoritarian states and did not realise that 
the Soviet Union was trying to found in the Mediterranean a centre of ‘subversive
65Grandi to Mussolini, 25 June 1936, ibid., b. 41, f. 102 (‘Documenti non spediti’).
^ ‘Falsa premessa \  L ’ltalia Nostra, 11 September 1936, n. 397.
67<Falsa premessa’, ibid., 11 September 1936, n. 397.
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infection’68. It was evident to Grandi that those British politicians who were not aware 
of the communist danger had at the same time an anti-Nazi attitude and were working 
for an isolation of Nazi Germany. He was clearly worried by the idea that France and 
Britain might support a democratic Spain, ‘barbarian and anarchist’, rather than a 
‘civil and ordered’ Spain under Franco.69 That this international situation might lead 
to an Italo-German alliance against the democracies and the Soviet Union became 
increasingly plausible in the following months.
However, the main ploy of the Italian Fascist newspaper in Britain was to 
pretend that Mussolini was still showing the way to peace in Europe: his quasi­
alliance with Hitler represented another attempt to reconstitute the Four Power Pact, 
waiting now for France and Britain to join the Fascist countries against the Soviet 
Union. Rome was again leading the way.70 Only at the end of November 1936 did the 
newspaper begin to admit the European dimension of the Spanish Civil War, in which 
two opposed political conceptions were fighting. Russia and France were sending 
every military and financial help to the ‘reds’, and this suggested that France was 
going to be excluded from the Four Power Pact proposed by Mussolini.71 Italy and 
Germany stood for the cause of European civilisation, and hoped that Britain would 
join them, since Italo-German agreement was never meant, the newspaper insisted 
between the end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937, to obscure the new attempts to 
reconstitute an Anglo-Italian friendship as the basis of a European peace.72 Articles in 
favour of Anglo-Italian friendship now reappeared, and Anglo-Italian events, such as 
Pellizzi’s lectures at the Friends of Italy society, were once again advertised.73
This situation changed from March 1937 onward, when the London Fascio 
reorganised in a way more suited to both the new ‘imperial’ aspect of the community 
and the needs of Italian foreign policy. Indeed, according to MI5, the political 
situation in Europe had ‘undergone considerable changes’ since 1936:
68‘I rapporti anglo-italiani’, ibid., 27 November 1936, n. 408, p. 1.
69Grandi to Affari Esteri, letter written but never sent, 14 November 1936, entitled ‘Spagna - Comitato
di non intervento’, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 41, f. 102 (‘Documenti non spediti’)-
70<Mussolini per la pace’, and ‘Roma Caput Mundi’, L ’Italia Nostra, 23 October 1936, n. 403, p. 1. 
^ ‘Precisazione’, ibid., 27 November 1936, n. 408, p. 3.
72‘Goering dal duce’, ibid., 15 January 1937, n. 415, p. 1; ‘H pensiero del Duce nell’intervista di un 
giomale tedesco’, ibid., 22 January 1937, n. 416, p. 2.
73See for example ‘Per l’amicizia anglo-italiana’ and ‘L’amaro in bocca’, ibid., 8 January 1937, n. 414, 
p. 3.
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Mussolini has conquered Ethiopia and sent Italian troops to fight in Spain. He has 
engaged in propaganda among Moslem peoples which is calculated to create 
difficulties to the British authorities in countries bordering on the Mediterranean 
and the Red Sea. In brief, the circumstances are such that the possibility might 
not in the far distant future consider the moment suitable to adopt an aggressive 
policy towards this country cannot be ruled out.
Furthermore, British Intelligence believed, on the basis of reliable information, that 
Parini was organising the Fasci Abroad ‘in such a way as to enable the Italian 
government to employ them for sabotage purposes’.74 It was alleged that a close 
relationship existed between the secretaries of the Fasci in Britain, Italian consulates, 
and Italian intelligence, and that Italian firms in Britain were engaged in espionage.
The change in the organisation of the London Fascio came with a change in 
personnel. According to Parini, Camagna seemed more occupied with the newspaper 
and with his own social life than with the affairs of the Fascio. At the beginnig of 
March 1937 he received peremptory instructions to go to Rome for an interview with 
Mussolini. While he was in Rome, Thaon de Revel, one of Parini’s principal 
assistants and a member of the Fascist Grand Council, paid a visit to London 
apparently to investigate the affairs of the Fascio in Camagna’s absence. 
Consequently, Parini replaced Camagna with a commissario straordinario whose duty 
was to reorganise the London Fascio. He chose Guglielmo Della Morte, who was also 
secretary of the Berlin Fascio. MI5 considered Parini’s choice, together with other 
exchanges between the Italian foreign ministry and Germany, as proof that the Fascio 
was being reorganised on German lines. Further evidence of this, according to MI5, 
was an increase in the pro-German and anti-Communist propaganga of the Fascio: 
‘this would seem to indicate that Parini is to some extent imitating Hitler’s campaign 
against world communism’.75
The general secretary of the Fasci Abroad, and consequently L 'Italia Nostra, 
presented the change at the secretariat of the Fascio as a choice made by Camagna 
himself. In a public letter to Camagna, Parini accepted his resignation and praised 
him for his activity in the fascistisation of the community in the crucial years from
74‘Italian Fascist Organisation Activities in U.K. Dominions and Colonies’ - ‘Secret. Additional Notes 
on the Organisation and Activities o f the Italian Fascist Party in the United Kingdom, the Dominions and 
Colonies’, MI5 to Home Office, 28 June 1937, PRO, HO 144/21079, 699617/22.
75"Fascio di Londra - internal affairs’, MIS to Newsam, 11 March 1937, PRO, HO 144/21079, 
699617/16A.
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1932 to 1937. Yet if fascistisation had been the main imperative in 1932, something 
else now seemed necessary. Grandi’s attempt to regenerate the spirit of the 
community with a new Fascist imperial perspective needed the help of a Fascio 
organised in ways appropriate to Italy’s new international position. That this was the 
main reason for the change of secretary is shown also by the fact that Parini had 
called in a commissario straordinario. Della Morte’s curriculum vitae was not simply 
that of a Fascist of the ‘first hour’, but also showed his suitability for the major new 
task, since he had been living and working in Germany for the Berlin Fascio™
MI5’s supposition that the new anti-Bolshevik stance of L'ltalia Nostra was 
due to the reorganisation - and germanisation - of the Fascio is probably an over- 
interpretation of the evidence. The anti-Bolshevik articles were a consequence of the 
Spanish Civil War rather than of a ‘germanisation’ of the Fascio, and they had begun 
to appear before Della Morte’s arrival. Their increase after that may have occurred 
simply because of the continuation of the Spanish Civil War and of the realisation of 
its European and ideological dimension. Nevertheless, two significant changes 
followed Della Morte’s arrival in London: the recent attempts toward Anglo-Italian 
friendship abruptly died within three days of his becoming director of the newspaper, 
and new organisations controlled by the party attempted to give a totalitarian, 
corporativist direction to the Italian community.
In an article signed L ’Italia Nostra, Della Morte launched the first call for the 
propaganda war against Britain that was to continue until the outbreak of the Second 
World War. His attack on Britain expressed neither a sense of inferiority, nor a 
demand for revenge. Nor did it put forward Grandi’s notion of Italian and British 
empires facing one another. It was rather a reaction against any criticism from Britain 
whatsoever - criticism Italians now had to reject as anti-Fascist, and see as a prelude 
to war between democracy and Fascism:
The clarifying, firm and unequivocal word of the Duce reaches us in a 
particularly delicate moment, due to a repeated, furious anti-Fascist attack against 
imperial Italy. It thus comes after the extremism which has characterised the anti- 
Italian attacks o f these last days; it comes after the tendentious, defamatory and
™L'Italia Nostra, 12 March 1937, n. 423, p. 1. Della Morte already had London experience, since he 
had worked there for the Banca Commerciale Italiana in 1931-32. Bom in Milan in 1902, member of the 
Fasci di Combattimento since May 1919, legionario fiumano and squadrista, organiser of the Fasci in 
Vahellina in 1920, from 1934 he was Secretary o f the Fascio of Berlin, to which he returned after the 
few months at the London Fascio.
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false claims which in Parliament, from the press, and even from the churches 
London launched against Italy .... How far do they want to go, in Great Britain, 
with this shifty and treacherous policy?77
Under the supervision of Della Morte, the Fascio organised not in a 
‘germanised’ way, but along corporativist lines. He founded a new Fascist group 
strictly dependent on the Fascio, the Fascio Giovanile, also named Giovani Fascisti, 
which organised Italians between 18 and 21 years old. This institution was meant to 
complete the education of the Italians of the Youth Organisations in a pre-military 
manner. He then appointed E. Toti Lombardozzi to supervise the new group. The 
latter was a young Fascist, although his ‘Fascist seniority’ preceded the March on 
Rome.78 MI5 defined the Giovani Fascisti as a senior ‘pre- military corps’ and warned 
the Home Office that most of these young Italians were British-born and therefore 
British subjects. In case of war they were likely to give their loyalty to Italy; yet they 
‘would not be liable to deportation and such other restrictions as would normally be 
placed on Italian subjects’.79
Parini claimed that it was no longer relevant if Italians had to work far from 
the fatherland for other countries: ‘today the ancient sense of injustice and 
humiliation which oppressed the heart of every emigrant has disappeared’. The 
‘vexed spirits of the Italian masses who in the last fifty years have broken their hands 
and lost their lives in the hardest jobs under the greediest foreign capitalists, are now 
pacified’. The new pride now shared by many Italians in the world had made 
foreigners less favourable. This situation could be overcome only if the Italians 
expressed total solidarity among themselves by establishing separate communities of 
pure Italian ‘race’:
We must close our ranks and help each other with absolute honesty .... We must 
gather in the Italian communities abroad and keep them alive. The Italians must 
know each other and must favour marriages among Italians as much as possible.
A mixed marriage is always an attack on the italianita o f the family. Most of the 
time, children will not speak the Italian language and will have lost part of then- 
own soul [...] by confusing blood, languages, habits and ideas.80
77‘XVm Annuale dei Fasci - Ricordare e prepararsi questo e il monito delTodiema celebrazione’, 
L 'Italia Nostra, 26 March 1937, n. 425, p. 1.
Fasci giovanili’, ibid., 2 April 1937, n. 426, p. 1.
79‘Italian Fascist Organisation Activities in U.K. Dominions and Colonies’, MI5 to Home Office, June 
1937, PRO, HO 144/21079, 699617/22.
8(>Parini, ‘Italianita integrale’, L 'Italia Nostra, 26 March 1937, n. 425, pp. 1-2.
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The greatest symbol of the new community and of the Italian empire in 
London was the new building of the Casa d ’Italia. The Fascio bought it in November 
1936 and opened it officially one year later. In the meantime, many articles described 
it, photographs appeared in the newspaper and it became a central topic in the 
correspondence between Rome and the embassy. It was a huge building on Charing 
Cross Road, named Casa del Littorio, with a main salon and three galleries named the 
Sal a dell’lmpero for the community’s gatherings. The basement contained a 
restaurant, recreation rooms, and a circolo dopolavoristico organised like those in 
Italy. The latter was in fact the old Club Cooperativo, centre of Italian life in London 
since before Fascism, now transformed into a Club dopolavoristico. The Fascio was 
to be the first organisation to move there, followed by the Veterans Association and 
the Alpini, and finally, when the upper floors were ready, by the semi-official 
organisations of the Italian community.81 Parini understood the importance of such a 
change in the image of the Italian community in London, which, for its position in the 
new international order, needed proof of the interest of the Italian government. He 
therefore approved the requests for more funds from consul in London Giuseppe 
Biondelli and even planned to be present at the opening.82
In July 1937 Parini considered that Della Morte’s ‘mission had been 
completed’ and therefore the time had come to nominate a permanent secretary. Della 
Morte was to return to Berlin, not merely as secretary of the Fascio but also as 
Inspector of the Fasci of Germany83. The new secretary, as Grandi proclaimed in a 
letter published two weeks later in L ’Italia Nostra, was to be Giovanni Telesio, the 
London correspondent of II Resto del Carlino, not only a ‘blackshirt of the 
Revolution’, but also a legionario of the African war, who, significantly, had 
volunteered from the London Fascio for service in Ethiopia.84
The reorganisation of the Fascio and the new direction given by Della Morte 
remained visible in the newspaper. The language itself made the newspaper very 
similar to Fascist newspapers in Italy particularly in the attitude to Britain, which it 
now attacked recklessly and even with contempt. From June 1937 onward the alliance
81‘La Casa del Littorio’, ibid., 20 November 1936, n. 407, p. 1.
82Parini to Grandi, 10 April 1937, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 48, f. 121; Grandi to Parini, 4 May 1937, ibid.
83‘La vibrante assemblea del fascio ‘Amaldo Mussolini” , L ’Italia Nostra, 16 July 1937, n. 441, p. 1.
84‘Una lettera di S. E. Dino Grandi al segretario del Fascio\ ibid., 30 July 1937, n. 443, p. 1.
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with Germany became an exclusive alliance, without any consideration of overture to 
thie democracies. The Rome-Berlin Axis was mentioned for the first time in June 
1937, and its basis was now explained not in terms of diplomacy but in terms of the 
spiritual values of two ‘new peoples’. The two Axis ambassadors, Grandi and 
Jo»achim von Ribbentrop, were fighting for European civilisation in the Non- 
Intervention Committee in London, and the readers of L ’ltalia Nostra suddenly 
discovered that Italy’s mission in Europe was now to be an Italo-German one, led by 
two leaders, Hitler and Mussolini, and in Britain by both the Italian and the German 
ambassadors.85
The climax came with Mussolini’s visit to Hitler in Berlin in September 1937. 
Parini requested the active participation of the Fasci in Germany organised by Della 
Morte, and addressed to them a message in which he emphasised that Italo-German 
friendship was not ‘an accidental event’, but constituted ‘a formidable garantee for 
the future’. He then reminded the Italians that
the imminent journey of the Duce to Germany [...] represents the highest and 
proudest emotion to the Italians who live and work there. They have the 
opportunity to see, outside the borders of Italy, in the historical and political 
climate of a country linked to Fascist Italy by an intimate solidarity o f faith and 
deeds, the Man toward whom the Italians abroad, more than anyone else, feel the 
most ardent love and passionate devotion.86
Italians who lived in the British empire were not as lucky as those living in Germany:
a foreigner who has lived there, who had to toil hard to earn daily bread under 
British laws, moving under the shadow of the Union Jack, becomes either mad 
because of desperation or consumed with anger. No people know the art of 
humiliating peoples of other origins as well as the British.87
These humiliations no longer (allegedly) offended the Italians, who could now 
measure the abyss that separated them and the Germans from the democracies. 
Germany and Italy stood as examples of success and continuous improvement for 
many years (although Germany had in fact appeared in the newspaper only recently).
85‘H perche’, ibid., 14 May 1937, n. 432, p. 1; ‘L’asse Roma-Berlino’, ibid., 4 June 1937, n. 435, p. 1; 
‘Punti fermi’, ibid., 16 July 1937, n. 441, p. 1.
86‘Gli sguardi del mondo su Berlino per l’incontro tra Mussolini e Hitler - Le Camicie Nere di Germania 
chiamante (sic) a raccolta da un appello di Piero Parini’, ibid., 24 September 1937, n. 451, p. 1.
87<Italiani in terra d’Albione - Sensazioni identiche sotto cieli diversi’, ibid., 24 Sept 1937, n. 451, p. 3.
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‘They are not so unlucky’, admitted Lltalia Nostra, ‘as to enumerate Anglican 
archbishops or hysterical suffragettes among the figures of their political life’. 
However, even if this happened, ‘no one in Germany and in Italy would hesitate in 
finding immediately a suitable place for their disturbing activity’.88 The 
remilitarisation of the Rhineland, which the London Fascio had viewed with anxiety 
two years before, it now compared to the Italian victory in Ethiopia, and the Berlin 
crowds now became ‘Italo-German multitudes’.89
The change in Italian foreign policy was also visible in the organisation of 
summer camps. MI5 had recognised a change in the propaganda at the summer camps 
due to the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936. From that summer, the object was also to 
‘remind Italians that they now have an Empire of which they must be worthy’. Even 
more than before, it became necessary that children had some knowledge of the 
Italian language since it was no longer acceptable that the Italian public hear ‘a 
strange language spoken among Italian children from abroad’. In selecting the 
children, the Fasci in Britain gave preference to sons and daughters of volunteers or 
those either killed or wounded in the Ethiopian campaign. According to MI5, summer 
camps were the most dangerous institution of Fascism abroad and it was important to 
keep record of all the names of the children from Britain, ‘so that these may be 
available in case in the event of war it should be necessary to take action regarding 
persons of dual nationality (who had then become of military age)’.90 For the first 
time, in the summer of 1937 foreign children, especially from Nazi Germany, were 
also invited to participate in the camps; children came from Spain too, where they 
were allegedly hoping to bring forward their own fascist revolution and to enjoy 
similar holidays in their own country once Franco had won the civil war.91
The Italians who lived in Britain therefore witnessed notable changes in 
Italian propaganda in the course of 1936-37. It was no longer simply anti-British as 
during the Ethiopian war, but rather noticeably more proud and aggressive, and based 
on the concept of a joint Italo-German struggle against the Western democracies. The
88‘Rinnovo di patente’, ibid., 8 October 1937, n. 453, p. 1.
89‘La Russia e il Comitem - II patto anticomunista’, ibid., 19 November 1937, n. 459, p. 3.
90 “Italian Summer Camps”, MI5 report, 18 August 1937, PRO, HO 144/21079, 699617/20.
91 ‘Verso il sole, il mare, le montagne’, L ’Italia Nostra, 6 August 1937, n. 444, p. 1; ‘A1 campo
Mussolini di Roma’, ibid., 3 September 1937, n. 448, p. 1; ‘Ventimila giovani fascisti all’estero 
acclamano il Duce in Roma etema’, ibid., 10 September 1937, n. 449, p.2.
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reorganisation of the Fascio and the new Casa d ’ltalia also meant to convince them 
that the regime now looked at them under a different light and expected more from 
them. Corporativism was particularly encouraged. Every Italian profession in Britain 
was praised as patriotic for its resistance during the war, and the Fascio sought to 
encourage the creation of corporative organisations. Every sector began to be 
described as a corporation with a particular mission.92 The most successful example 
of corporativism was the foundation at the end of November, in the presence of the 
secretary of the Fascio Bernardo Telesio, of an Associazione dei caffettieri.n 
According to MI5 records, it included the owners of about 150 out of the 700 Italian 
cafEs in inner London, and those principally responsible for setting it up were 
prominent members of the London Fascio. At the foundation ceremony, the 
authorities of the Fascio proposed that Italian Fascists in Britain use their profits to 
purchase land in Italy and return to their country as landowners. They also insisted 
that owners of Italian coffee shops buy their supplies only from Italian stores in 
Britain, or directly from Italy, rather than from British suppliers.94
In 1937 the membership of the London Fascio stood at approximately 900 
adults, or 1000 including the Fascio femminile. MI5 considered this to be a very low 
number, given the community of 10,942 Italians then living in London. Yet the 
number of those affiliated to other Fascist institutions in London might have made the 
figure much higher. MI5 calculated that by adding the members of the Fascio to those 
affiliated to the Youth Organisations, the total came to 2,092, although according to 
the newspaper the figure was 2,379. To this the newspaper added those who had 
recently applied to the Fascio, the members of the dopolavoro, of the dopolavoro 
sportivo and of the sezione dopolavorisctica Mazzini e Garibaldi, bringing the total to 
3479. As the newspaper emphasised, this number represented the organisations 
directly dependent on the Fascio. Adding all the other Italian veterans’, patriotic and 
corporativist organisations, brought the total to over 6,000.95
^See for example the appeals to hotel keepers and to chefs in L ’Italia Nostra of 7 May 1937, n. 431, p. 
1 (‘Benemeriti’) and of 21 May 1937, n. 433, p. 1 (again ‘Benemeriti’).
93tI proprietari di caffe si uniscono in associazione’, ibid., 26 November 1937, n. 460, p. 4.
94‘Association of Italian Cafe Keepers in London - Formation’, Metropolitan Police, Special Branch, 
Scotland House, 18 December 1937, HO 144/21079, 669617/26.
95 ‘Italian Fascism in U. K. - Forward note on the organisations’, MI5 to Newsam, HO 144/21079, 
699617/7; ‘L’assemblea generale alia casa del Fascio - Le camicie nere di Londra salutano l’anno XVI 
col grido: viva il Duce!’, L ’ItaliaNostra, 5 November 1937, n. 457, p. 1.
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At the end of 1937, Dino Grandi’s image among the Italians seemed to have 
reached its zenith as well. Hero of the Ethiopian war, he was both a charismatic and 
revolutionary leader and a father who loved all common Italians as his own family. 
During the Ethiopian war he had praised those Italians who helped keep his morale 
high, including the poorest organ players who played patriotic songs. In October 1937 
he published in the newspaper a letter of gratitude to an old woman who had played 
her organ outside the embassy during the war:
The small humble woman who, during sanctions, used to come every day and 
play Marcia Reale and Giovinezza with her organ under the windows of the 
Italian embassy, encouraging my fight and my work, is in my eyes worth more 
than one hundred duchesses.
When she fell ill at the beginning of October, Grandi paid her a visit at the hospital. 
She had emigrated from Naples when she was a young girl, and she spoke to Grandi 
with a mixture of English and Neapolitan. Among a crowd of Italians and of surprised 
English nurses, everyone was moved, according to L ’ltalia Nostra, by such an 
emotional meeting.96
The final turning point in the transformation of the Italian community came 
with Italy’s withdrawal from Geneva and was anticipated by a dramatic speech by 
Grandi at the opening of the new Casa d'ltalia. The radically Fascist style of his 
speech well represented the ideals supported by Pellizzi of a revolutionary community 
led by a revolutionary Fascio and embassy:
Camerati,
tonight’s gathering is not a meeting, nor a reunion just to listen to speeches: it is a 
report, a great typically military and spiritually Fascist report, and, I would like to 
add, a squadrista report.
He then reminded the audience of the help he had received from his fellow- 
countrymen during the most difficult battle of his life:
The Italians in London have helped me, every time I had a doubt, a weakness, I 
used to go and look for them all over London, to see their proud and firm smile 
and to find my faith again and restart the struggle.
^Dino Grandi, ‘L’ambasciatore da Teresa Papa’, ibid., 8 October 1937, n. 453, p. 1.
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Subsequently, he thanked the consul Biondelli for co-ordinating the transformation of 
the Club Cooperative) into the Dopolavoro Fascista, and underlined how deep and 
meaningful this change had been:
Someone said that this was not necessary, that nothing has changed, that 
everything is like it used to be. No! My dear earnerati, it is no longer the same!
Until recently, we were still in the nineteenth century, we were in the pre-Fascist 
period. People were philo-Fascist rather than Fascist.
The spirit of the Empire must now transform the attitude of Italians toward their 
fatherland:
To accept a revolution and a regime is no longer enough: we must have the 
courage and the sense of responsibility to bind our personal destiny, however 
great or small, to this revolution and to this regime.
He reminded them of his first visit to the old headquarters of the Fascio in London: 
‘that first time I felt my heart wringing’; the new Casa d'ltalia was not simply a new 
and more beautiful headquarters, it was the very symbol of a community, which, from 
that very moment ceased once and for all to be Little Italy, and became an Italian 
Empire in the heart of London:
This Casa is not in Greek street .... This Casa is not in Soho, an area which, 
thank God, will disappear, just as the tradition of Little Italy will be buried: 
although it had the great joy to see a great Italian, Giuseppe Mazzini, walking in 
its little streets, still it will remain a ‘little Italy’, far away from our spirit,
and, dramatically, he concluded: ‘we want to see it buried for ever’.97
A week later the community gathered again in the Sala delVlmpero at the Casa 
d ’ltalia, this time to listen by radio to Mussolini’s words, as he proclaimed to the 
entire world Italy’s withdrawal from the League of Nations.98
97‘L’ambasciatore Grandi e l’on. Cianetti nel nome del Duce inaugurano la Casa del Littorio’, ibid., 3 
December 1937, n. 461, p. 1.
98‘L’Italia ha lasciato al SdN - Fuori? Si!’, ibid., 17 December 1937, n. 463, p. 1.
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Conclusion
In his memoirs, Grandi criticised the way Mussolini conducted the Ethiopian 
war and accused him of having intended to defeat the League of Nations through the 
Ethiopian war59. However, his own activity in Britain as well as his correspondence 
with the Italian foreign ministry in 1935 and 1936 show that his point of view at the 
time was not very different. In his letters to Mussolini, he repeatedly claimed that the 
Ethiopian war was a war against Britain and the League, and played the part of Fascist 
revolutionary ambassador in the Italian community in London.
Collaboration between the embassy, the Fascio and other Italian institutions 
was very efficient, and the policies of the Fasci obviously reflected those of the 
embassy. The Italian Fasci in Britain adopted an anti-British propaganda line from 
1935 onward, although only in 1937 did they also become pro-German. These shifts 
reflected the development of Italian foreign policy during the Ethiopian war and 
subsequently during the Spanish Civil War. The policies of the London Fascio toward 
the Italian community were clearly decided in Rome by Parini, whose organisation 
was part of the Italian foreign ministry. Centralised control made the Fasci most 
efficient both in organising the resistance to sanctions and in creating new 
organisations for the community. Their revolutionary mission of transforming the 
Italian colonies abroad into Fascist corporate communities reached a high degree of 
apparent success after the conquest of the empire, and in particular through the 
reorganisation of the London Fascio in 1937. And while Fasci and embassy 
disseminated anti-British propaganda among the Italians living in Britain, they also 
made use of pro-Italian propaganda among British fascists and conservatives. As the 
next chapter will outline, Grandi’s relationship with British italophiles was another 
vital aspect of his fight from the ‘London trench’.
99 Which rather contradicts De Felice’s version of Mussolini’s intentions. See also Goglia, ‘La 
propaganda italiana a sostegno della guerra contro l’Etiopia svolta in Gran Bretagna nel 1935-36’, p. 
847.
108
Chapter 4
A ‘Wonderful Colonisation’
Italian Fascism and the British Italophiles during the Ethiopian W ar
As explained in Chapter 2, until 1935 Grandi had been interested in 
establishing some degree of collaboration with the BUF. He had often praised Mosley 
to Mussolini, and had convinced the Duce that he should finance the British 
movement. At a local level, the Italian Fasci in Britain established many contacts 
with the BUF, and similar contacts between British and Italian fascism existed in Italy 
thanks to the creation of BUF offices in several Italian towns. During the Ethiopian 
war Mosley did his best to support the Italian cause, and in the conflict between the 
British and the Italian governments he had chosen the latter, a position that appeared 
notably inconsistent with his movement’s claim that its main principle was ‘Britain 
first’.
However, from 1935 onward Grandi’s relationship with the BUF cooled, and 
Anglo-Italian Fascist solidarity became limited to mutual support on issues such as 
Ethiopia. Although the BUF’s pro-Italian campaign was useful to Grandi in his battle 
against sanctions, Grandi stalled requests from Mussolini for help for the BUF, 
declaring the movement almost dead: he no longer had hopes for their possible 
success in Britain.1 Moreover, Grandi needed to work with the British establishment 
and could no longer risk association with a British fascist movement, especially 
during the crucial months of the Ethiopian War, and he was also increasingly aware 
of the BUF’s closeness to Germany. That in turn raises a further issue: to what extent
1 Mike Cronin, The Failure o f British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for political recognition 
(London - Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996); Richard Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism, 1932- 
1940’, in Andrew Thorpe (ed), The Failure o f Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain (Exeter: Exeter 
University Press, 1989); Thurlow, ‘The Return of Jeremiah: the Rejected Knowledge of Sir Oswald 
Mosley in the 1930s’, in Kenneth Lunn and Richard Thurlow (eds), British fascism: Essays on the 
Radical Right in inter-War Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
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did the German threat and the continued British-Italian confrontation compromise 
Grandi’s expectations for closer Italian-British relations?
After an investigation of the causes of the shift in Anglo-Italian fascist 
relations, this chapter will focus on the contacts between Grandi and British right- 
wing Conservatives during the Ethiopian War. Indeed Grandi thought that British 
Conservative Italophiles, integrated in their society, could be more effective in 
spreading pro-fascist propaganda than the BUF, which was advocating a ‘revolution’ 
and therefore had little impact on the centres of power. Not only have these people 
not been studied (only a few biographies exist, by authors who were close friends of 
the subjects), but they have never been seen as a group since they did not give birth to 
a political party. However, they belonged to the same organisations and clubs, they 
wrote in the same periodicals, and, unlike the BUF members, they contributed to the 
Italian embassy’s paper The British-Italian Bulletin, which appeared in 1935 and 
1936, at first as an appendix to LTtalia Nostra, and subsequently on its own. This 
chapter will therefore treat them as a group and will try to analyse their relationship 
with Italian Fascism and assess its influence on Anglo-Italian relations. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Grandi’s activity in Britain during the East 
African campaign was obviously anti-British, and in line with Mussolini’s directives 
from Rome. However, the ambassador’s relationship with British Italophiles was one 
of friendship, which involved close collaboration, including attempts to improve 
Anglo-Italian relations once the war was over. Mussolini considered Grandi’s activity 
among the Italophiles, which intensified from the beginning of 1935 onwards, to be a 
crucial aspect of the ambassador’s work in Britain. Yet secondaiy works have always 
focused on Grandi’s contacts with the Foreign Office and have neglected this aspect. 
It can therefore contribute, along with Grandi’s activity in the Italian community, to 
an understanding of Fascist foreign policy and propaganda during probably the most 
crucial years in Anglo-Italian relations before the Second World War.3 This chapter
2 For example, Quartararo and Nello, who defined their activity as typical of British conservative policy, 
along the lines of Vansittart’s, have almost ignored them (Rosaria Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e 
Berlino. La politico estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940, Rome: Bonacci, 1980, p. 89; Paolo Nello, Un 
fedele disubbidienie. Dino Grandi da Palazzo Chigi a l 25 luglio, Bologna: II Mulino, 1993, p. 253). 
Richard Griffiths has however recognised their peculiarity in an interesting book dedicated to British 
pro-Nazis {Fellow Travellers o f the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933-39, London: 
Constable, 1980, p. 15).
3 David N. Dilks, ‘British Reactions to Italian Empire-Building, 1936-1939’, in Enrico Serra and 
Christopher Seton-Watson (eds.), Italia e Inghilterra nelVeta deirimperialismo (Milan: Angeli, 1990),
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will distinguish between the work of italophile ‘intellectuals’, who wrote for Grandi’s 
paper and helped the embassy in disseminating pro-Italian propaganda among British 
society, and of italophile ‘politicians’, who were members of Parliament and regularly 
met with the Italian ambassador during the period of the Ethiopian war.
Grandi and the BUF during the Ethiopian War
Grandi reported on pro-Italian BUF activities mainly from the spring of 1936 
onward, often at Mussolini’s request,4 He seemed to be impressed by the 
choreography of Mosley’s speeches: fascist hymns, a vast display of flags and 
guidons, the use of drums, and the sudden appearance of the leader surrounded by a 
group of stewards, walking amid rows of blackshirts demonstrating their reverence 
with the Roman salute,5 During the meetings* BUF officers handed out leaflets* some 
of which had been provided by the Italian embassy, in defence of the Italian campaign 
in Ethiopia. Although according to one historian of British fascism Mosley’s ‘Mind 
Britain’s Business’ campaign ‘raised natural suspicions that Mosley, at the very least, 
had more than ideological ties with the dictators’*6 BUF meetings were never simply 
pro-Italian. Their banners explained the reasons why the BUF supported the Ethiopian 
campaign: ‘sanctions and unemployment’ and ‘seven million pounds wasted’: for 
Britain rather than for Italy, Additional banners demanded ‘peace with Germany’,7 
The main BUF theme was the sacrifices imposed on British workers by sanctions, 
rather than the rights of Italy in Ethiopia,8
However, Mosley supported Italy’s right not to be ‘suffocated in the 
Mediterranean’. Furthermore, Italian and British interests in the Mediterranean were
pp. 165-194; Aaron L. Goldman, ‘Sir Robert Vansittart’s Search for Italian Cooperation against Hitler’, 
Journal o f  Contemporary History, 1974, 13, pp. 93-130; Ken Ishida, ‘Mussolini and Diplomats in the 
Ethiopian War. The Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process in Fascist Italy’, Journal o f Law and 
Politics o f Osaka City University, 42, 4 (1996), pp. 1-11.
4 Suvich to Grandi, 21 March 1936, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 1.
5 ‘Comizio fascisti britannici all’Albert Hall’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 23 March 1936, ibid.
6 Thurlow, The Failure, p. 73.
7 ‘Comizio fascisti britannici all’Albert Hall’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 23 March 1936, ASMAE, AL, 
b. 912, f. 1, sf. 1.
8 ‘Settimanale “Action” -  campagna anti-sanzionista’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 2 May 1936, ibid.
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deemed not to clash; on the contrary, if the two countries did not collaborate, a 
universal catastrophe, namely the triumph of Bolshevism, might follow.9 A BUF 
member, Richard Bellamy, wrote in his memoirs that Eden ‘was prepared to risk a 
war in the Mediterranean’ not only on behalf of ‘the most backward comers of the 
globe’, but also of a League of Nations whose leader was the Russian Jewish 
Bolshevik Maksim Litvinov.10 At a public meeting in Huddersfield at the end of 1936 
Mosley announced that Mussolini, during a speech in Milan, had ‘offered his hand to 
Britain’. Consequently, Mosley claimed, the people of Britain, despite the intentions 
of their politicians, were offering their hands to Italy.11
Grandi sent Mussolini several articles denouncing sanctions that had appeared 
in either Action or The Blackshirt. The articles carried violent criticism of the British 
government, which was described as ‘the mad people who are governing us’, together 
with illustrations of atrocities by the Ethiopians. They also relayed information 
received from Grandi himself. The BUF regularly asked the embassy for Italian news, 
not only regarding Ethiopia, but also welfare and other Fascist programmes such as 
the corporations and town planning in Italy, in order to contradict anti-Italian articles 
in the press.12 The BUF press also reported on Italian books, periodicals, and articles 
written by Italians.13 Grandi in turn reported on disturbances and political violence 
between fascists and communists, which regularly took place at BUF meetings. He 
believed that these events usually helped the fascist cause, because they ensured press 
coverage of the BUF.14
Grandi was also aware of the strongly anti-Semitic policy of the BUF. He 
shared Mosley’s opinion that the Jews in England were linked to the communists and 
were therefore an enemy. He even shared Mosley’s language, calling the East End
9 ‘British Youth Refuse to Fight for the League of Nations’, The Saturday Review, 14 March 1936.
10 Richard Reynell Bellamy, We Marched with Mosley (Holt, Norfolk: 1968), 4 vols, typescript, SUL, 
Special Collections and Archives, BU Collection, 5/6, p. 424.
11 Grandi to foreign ministry, 5 November 1936, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 2.
12 Anne Brock Griggs, BLJF Women’s Propaganda Qflficier, to Italian embassy, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f  
1, sf. 1.
13 See for example the review of a book by Mario Pigli, Italian Civilisation in Ethiopia (Rome: Dante 
Alighieri, 1936) in Action, 21 May 1936; Virginio Gayda, ‘Italy and Empire’, The Fascist Quarterly, II, 
3, July 1936, pp. 353-360.
14 ‘Campagna anticomunista e antisemita fascisti britannici’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 14 October 
1936, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 12, f. 2.
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anti-fascists ‘the Jewish-Communist thugs’.15 He had informed Mussolini of Mosley’s 
assumption, as early as spring 1935, that the principal enemy of fascism was 
‘international Jewish finance’.16 Grandi also received information on the BUF from 
Italian consuls in other British cities. The consul in Liverpool, for instance, wrote the 
ambassador in 1936 that British fascism was successful in cities such as Manchester 
and Leeds, because many Jews allegedly lived in those cities. There they purportedly 
used their capital to open big department stores and thus forced smaller non-Jewish 
shop owners into bankruptcy. The shop owners consequently could be influenced by 
BUF propaganda. The consul shared the common opinion that the Jews were also 
money-lenders at high rates of interest.17
Although Grandi was publicly grateful for the BUF’s attitude toward Italy and 
the Italian embassy, his private perception of Mosley’s movement was more 
pessimistic, as was evident from a report he wrote although never sent to Rome as 
early as the end of 1935:
Since last year, the British Union of Fascists has continued to decline. The main 
reasons for this are the British reaction to the events o f 30 June 1934 in Germany, 
the murder of Dollfuss, and Nazi policies. At first Mosley sought to dissociate 
himself from Nazism, emphasising the differences between Fascism and Nazism, 
but then he came closer to Hitler and imposed an anti-Semitic line on the BUF. It 
has been a huge mistake, not only because racism has no support among the 
British people, but also because it has disfigured the character of British fascism, 
moving away from its real bases, namely criticism of parliamentary democracy 
and of socialism, and the attempt to reform the British State according to the 
corporativist system. In this way Mosley has become isolated and has lost contact 
with political currents that had previously been interested in fascism.18
The relationship between the BUF and Italy was thus complicated and 
ambiguous; the Italian government and the BUF shared Grandi’s doubts. It is 
therefore difficult to interpret the BUF decision in October 1935 to shut down its 
offices in Italy. The Italian ministry of the interior informed the Italian foreign 
ministry that according to the prefect of Florence the orders had come from the BUF 
headquarters in London. The Florence group, some members of which had been bom
15 Grandi to foreign ministry, 15 October 1936, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 2; ‘Manifestazioni 
fascismo britannico’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 16 October 1936, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 12, f. 2.
16 Grandi to foreign ministry, 25 March 1935, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 1.
17 Italian consulate in Liverpool to London embassy and to foreign ministry, 29 September 1936, 
ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf  2.
18 ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 41, f. 102 (‘Documenti non spediti, 1934-37’). No date, probaby end of 1935.
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in Italy, protested against the new anti-Italian attitude of the BUF. The prefect 
reported that one BUF member had reacted by applying for Italian citizenship, and 
had asked to be sent as a volunteer to East Africa.19
Mussolini himself regarded Mosley’s activities in Britain favourably, as an 
element in pro-Italian propaganda in that country. He was also proud of the existence
90of foreign fascist movements, which he believed to be one more proof of his genius. 
Yet at the same time, he sought to discourage too direct a collaboration with the BUF, 
perhaps because of Grandi’s continuous warnings about British government and 
Labour Party enquires into the origins of the BUF’s funds, which they assumed came 
from either Rome or Berlin, or both. The Italians became cautious as a result of Sir 
John Simon’s declaration in November 1936 that the BUF was receiving money from 
abroad and because of the subsequent decision, after a debate in the Commons, to ban 
the public use of uniforms in Britain.21 Grandi also reported Mosley’s November 
1936 visit to Goebbels in Germany, in addition to frequent journeys to Germany 
undertaken by other BUF members.22 Grandi was particularly annoyed by Ian Hope 
Dundas’ association with a radio station in Rome, from which he had been allowed to 
broadcast weekly commentaries. This was particularly the case in the summer of 
1936, during one of the most difficult periods for Grandi’s London embassy, when 
Dundas began broadcasting open propaganda for the BUF, praising Mosley, 
describing BUF demonstrations in the East End with hugely exaggerated numbers, 
and announcing that the present British government was going to fall in the 
forthcoming elections. All this was of course likely to appear in Britain as an Italian
93attempt to interfere in British internal politics.
19 Italian ministry of interior to foreign ministry, 4 October 1935, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 12, f. 2.
20 On Mussolini’s definition of Fascism as universal in 1932, and on his commitment to international 
fascism even before 1932, see Roger Griffin (ed.), International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the 
New Consensus (London: Arnold, 1998).
21 Grandi to foreign ministry, 13 November 1936, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 2. On BUF violence and 
the question of uniforms, see Thurlow, ‘British Fascism and State Surveillance, 1934-45’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 1988, 3 (1), pp. 77-99; Stephen M. Cullen, ‘Political Violence: the Case of the 
British Union of Fascists’, Journal o f Contemporary History, 1993, 28 (2), pp. 245-267; Robert 
Benevick, Political Violence and Public Order: A Study o f British Fascism (London: Penguin, 1969).
22 ‘Fascismo e comunismo in Gran Bretagna. Eventuali prowedimenti legislativi’, Grandi to foreign 
ministry, 6 novembre 1936, ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 12, f. 2.
23 Grandi to foreign ministry, 15 giugno 36, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 1.
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In July 1936 Mosley fell ill and the Italian Foreign Secretary Galeazzo Ciano 
immediately ordered Vitetti to convey to him his best wishes24; yet in October a 
request from Mosley to the Duce to grant an audience to the BUF officer William 
Allen was denied simply on the grounds that ‘for the moment’ it was not possible.25 A 
similar Italian reticence now characterised contacts between Italian and British 
fascists in Britain, particularly for Italian consuls. When Mosley held speeches in 
provincial British cities, Italian consuls were often invited to BUF luncheons and 
festive occasions. The embassy decided that they should no longer participate, and 
should plead prior appointments.26
This shift in the Italian relationship with British fascism corresponded with a 
growth in Italian Fascists’ fears about German ideas of a New European Order. While 
Mussolini continued to favour the expansion of fascism in other countries, he made 
clear that the new European civilisation was Mediterranean, since it had developed 
from Rome and was made universal again by Rome. The entry on Fascismo nel 
mondo in the Encyclopaedia Treccani of 1938 stated that differences existed between 
Italian Fascism and German Nazism due to individual traditions, geographical 
conditions, social structure and mentality, of which the main example was the
97German identification of nation with race. However, it became clear that for the 
BUF European fascism was no longer a Roman form of fascism but rather a Teutonic 
one, led by Germany and Britain.
BUF support for the Ethiopian campaign was thus politically and culturally a 
pro-British fight rather than a pro-Italian one. It was, according to Daniel Waley, an 
‘extreme form of the conventional right-wing mixture of imperialism and 
isolationism’ 28 The BUF believed that a threat to British prestige in Africa from 
Italian ambitions was less serious than the threat posed by the possibility of African 
success over Europeans. At a deeper level the Italian cause was also a British cause,
24 ‘Personate per Vitetti’, De Peppo a Vitetti, 31 July 1936, ibid.
25 ‘Fascismo inglese - William Allen - Domanda di udienza con S. E. il Capo del Govemo’, Grandi to 
foreign ministry, 23 October 1936, ASMAE, AL, b. 912, f. 1, sf. 2; De Peppo to Grandi, 3 November 
1936, ibid.
26 See for example the Italian consul in Cardiff Renato Citarelli to Grandi, 13 October 1936, ibid., and 
embassy to Citarelli, 14 October 1936, ibid.
27 Guido Bartolotto, II fascismo nel mondo (1938), in II fascismo nella Treccani, edited by Giorgio 
Galli (Milan: Terziaria, 1997), p. 218; p. 228.
28 Daniel Waley, British Public Opinion and the Ethiopian War, 1935-6 (London: 1975), p. 25.
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the Ethiopian was not.29 In fact Mosley continued to see African colonisation as a 
necessary policy for the Europeans even after the Second World War, when he 
claimed that Africa was the ‘way out from the dole’. Since ‘the Black’ in his opinion 
was ‘not nearly fit for self-government’, the British ‘economic problem could be 
solved by negro labour under white direction in Africa’, instead of importing foreign 
labour into Britain.30
Italy, the 'NecessaryAlly’
With the decline of the BUF and of Anglo-Italian fascist solidarity as it had 
developed between 1932 and 1935, Grandi focused his attention on another section of 
British society, the pro-Fascist intellectuals (mainly writers and journalists) and right- 
wing Conservative politicians who worked together in various ways and shared 
common views. Conservative MPs such as George Ambrose Lloyd, Leo Amery and 
John Edward Bernard Mottistone, journalists such as Francis Yeats-Brown, Douglas 
Jerrold, Charles Petrie, Harold Goad and Muriel Currey, militaiy men such as John 
Frederick Charles Fuller and Edward William Polson-Newman were all strongly pro- 
Italian. An obvious difference existed between politicians and intellectuals: the 
former had contact mainly with Grandi and did not expose themselves by writing in 
Italian newspapers; the latter also worked with Grandi, but their influence was 
effective mainly in the press. Not only did they share political views, but also 
personal friendship. For example, Yeats-Brown was in close contact with Douglas 
Jerrold and was a close friend of Harold Goad and Muriel Currey; the latter also 
helped him with research and the typing of his books.31 Petrie, Currey and Goad were 
also close friends of Luigi Villari. Petrie was constantly in contact with Grandi and 
remained so even after the Second World War.
29 Ibid., p. 76.
30 Oswald Mosley, A policy for Britain (Ramsbury: Mosley Publications, 1947), pp. 7-8.
31 John Evelyn Wrench, Francis Yeats-Brown, 1886-1944 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948), p. 
243; after 8 September 1943 none o f them could remain in or travel to Italy safely, since they were 
suspected of being fascists (p. 255).
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The British Italophiles were convinced imperialists who bitterly criticised the 
attitude of the British government for neglecting the empire and pursuing an allegedly 
feeble policy in India.32 They believed the parliamentary system could not continue to 
work as it was: while not in favour of a dictatorship in Britain, they wanted a stronger 
executive and the creation of a corporativist system like the Italian, but adapted to the 
British constitution.33 They were strongly anti-Bolshevik and saw the Russian threat 
expanding in Europe, particularly in Spain and France. They were genuinely pro- 
Italian and fervent admirers of Mussolini, an admiration different from the typical 
sympathy which most British conservatives felt for Fascism as a regime suitable for 
Mediterranean peoples, and for Mussolini as a man able to discipline the Italians, to 
end the strikes and to make the trains run on time.34 On the contrary, the Italophiles 
had no sense of superiority over the Italians, whose country they genuinely loved, 
indeed some of them chose to live there for long periods, others to travel there often. 
Some of them were Catholics rather than Anglicans, which was also an important 
distinction between them and the members of the BUF. Some were strongly anti- 
Nazi; others were worried by Germany but did not completely reject Hitler, mainly 
because of their anti-Bolshevism. In their view, and unlike Nazi Germany, Fascist 
Italy was not only the state of the Fascist movement (of squadrismo and of 
corporativism), but also a state with a compromise between these forms of Fascist
35radicalism and conservative forces (crown, church, and industrialists). They 
believed British foreign policy had to be pro-Italian and to favour the building of an 
Italian empire, which had to work with the British empire, with both eventually 
organised along corporativist lines. However, their support for Fascism was not 
simply based on foreign policy; it was spiritual and cultural; they had studied Fascism 
and were personal friends of many members of the PNF and of the Fascist Grand 
Council. They played a role in the dissemination of Fascism outside Italy and often 
developed their own interpretations of Fascism.
32 G. C. Webber, The Ideology o f the British Right, 1918-1939 (London-Sidney: Croom Helm, 1986), 
pp. 37-38.
33 Charles Petrie, The British Problem (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934, pp. 19-20; L. P. 
Carpenter, ‘Corporatism in Britain, 1930-45’, Journal o f Contemporary History, 11 (1976), p. 8.
34 Gianni Silei, ‘I conservatori britannici e il fascismo (1929-1935). La parabola discendente di una 
“storica amicizia’”, II Politico, LVII, 1992, 3, pp. 527-528.
35 Martin Blinkhom, ed., Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in 
Twentieth-Century Europe (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 7.
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Italy was a model because they saw it as a rising nation, as opposed to a 
declining Britain. In this sense they were patriotic as well as pro-Italian, since their 
focus was always Britain. Their perception of the decline of Britain indeed reinforced 
their belief in Fascism. Britain’s slums and mass unemployment indicated that 
Baldwin’s and MacDonald’s methods were half-hearted compared with the myth of 
Mussolini ‘pulling down derelict areas in Rome, draining the Pontine marshes, and 
establishing new and healthy colonies in the Campagna’.36 Dissatisfied by the present, 
the pro-Fascists looked to a recent past in which Britain still shared Victorian ideals. 
They believed themselves to be the bearers of a Victorian legacy, building ‘a brave 
and better world’.37 Although they were proud of the recent past, they thought Britain 
lacked something Italy had, namely real leadership:
we were the most powerful people in Europe. We had a victorious army, a large 
and undefeated fleet and the largest airforce in existence. But we were without 
leaders, without a policy .... The more powerful the ship, the greater the risk of 
disaster.38
The fascination the Duce exercised on them was not due simply to his 
policies; the pro-Fascists appeared to be as influenced by his myth as Italian followers 
of the Duce. To the writer John Squire, who met Mussolini in 1933, the Duce was ‘at 
heart a poet’.39 Following this meeting, Squire became one of the founders of the 
January Club, formed by figures from different political groups, but all in favour of 
fascism. The Club was an occasion of meetings between BUF members and British 
Italophiles who did not belong to Mosley’s party.40 For example, it organised a debate 
on ‘Roads to fascism’, chaired by Squire, at which Mosley and Petrie were speakers. 
In general, members of the January Club believed that the existing democratic system 
of government in Britain had to change, and although the change was unlikely to 
come about suddenly, as it had in Italy and in Germany, they regarded it as inevitable.
36 Wrench, Francis Yeats-Brown, p. 120.
37 Douglas Jerrold, Georgian Adventure (London: Collins, 1937), p. 8.
38 Jerrold, Britain and Europe, 1900-1940 (London: Collins, 1941), p. 84.
39 Patrick Howarth, Squire: Most Generous o f Men (London: Hutchinson, 1963) , p. 223. See also 
Squire’s literary autobiography, John Squire, Reflections and Memoires (London: William Heinemann,
1935).
40 A similar role had another Conservative club, the Carlton Club. See Charles Petrie, The Carlton Club 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955); Nick Smart, The National Government, 1931-40 (London- 
Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1999), p. 102.
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Jerrold fought on the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War in the 
conviction that he was fighting for the freedom of the Catholic religion, which Franco 
allegedly sought to save from the atheism of the Republicans. The secularisation of 
education and confiscation of clerical properties and legalisation of divorce all meant 
for him that the Spanish republic was persecuting religion.41 Yeats-Brown, besides 
frequent travels to Italy, went to Spain, met Franco, ‘and returned home an even 
stronger partisan of the Caudillo’.42 In 1937 he attended the annual Nazi Party rally at 
Nuremberg and met Hitler, with whom he became disillusioned only after the March 
1939 invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, he continued to trust Mussolini and to 
admire the affection he believed the Italian people had for the Duce.43 The role of the 
crown in Italy, according to Petrie, distinguished Fascism from Nazism. An ardent 
monarchist, Petrie believed that Fascists regarded the crown as the ‘incarnation of the 
national idea’.44 The Corporative State could be ‘more successfully worked under a 
monarchy’, especially in Britain, where according to Jerrold, all that was left of 
national pride was ‘centred on Windsor not on Westminster’.45
One of the major Fascist myths, which transformed Italy into a sort of a Mecca 
for foreign sympathisers, was that of the classless society. Mussolini’s propaganda 
had not invented this image of Italy; it had already been present in Anglo-Saxon 
literature during the nineteenth century.46 Another myth was the influence of the 
Roman Empire, which the Italophiles thought fundamental in the understanding of 
Fascism. Italy’s determination to be a great power could ‘only be understood if 
allowance be made for the part which the Roman Empire, and the republics of Venice 
and Genoa, played in the Mediterranean in the past’; Italy had recently revived the
41 Jerrold, Britain and Europe, pp. 132-133. See also Id., Georgian Adventure, p. 27: ‘I have lived, 
thank God, to see the beginning of a Catholic revival in England’.
42 Wrench, Francis Yeats-Brown, p. 224.
43 Ibid., p. 228.
44 Charles Petrie, Mussolini (London: The Holme Press, 1931), p. 77. The book was part o f a series on 
‘Makers o f the Modem Age’, edited by Osbert Burdett. Petrie, Monarchy in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Dakers, 1952); id., The Modem British Monarchy (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955).
45 Petrie, ‘Foreign Affairs’, The English Review, XXIX, vol. 60, February 1935, p. 230; Jerrold, ‘The 
King’s Jubilee’, ibid., XXIX, vol. 60, May 1935, p. 522.
46 Henry James’ novels are probably the best example; see also Wrench, Francis Yeats-Brown, p. 166. 
On the classless society, see also the proliferation of pamphlets during the 1930s: Harold Goad, The 
Making o f the Corporate State: A Study o f Fascist Development (London: Christophers, 1932); Goad 
and Currey, The Working o f a Corporate State: A Study o f National Co-operation, (London: Nicholson 
& Watson, 1933); Currey, Insurance and Social Welfare in Italy (London: 1938); Karl Walter, The 
Class Conflict in Italy (London: P. S. King & Son, 1938); Michele Catalano and Harold Goad, 
Education in Italy (Rome: Laboremus, 1939).
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tradition of Venice and Genoa, and had again become a formidable naval power.47 
Yet perhaps the principal myth was that of the Duce. Whether or not the Italophiles 
truly believed that in Italy classes did not exist, that Right and Left had disappeared 
and that even the Mafia had been finally defeated, the power of fascination Mussolini 
exercised over them is evident. He was not, like Napoleon, the ‘child of a revolution’, 
he was rather ‘the revolution itself; for he has gone through the same spiritual 
exercises as the Italian people, and he has consequently been able to produce both the 
crisis and its solution’.48 He was also a master in foreign policy and might, ‘mutatis 
mutandis, be compared with Augustus’.49 Italy had not simply provided an experiment 
worthy of study, but represented the true spirit of the twentieth century, which was
pre-eminently an age of monarchy, in the etymological sense of the term, and 
some of the most convincing proofs of this are to be found on the shores of the 
great inland sea. First and probably foremost there is Mussolini, the greatest 
figure of the present age, and perhaps one of the most notable of all time.50
Yeats-Brown, the son of a British consul in Liguria, frequently sojourned in 
Portofino, and considered Italy as his second country: ‘the longer I live the more I 
thank God that I’m an Englishman. But after that I think I’d rather be a Florentine or a 
Venetian, for they have great traditions too’.51 In June 1933 he went to visit 
Predappio, to see the room where Mussolini was bom and the Duce’s parental house. 
Fascism was not for Yeats-Brown simply an economic solution; it was a whole 
system of moral values. He felt that he understood the true spirit of Fascism thanks to 
his visits to the Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista, an exhibition that helped in the 
dissemination of the myth abroad:
But it is the Sacrario, The Hall of the Martyrs, which no visitor will ever forget. I 
think it is a room that only New Italy could have conceived, in its combination of 
strength and simplicity, with a particular note that no Nordic race would have 
conceived. You enter it with a mind full of the terror and tragedy of the formative 
years of Fascism: you are in the semi-dark and see a colossal cube in the centre of 
the room, leading the eye upwards to a metallic cross... Round the walls the word 
‘Presente’ is written, and you remember that that was the answer of the arditi in 
memory of their fallen. You think at first there is silence in this darkened room,
47 Petrie, Lords of the Inland Sea: A Study of the Mediterranean Powers (London: Lovat Dickson 
Limited, 1937), p. 6.
48 Petrie, Mussolini, p. 37.
49 Ibid., p. 171.
50 Petrie, Lords o f the Inland Sea, p. x,
51 Wrench, Francis Yeats-Brown, p. 179.
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but as you walk round it, (and here is the touch that no Nordic race would have 
added), faint and far away comes the lilt of Giovanezza [sic]: it is played on a 
muted gramophone and comes to you as the very voice of all these young men 
who gave their lives for the cause. Ever after, when you hear Giovanezza [wc], as 
you will throughout the length and breadth of Italy, you will remember the 
Sacrario.52
Like other Italophiles and right-wing conservatives? Yeats-Brown had been a keen 
supporter of Mosley? and had admired him until the Olympia rally of 1934. The 
connection of British fascism with Nazi Germany may also have influenced the 
Italophiles5 attitude? since they continued to believe that Italian Fascism was 
fundamentally different from German Nazism and to hope that Mussolini would not 
ally himself to Germany.
A discrepancy was increasingly evident between the pro-Italian and anti- 
German stance of the Italophiles and the pro-German and anti-British stance of Italian 
propaganda. Two aspects sometimes worried the Italophiles: Italian anti-British 
propaganda and activities in the Mediterranean and, even more? Italy's rapprochement 
with Germany. The two aspects were often related, since Italy's disputes with Britain 
in the Mediterranean might lead Italy to seek German support. In that case, Britain 
needed to be prepared against naval and land attacks in the Mediterranean theatre. 
The most crucial area, according to vice-admiral Heniy C. Usbome, was ‘between 
Gibraltar and Malta, Malta and Port Said, and Malta and the Dardanelles' and now 
that Italy was ‘building two fast 35,000-ton battleships', ‘battle-cruisers or some new 
type of battleship' also had to ‘be called into play'. It was particularly necessary to 
strengthen overseas bases and Malta was ‘the keystone of everything'. However, as a 
friend of Italy he claimed to hope that Britain and Italy would always remain friends 
and that Italy could feel certain, now that she had ‘joined the ranks of ‘satisfied 
nations', that peace-loving Britain will never provoke her'. Charles Petne wrote 
several anti-German articles in The English Review well before the Ethiopian War. As 
early as summer 1934, he had made clear his opposition to an Italo-German 
alliance.54 His support for Italy on the Ethiopian question was thus partially linked to
52 Ibid., p. 168.
53 Henry C. Usbome, ‘The New Mediterranean Problem and its Solution’, The English Review, 
December 1936, vol. 63., pp. 565-567.
54 Charles Petrie, ‘Foreign Affairs’, ibid., XXVDL, vol. 59, August 1934, pp. 224-231; Id., ‘Foreign 
Affairs’, ibid., XXVIII, vol. 59, July 1934, pp. 93-100.
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fear of Germany. In March 1935 he warned that Austria was ‘more important than 
Ethiopia’, and that Europe could not ‘spare the guardians of the Brenner for a 
campaign in Africa’. He indicated that Germany was responsible for many of the 
present international troubles: it was seeking to distract Italian attention from Central 
Europe and to make ‘bad blood between Italy, France, and ourselves’.55 Muriel 
Currey agreed with him and stressed the importance of Carinthia, due to its 
geographical position between Italy, Jugoslavia and Austria. Because of economic 
depression and poverty, it was an easy target for the Nazis and some of its inhabitants 
were allegedly awaiting the Germans and Anschluss, which was a danger for 
Yugoslavia, Italy and the whole of Europe. She concluded on a note that sounded like 
an advertisement from a travel agency: ‘a pleasant and practical way of helping 
Austria is that everyone who is able to do so, should spend their holidays in that 
country’. At the same time, they could help to defeat ‘a cruel and unscrupulous plot 
against a small and helpless country’.56
British Italophiles were also active members of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. They organised meetings and conferences, published several of 
the Institute pamphlets and wrote in the Bulletin o f International News. The latter was 
less openly pro-Fascist than The English Review and most of its articles were not 
signed, yet it favoured a pro-Italian and anti-German foreign policy. Since 1934 the 
Bulletin had blamed Hitler for his methods, had supported the independence of 
Austria and had distinguished between Fascism and Nazism.57 Several articles in the 
Bulletin propagated the myth that Mussolini was a master of foreign policy. They 
congratulated him for the January 1935 agreement with France, which had allegedly 
weakened Germany’s position, and especially for the April 1935 Stresa conference. 
They believed Italy and Britain had to continue their role as garantors of the Locarno 
treaty.58 At the beginning of the Ethiopian dispute, the Bulletin remained neutral, and 
proposed an investigation of the various aspects of Italy’s grievances.59 However,
55 Charles Petrie, ‘Foreign Affairs’, ibid., XXIX, vol. 60, March 1935, p. 353.
56 Muriel Currey, ‘Where Three Frontiers Meet’, ibid., XXIX, vol. 61, November 1935, p. 590.
57 ‘Germany’s Second Revolution’, The Bulletin o f International News, XI, 1, 5 July 1934, p. 11; ‘The 
Independence of Austria’, ivi, XI, 4, 16 August 1934, p. 4.
58 ‘The Agreements between France and Italy’, ibid., XI, 14, 10 January 1935, p. 3; ‘The Stresa 
Conference’, ibid., XI, 21, 18 April 1935, p. 3. On the feeling of optimism after the Stresa conference in 
Britain, see R. J. Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreign policy in the Age o f Appeasement, 1935-39 
(London-Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1993), pp. 20-21.
59 See for example ‘Italy and Ethiopia’, The Bulletin o f International News, XII, 2, 27 July 1935.
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shortly after? it explained that Italy was a country with an over-large population and 
an ‘exceptional lack of essential raw materials’. This was in fact the major point of 
pro-Italian propaganda in Britain, as it was possible to see from the embassy’s 
publications.60 Among them was the British-Italian Bulletin, which was indeed 
written by Italophiles who were also members of the Royal Institute.61 In September 
1935, the Bulletin of the Royal Institute began to report Mussolini’s and other 
Fascists’ views. It considered very seriously Mussolini’s contention that the measures 
he intended to take in Ethiopia were purely colonial in character and that the 
question, therefore, did ‘not come within the province of the League’. Ethiopia, the 
Duce declared, had ‘forfeited her right to membership of the League, by her failure to 
carry out her undertakings, especially as regards the abolition of slavery’ and it was 
therefore ‘impossible for Italy to deal with her on terms of equality’. The Bulletin 
accepted the assumption that Ethiopia was incapable of governing itself and 
consequently found ‘Italy’s claims to a major share in the task of working a 
mandatory system’ plausible.62
The British-Italian Bulletin and the Italophiles in Ethiopia
On 8 November 1935 LTtalia Nostra advertised ‘the English pages’, a 
supplement entitled The British-Italian Bulletin. Rather than serving as a propaganda 
instrument, the latter was meant to explain facts in their ‘truthfulness’ and to clear 
some misunderstanding originated by the British press. As Grandi explained to 
Mussolini, the newspaper was an emanation of the embassy and he regarded it as his 
own 64 It carried few articles in Italian; most articles were in English and the authors 
were British Italophiles. This demonstrates the extent to which Grandi not only had 
personal contacts with these Italophiles, but unlike his relationship with the BUF, also 
co-operated with them publicly. The newspaper was obviously created because of the
60 See Luigi Goglia, ‘La propaganda italiana a sostegno della guerra contro l’Etiopia svolta in Gran 
Bretagna nel 1935-36’, Storia Contemporanea, XV (1984), 5, pp. 845-908.
61 ‘Italy’s Economic Position’, The Bulletin o f International News, XII, 4, 31 August 1935, p. 5.
62 ‘Italy, Ethiopia, and the League Committee’s Report’, ibid., X3I, 6, 28 September 1935, p. 5.
63 ‘La nuova “Italia Nostra” - Le pagine inglesi’, L ’ItaliaNostra, 8 November 1935, n. 352, p. 1.
64 Grandi to Mussolini, 5 November 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
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Ethiopian war: the first issue, only two pages long, was dedicated to the Italian 
conquest and intended to explain the Italian case. Only from August 1936 did the 
journal begin to discuss topics other than the Ethiopian war. However, a deeper 
reason existed behind this publication, which helps to clarify the relationship between 
Italians and British Italophiles, and also the extent to which these Italophiles were 
actually fascists. The usual Italian pretext for invading Ethiopia, namely the 
overpopulation and poverty of Italy, was obviously a major topic, but this was always 
linked with deeper reasons which were entirely British and not simply a clone of 
Italian propaganda. One important aspect was the recognition of Britain’s 
‘immemorial’ spiritual debt to Italy. This was not simply a British debt but a world 
debt ‘for spiritual services whereby in law and letters, as in art and half the sciences, 
she has ever led the way to civilisation and enlightenment’.65 This feeling was shared 
mainly by those who, like Harold Goad, lived or had lived and worked in Italy, 
especially in some cultural capacity. Figures of this kind looked upon themselves as a 
‘distinctive class of cultured English people who knew Italy and had a clear idea of 
what she stood for in her relations with England’.66 The former secretary of the 
British Academy of Arts in Rome, L. D. Cosgrove, wrote that
no one who is in any way interested in the arts can be other than horrified at the 
thought of a possible conflict between England and Italy. The cultural and social 
relations between the two countries have been for five hundred years stronger 
than those between any two other nations in history. Geoffrey Chaucer, the father 
of modem English poetry, owed a great deal to Boccaccio.
He went on to mention Keats, Byron, and Shelley, Rossetti and the pre-Raphaelites, 
and Browning’s love for Italy. He also reminded his readers how the English had 
always gone to Italy for the climate, and how so many painters, sculptors and artists 
had found a ‘welcome and a temporary home’ in Italy. Only since 1870 had the 
Italian people begun to think and act in the same imperial manner which for three 
hundred years was typical of the British: ‘let us not treat them as hereditary 
enemies’.67 The most recent demonstration of this ‘past comradeship’, which the BUF
65 Harold Goad, ‘Italy’s proud poverty’, The British-Italian Bulletin, 8 November 1935, n. 352, pp. 1/2.
66 Helen Rossetti Angeli, ‘Peoples’ Short Memory’, ibid., 2 May 1936, p. 3.
67 L. D. Cosgrove, ‘World’s debt to Italian culture - The new Italy’, ibid., 13 December 1935, p. 2. See 
also Charles Peter Brand, Italy and the English Romantics: The Italianate Fashion in Early Nineteenth- 
Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957).
124
had also emphasised at times, was participation in the Great War.68 Grandi found this 
special relationship with Italy very beneficial. He received many letters from both 
British politicians and common people describing their feelings of love and of guilt 
for their country’s alleged injustice to Italy.69 The insistence on this theme, which has 
more recently inspired both literature and cinema,70 was able to attract part of British 
society to Italy’s side and was paralleled by the work that some right-wing politicians 
such as Lloyd, Mottistone and Amery carried out in Parliament. If serving MPs did 
not commit themselves so far as to sign articles in Grandi’s paper, former 
Conservative MPs did, as well as well-known military men and righ-wing journalists. 
For example, H. K. Hales (former Conservative member for Stoke-on-Trent), Major 
E. W. Poison Newman, General Fuller, Robert Hield (journalist and political writer) 
and Robert Machray (novelist and journalist) were among the contributors. The most 
regular reporters, who were for the most part already associated with Italian fascism, 
were Douglas Jerrold, Muriel Currey, Harold Goad and the famous poet Ezra Pound. 
The latter wrote a number of anti-League articles in which he explained Italy’s 
position in terms of a new civilisation and a new challenge. Italy’s major contribution 
to the present world was in his opinion the substitution of the concept of freedom 
with that of responsibility. Freedom of the press, for example, meant simply that 
third-rate journalists were allowed to write, and the same principle applied to every 
other section of society. He realised that ‘the founders of the USA did not state that 
all men are equal’, but rather that they were born equal. This was perfectly 
understood only in Italy: Italians were allegedly equal in front of the law, but differed 
‘in the grade of responsibility’, a Fascist ideal ‘vastly higher than the ideal of liberty’, 
which was the major cause of degradation of Western society.71 He advocated a 
strong Italy because he believed Italy represented the keystone in world civilisation.72 
The myth of the rebirth of the Roman empire,73 far from being considered a threat to 
Britain in the Mediterranean, strongly impressed the Italophiles since they believed 
Rome to be the ‘mother’ of all Europe. To make war on Italy, ‘a country which has
68 ‘A record of past comradeship’, 5 June 1936, The British-Italicm Bulletin, p. 1.
69 See especially ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
70 See for example the novel by Muriel Spark, The Prime o f Miss Jean Brodie (London: Penguin, 1961) 
also transformed into a movie, and Zeffirelli’s recent movie Tea with Mussolini (1999).
71 Ezra Pound, ‘The Fascist Ideal’, The British-Italian Bulletin, 18 April 1936, n. 16, p. 2.
72 Ezra Pound ‘A keystone of Europe’, ibid., 27 December 1935, p. 1.
73 ‘Ancient Roman Spirit Reborn’, ibid., 25 April 1936, n. 17, p. 4.
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had two great periods of civilisation where other European countries are fortunate if 
they have had one’, would have been like ‘murdering our own mother’: war against 
Italy was ‘a form of spiritual matricide’.74 Like the British Union of Fascists and like 
many Conservative politicians, these Italophiles shared the perception that in 
defending Ethiopia the British government was standing against the cause of 
European civilisation. The latter was in this case defended by Italy, as it had been at 
other points in history: ‘the war is not between Rome and Ethiopia’, wrote G. K. 
Chesterton, ‘it is between Rome and Carthago [szc]’.75 As he wrote to Villari in 1936, 
Chesterton believed Italy was ‘doing what everybody else has done’ and was 
consequently taking part in the wider European colonisation of Africa.76 Politically 
this implied that Ethiopia was an agent of non-civilisation, anti-European and 
therefore also anti-French and anti-British. It was obvious, wrote General Polson- 
Newman, ‘that Ethiopia must gradually become brought into line with the methods of
77modem civilisation for her own benefit and that of her neighbours’. Although some 
Conservative Italophiles had once been members of the League of Nations Union, 
they suspended their collaboration with the League, and bitterly attacked Lord Cecil 
of Chelmwood and the Archbishop of Canterbury over their allegations about the 
Italian use of poison gas in Ethiopia.78
Unlike Mosley, who was publicly pro-German, the Italophiles believed that a 
policy of friendship with Italy in Ethiopia was necessary in order to restrain Germany. 
In March 1936 the British-Italian Bulletin condemned Germany’s violation of 
Locarno when it remilitarised the Rhineland, and insisted on the importance of
70keeping Italy separated from Germany. The Bulletin closed publication when Italy 
conquered Ethiopia. The last issue, reflecting both the general policy of L ’ltalia 
Nostra at that stage and also Grandi’s own hopes, expressed its wishes for a better
74 Osbert Sitwell, ‘Alma Mater’, ibid., 3 January 1936, p. 1.
75 G. K. Chesterton, ‘Rome v Carthago’, article from La Revue Catholique des Idees et des Faits, edited 
in Brussel, quoted in The British-Italian Bulletin, 18 January 1936, n. 3, p. 1.
76 G. K. Chesterton to Villari, 12 February 1936, British Library, Manuscript Collection, Add. 73240, f. 
139. Chesteron also provided Villari with his own pro-Italian articles allowing him to quote them in 
several newspapers.
77 Poison Newman, ‘A nuisance to civilisation’, The British-Italian Bulletin, 7 March 1936, n. 10, p. 1.
78 ‘Ethiopia as a model!’, ibid., 4 April 1936, n. 14, p. 1; ‘Public ignorance exploited’, ibid., 2 May 
1936, n. 18, p. 1.
79 ‘Italy’s part’, ibid., 14 March 1936, n. 11, p. 1; Arnold H. Richmond, ‘A partner indispensable’, ibid., 
21 March 1936, n. 12, p. 1.
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future in Anglo-Italian relations and celebrated Italy as ‘the necessary friend’ of 
Britain.80
Some Italophiles did not confine themselves to writing for the British-Italian 
Bulletin, but showed their solidarity in a more vigorous way: they decided to follow 
the Italian troops to Ethiopia. In this way they believed they could inform British 
society about what was ‘really’ happening there. General Polson-Newman, General 
Fuller (who was both an Italophile and a BUF member) and Muriel Currey wrote 
diaries during their travels in Ethiopia which they published immediately after their 
return to England.81 Thanks to Lord Rothermere, Fuller followed the Italian forces as 
a Daily Mail special correspondent. He included extracts from some of his despatches 
in his book. He felt a deep obligation to Douglas Jerrold for his book on the future of 
the League of Nations, They that Take the Sword, and was also one of the organisers 
of the BUF’s ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ campaign, together with Joyce, Dundas and 
Beckett. According to Fuller, the Ethiopian war was a turning point in history, it was 
‘a stupendous historical event and a most significant political and military 
undertaking’.84
Italian colonisation reminded Muriel Currey of the British colonisation of
o c
India, which her friend Yeats-Brown and Rudyard Kipling had described. She had 
admired films of ‘Italian cavalry officers riding down the sides of precipices’, and 
some of her narration of the Ethiopian war was indeed imaginative and idealised. She 
reported Italian soldiers leaving for Africa and singing the songs of the Revolution, of 
Italian soldiers in Asmara building roads and cleaning up the town, of Italian soldiers 
resting and talking about their own regions and the different ways of making 
macaroni. She recalled that at night, ‘outside in the darkness the soldiers were singing 
the traditional songs of the Tuscan countryside to the accompaniment of a 
mandoline’.86 Fuller’s account described the same happy and relaxed atmosphere that
80 ‘To a brighter future’, ibid., 4 July n. 27, p. 1.
81 John Frederick Charles Fuller, The First o f the League Wars: Its Lessons and Omens (London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1936); Muriel Currey, A Woman at the Ethiopian War (London: Hutchinson & Co,
1936); E. W. Poison Newman, The New Ethiopia (London: Rich and Cowan, 1938).
82 Jerrold, They That Take the Sword: The Future o f the League o f Nations (London: John Lane, 1936).
83 John Beckett, After My fashion: Twenty Post-War Years (London: 1940), typescript, Shieffield 
University Library, Special Collections, BU Collection, 5/1, p. 363.
84 Fuller, The First o f  the League Wars, p. 1.
85 Francis Yeats-Brown, Bengal Lancer (London: Victor Gollancz, 1930).
86 Currey, A Woman at the Ethiopian War, p. 76.
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existed among the Italian troops. In the Italian General Headquarters, ‘there was never 
any fuss or flurry’ and ‘every officer could afford to take a by no means short siesta 
after his midday meal’.87 The leading idea behind the army organisation ‘was not 
tactics but politics’. The political enthusiasm, the presence of war veterans, 
blackshirts, regular troops, and native troops were altogether the ‘symbol of a united
o o
Fascist Italy’. The Italian army was ‘a huge melodramatic troupe; a Fascist 
demonstration; a gathering of armed men in which each group possessed a discipline 
or lack of discipline of its own’. The Blackshirts were strangely picturesque: they 
considered themselves to be ‘the salt of the earth’ and sang most of the time. It was an 
‘Army of the Exodus which crossed the Red Sea in search of the Promised Land’.89 
Their leaders were selected not always because of their military skill, but because 
they were ‘poets, orators, or futurist artists’. They were also ‘the most generous and 
kindly men in the world’ and ‘the more unmilitary their actions’ the more they were 
pleased. ‘In spite of their glitter and glamour, their terrifying badges and knives’, they 
were not soldiers: ‘they may be good sub-machine-gunmen, street fighters and town 
sackers, but they are not soldiers’; yet ‘as collectors of glory they stand unrivalled - 
these men of the Army of the old Adelphy’. They were ‘the war chorus of the Duce, 
and the troubadours of his cult’.90 Although he admitted that one of the reasons for 
the Italian victory in the war was that the enemy was much weaker, Fuller emphasised 
that Italy won also thanks to the peculiarly Fascist organisation of the war. It was a 
new idea of war, unknown to British colonial practise:
had a British General been in Badoglio’s place [...], how many Staff Officers, 
Experts and Advisers would he have required? Probably several hundreds. What 
would the result have been? Not only a cautious but a routine war, the very 
weight of advice complicating every problem and slowing down every decision. 
With us it is always a matter of too many cooks spoil the broth, but with the 
Italians there were so few that, when the order ‘Annihilate your enemy’ was 
received, Marshal Badoglio, being a man of decision, was in no way impeded by 
his Staff from striking immediately. It was decision and not consideration, action 
and not the perfection of routine, which won him the war and established for ever 
his reputation as the most successful of colonial war generals.91
87 Fuller, The First o f the League Wars, p. 55.
88 Fuller, The First o f the League Wars, p. 57.
89 Ibid., p. 58; p. 60.
90 Ibid., p. 61; p. 62.
91 Ibid., p. 56.
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The Italians allegedly ‘fought like Crusaders’, they were ‘a revolutionary army 
imbued with the spirit of the army of Huss and those who fought in the religious wars 
of the sixteenth century’.92
Fuller believed that the Italians had ‘transformed tracks into negotiable roads 
as if by the wave of a magician’s wand’.93 Bellamy of the BUF considered that poison 
gas, bombs ‘and other civilised refinements, contributed to the Italian victory; but the 
war was won mostly by the amazing speed with which roads were made and bridges 
built in appallingly difficult terrain’.94 Currey wrote that Italians were teaching the 
natives to transform their country into a modem agricultural and industrial society, by 
introducing them to machinery and new methods. They also liberated slaves, provided 
women and children with medicines and introduced education, for which the natives 
were supposed to be very grateful. In some villages the natives welcomed the Italians 
as liberators. Unfortunately for the Italians, the Negus and local ‘brigands’ who had 
always exploited and enslaved the populations did not want to accept these 
developments. Currey did occasionally mention that this ‘wonderful colonisation’ 
also involved a war: ‘I knew that they were happy and contented, but I thought, too, of 
all that war costs in human lives and suffering, of its glory and its misery’. War was 
‘both good and bad’ and ‘as a woman one must hate and dread it, while one’s heart is 
with the men who fight’.95 The myth of the Italian soldier who goes to war even 
though he dislikes it, and when at war plays the mandolin, is nice to the natives and 
talks about macaroni, seems to have remained in English literature until recent times, 
together with the belief that these Italian characteristics marked an overwhelming 
difference between themselves and the Germans, between Fascism and Nazism.96 
Muriel Currey shared this view. She reported that she never heard one word glorifying 
war for its own sake, and added: ‘let those who profess to see no difference between 
National-Socialism and Fascism ponder this fact’.97
92 Ibid., p. 63.
93 Ibid., p. 63.
94 Bellamy, We Marched with Mosley, p. 439.
95 Currey, A Woman at the Ethiopian War, p. 70.
96 The most recent example is the world-wide success obtained by the London writer Louis de Bemieres 
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The myth of the ‘good Italian’98 also included Mussolini. During a broadcast 
addressed to the English people from a Rome radio station, Currey described her 
recent meeting with the Duce, in which she ‘found that the only thing in which he was 
particularly interested was the native population in the province of Tigrai’.99 Despite 
sanctions and the fact that she was English, Currey recalled that Italians always 
welcomed her, as if international relations and anti-British propaganda had never 
really influenced them. She wondered ‘if there were any other nation in the world at 
once so civilized and so chivalrous’.100 She left Ethiopia with these thoughts: 
‘because I was a woman, the thing that I desired was that the war should end .... I 
wanted to see these horrors put an end to .... It was a war against ignorance, dirt, 
disease, and apathy’. She felt sure the Italians would win the war because in the 
conquered territories the native populations were happy, while in the areas still to be 
‘liberated’ misery triumphed.101
After the conquest, Major Poison Newman described a three months’ journey 
with his wife in the East African territories under Italian rule. Before leaving, he met 
Mussolini at the Palazzo Venezia. They talked about the prospects for Anglo-Italian 
agreement in the Mediterranean and Mussolini suggested that he go to Ethiopia. This 
confirms that Mussolini continued to receive British Italophiles and to be in contact 
with them after the conclusion of the war.102 Poison Newman’s book continued 
Currey’s account, illustrating the progress of Italian civilisation in Ethiopia after the 
conclusion of the war. He wrote about attractively built tennis clubs and the 
‘incessant traffic of lorries, cars, and motor-cycles’; in Asmara every evening the 
restaurants were packed, and people were queuing outside cinemas. When he left 
Asmara, ‘the road surface was admirable and the speed of the car fast. Where possible 
cactus and aloes were planted along the roadside, and everything connected with the 
road had a brand-new appearance’ ,103 On the roads Italians, Amharas, and liberated
98 See David Bidussa, II mito del bravo italianO (Milan. D Saggiatore, 1994).
99 Currey, An Englishwoman's Impressions of Tigrai under Italian Rule: A Broadcast (Rome: 1936), 
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slaves were always working together. It seemed as if Italy’s alleged classless society 
had now arrived in Ethiopia; the natives were always happy and saluted cheerfully as 
the British couple passed by.104 He met Marshal Graziani and described him as a 
heroic figure:
great personal charm, besides being tall and distinguished-looking. Strength of 
character was written on every feature and line of his face. His hands also were 
those of a man of action.
Graziani was also ‘positively loved by the army [...] and he has done a great deal to 
win the affection of the native population by his sympathy and understanding’.105
Like Currey two years before, Poison Newman and his wife ‘met nothing of 
the strong hostility to Britain about which we had heard so much’. Yet Italians could 
not understand ‘British ways and methods, just as in England there is a corresponding 
want of knowledge about the Italian system and way of looking at things’.106 He 
concluded that the problem was the inclination of both British and Italians to ‘lose 
sight of the many important differences between the two races’:
Britain is a northern country, with a cold, damp, and depressing climate; her 
people are Anglo-Saxon in race, chiefly Protestant in religion, and the majority 
are occupied in industry. Italy, on the other hand, is a southern country, enjoying 
a pleasant, sunny, drier climate; her people are Latin in race, almost entirely 
Catholic in religion, and the majority are occupied in agriculture. With these 
fundamental differences there cannot possibly be the same outlook towards many 
aspects of life.
Italy, too, had unified recently and had become an Empire only lately, which reflected 
the psychological differences between youth and maturity: ‘while youth regards 
maturity as slow, out of date, and obstructionist, maturity regards youth as impetuous
1 r y j
and unreasonable’. Fuller found that the same problem characterised Italian 
warfare. There was a deep psychological reason why bloodless wars were ‘repugnant 
to young nations, namely, that a war without a battle is like an unconsummated 
marriage, it is a sterile event’.108
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'The Traditional Friendship Never Existed': 
the Invention o f an Anti-British Tradition in Italy
While the Italophiles and Grandi were seeking to make the Italian cause 
popular in Britain, Italy’s anti-British propaganda was making the ‘necessary 
friendship’ difficult to realise. In fact, Italian propaganda was denying the very 
principles in which the British Italophiles believed. Despite the latter’s wide literature 
on the ‘traditional friendship’, Italian propaganda from 1935 onward concentrated on 
describing Britain as a ‘traditional enemy’.109 Furthermore, the image of the Italian 
soldier described by the Italophiles who went to Ethiopia appeared completely 
opposed to Mussolini’s conception of the new Italian. At the beginning of the war, 
Mussolini stressed that Britain had failed to realise that ‘we are no longer the nation 
we used to be’. The ‘British had always seen the Italians as happy, picturesque and 
nice people’; Italy had always represented ‘an important part of the pleasure of their 
lives’. Yet now the Italian people were radically different. The Great War had 
educated them to bear privations and had created ‘on our soil grave and austere men’. 
However, the real secret of the Italian metamorphosis was that Fascism had 
concentrated all its efforts on educating and preparating Italians from childhood.110 
Unlike the Italophiles, British supporters of sanctions in London had clearly 
understood the importance of Mussolini’s ‘secret’ and discussed it during a 
particularly dramatic meeting at the League of Nations Union in 1936: ‘with 
Mussolini training the youth of Italy to war from the cradle upwards, the risk of war 
would be far greater in the future’.111
In 1936, the Italian writer Giovanni Saracino proclaimed that ‘after 15 
centuries the Roman Empire has been reborn. The solemn event brings us back to 
Caesar and to the military and civil feats of our Roman fathers’.112 His book on the
109 See Enrico Serra, ‘Diplomazia italiana, propaganda fascista e immagine della Gran Bretagna, Rivista 
di storia contemporanea, XV, 3 (1986), especially pp. 461-464.
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416.
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Italian empire and Britain was one of several examples of the link now being made 
between the myth of the new Roman empire and rivalry with Britain. The Italian 
people, who were said to have fallen asleep on the ‘ancient traditional friendship’, 
were still unaware of several aspects of British history and mentality.113 Like other 
books written in the years that followed, the most important point was to convince the 
Italians that British support in the Risorgimento had never really existed and that self- 
interest and cynicism, never friendship, had always characterised British actions.114 
This became evident at the time of the Italian attack on Corfu in 1923, which had 
underlined once and for all the new Italian attitude - a Fascist attitude - toward 
Britain.115 Italian irredentist activities in Malta from the late 1920s onward 
represented another example of the cultural aspects of anti-British propaganda and of 
the invention of an anti-British tradition in Italy. According to MI5, at the beginning 
of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute a large number of Italians living in Malta gathered 
information and spread subversive propaganda. A similar situation existed in Egypt, 
where as a result of the Ethiopian campaign Fascism spread among the Italian 
community there. The Fascio received a number of new recruits, including some 
Egyptians, and Fascist centres were established at Alexandria and Cairo.116
Another myth created in 1936 was that of British decadence as opposed to 
Italian military strength; it was now assumed that Italy would win a war against 
Britain.117 Ciano reported in his diary that, shortly before the Ethiopian campaign, 
Mussolini had studied the composition of the British people and had divided it 
according to age. He had found that 22 million men and 24 million women lived in 
Britain, and that 12 million citizens were more than 50 years old, the ‘age limit of 
belligerence’. This meant a ‘predominance of the static masses against the dynamic
113 Ibid., p. 7.
114 Alfredo Signoretti, Italia e Inghilterra durante il Risorgimento (Milan: Istituto di studi di politica 
intemazionale, 1940).
115 Saracino, L ’impero italiano e VInghilterra, p. 21.
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masses of youth’.118 Britain’s alleged military decadence was due to a general 
decadence, which the Italians also examined from an economic point of view. The 
most detailed study, published in 1940 but written before the outbreak of the Second 
World War, explained the reasons for British decadence in the economic rise of other 
countries during the nineteenth century. However, it was Italy, by the invasion of 
Ethiopia and the defeat of sanctions, that demonstrated for the first time that Britain 
could no longer dictate European politics. Germany, it was said, followed the Italian 
example.119 At the same time, demographic decrease meant that the quality of the 
British race worsened. It was therefore clear that ‘today England no longer retains the 
requirements and the material and moral strength which are necessary to maintain a 
predominant position’. It was also evident that Britain ‘had to clash with younger and 
more dynamic countries with a high demographic potential, which is the main factor 
in a steady imperial activity and in a legitimate and natural hegemony’.120 Mussolini 
had already publicly praised Germany, where the population had increased and had 
shown the healthy state of the German race, a development that foretold major 
changes in Europe.121
Another Italian writer, Colonel Emilio Canevari, claimed that the British
appeared pacifist not because they loved peace but because they knew that ‘the
1 ^
Empire is exhausted and would collapse in case of a new conflict’. Yet it was not 
simply a question of military strength; nations decayed when they lacked courage. 
While courageous men such as Graziani had characterised Italy’s conquest of 
Africa,123 new men had not appeared in Britain for a long time: ‘the feminine element 
dominates this country, which once was the fatherland of the harshest sailors, 
soldiers, adventurers and merchants who wanted to conquer the world’; moreover, the 
‘intimate decadence’ was also due to Jewish influence.124 According to Ciano,
118 Galeazzo Ciano, Diario 1937-1943 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1980), pp. 32-33.
119 Aldo Fiaccadori, La supremazia economica inglese e le origini della sua decadenza (Milan: Hoepli, 
1940), p. 380.
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Opera Omnia, p. 36.
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Mussolini announced privately in 1937 that he planned to write a book on ‘Europe in 
2000’: the races that were going to play an important role, the Duce told Ciano, were 
the Italians, the Germans, the Russians and the Japanese. ‘The other peoples will be 
destroyed by the acid of Jewish corruption. They even refuse to have children because 
it involves pain. They do not realise that pain is the only creative element in the life of 
nations’.125
The Italian way of colonisation, allegedly based on justice and the export of 
the Fascist ideal, was a new concept to the British, whose colonisation had always 
been based on exploitation and injustice: the Italian challenge was thus principally a 
moral challenge. That meant that the confrontation was a clash of two opposed types 
of civilisation, and could lead only to war:
The Anglo-Italian contest [...] is a deadly contest, because our Empire, based on 
Roman peace and justice rather than on the exploitation of subordinates, is for the 
British a serious danger, not only because of its weight but also because of the 
comparison which it imposes.126
The main difference between Italian and British domination in Africa was thus that 
the latter was due only to economic motivations: ‘any sentimental reason, of prestige,
197of civilisation etc. is unknown to it’. Another myth, which persisted until the 
Second World War, was that Britain had been responsible for the outbreak of the First 
World War: ‘1914-1935: two dates, two facts which reproduce themselves along the 
same tradition’.128 The invention of an anti-British tradition sometimes unleashed 
pure hatred:
God, who is wiser than all politicians, had chosen that England was an island. He 
has thus indicated to us the attitude we have to adopt toward the inhabitants of 
that island: ISOLATE THEM. For everybody’s sake, it is necessary to transform 
the English Channel into an immeasurable abyss, and the island into a guarantine 
zone of the selfish, to be avoided like the lepers.129
Mario Borsa, former correspondent of II Corriere della Sera, reported a 
‘prayer’ the regime wanted the Italians to say during the months of the Ethiopian war. 
It emphasised once more the image of the British as pirates, but went further by
125 Ciano, Diario, entry for 6 September 1937, p. 34.
126 Saracino, L ’impero italiano e I ’Inghilterra, p. 8.
127 Canevari, La conquista inglese, p. 307.
128 Saracino, L ’impero italiano e I'lnghilterra, p. 32.
129 Ibid., pp. 113-114 (capital letters and italic in the original).
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wishing for the fall - forever - of the British empire, leaving Italy - again forever - its 
place in the sun, while Britain paid back to Italy the debts accumulated since the 
Great War. It was a twisted parody of the Lord’s Prayer, beginning ‘Our Pirate, who 
art an Englishman / Cursed be Thy name’:
Pirata nostro che sei inglese/ sia maledetto il nome tuo,/ venga a crollare per 
sempre il regno e l’impero tuo./ Sia sanzionata la bestiale volonta tua/ siccome in 
terra cosi in mare./ Lascia per oggi e per sempre le tue mire sul nostro posto al 
sole/ e rimborsaci i nostri crediti dal 1915 al 1918/siccome il Negus, nostro 
debitore,/ ci rimborsera a noiI Cosi sia.130
Anti-British propaganda alarmed the British Foreign Office and complicated 
Grandi’s work in London. Vansittart was also worried by alarming reports from the 
British Ambassador to Rome, Eric Drummond.131 Grandi’s difficulties increased 
when Eden became Foreign Secretary after Hoare’s fall in December 1936. Grandi 
thought that Eden had always propagated the idea that the Ethiopian question was 
merely a part of wider Italian aims in the Mediterranean that included Egypt, Malta 
and Cyprus.132 And although he did not advocate a clash with Britain, Grandi also 
contributed to creating the belief that Britain was not ready to fight Italy. He reported 
optimistically on the military balance to Mussolini, probably because he felt he
needed to show confidence of Italy’s victory. His optimism and enthusiasm clearly
1increased toward the end of the Ethiopian war. However, Fascist propaganda 
continued to associate Eden’s name with the ‘crime of sanctions’ well into the 
Second World War. Luigi Villari, writing in 1943, believed the origins of the war 
were to be found ‘on the Ethiopian mountains’.134
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Grandi and the Italophiles
The role of the embassy in supporting British sympathisers was crucial; the 
creation of the Bulletin harnessed them to the Italian cause. Italians who worked for 
the embassy, including Luigi Villari, contributed to The English Review, which 
propagated the views of the Italophiles both on Italy and on international politics. 
Grandi met regularly with some of them, especially Charles Petrie, but also figures 
such as Viscountess Georgina Milner, pro-fascist director of the National Review, 
another extreme right-wing conservative periodical which during the Ethiopian war 
was particularly useful to Italian propaganda. She believed that the pacifists were 
‘traitors to England’ and that the League was ‘a son of Satan’.135
As with Grandi’s relations with the BUF, the aggressive anti-British campaign 
in Italy and Mussolini’s increasingly pro-German foreign policy also created problems 
for Grandi in dealing with Conservative Italophiles. In 1935 Mussolini banned some 
British newspapers, including Conservative papers that had never been particularly 
anti-Italian, because of their attitude toward the Ethiopian War. One example was the 
Sunday Express, owned by the pro-Italian Lord Beaverbrook, whose friendship with 
Grandi never ceased and in fact continued into the post-1945 period. Beaverbrook 
was obviously astonished by Mussolini’s decision and complained to Grandi: ‘I would 
like to know why we are banned. These papers are not hostile to Italy. These papers 
are not criticising Italian policy in Africa’. In 1935, Austen Chamberlain had 
warned Grandi that the Italian campaign in Ethiopia was going to complicate both 
Anglo-Italian relations and European politics in general. According to Chamberlain, 
Grandi himself was aware of this but ‘had no hope that Mussolini could now be 
deflected from his purpose’.137 The British political figures most helpful to Grandi 
during the Ethiopian war were Sir George Ambrose Lloyd, John Edward Bernard
135 Lady Milner to Grandi, 29 August 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1; Grandi to 
Mussolini, 31 August 1935, ibid.
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Seely Mottistone and L. S. Amery.138 As long as Italy did not openly side with 
Germany, they thought its anti-British reaction justified, and believed that they were 
working for an improvement in Anglo-Italian relations. However, unlike Vansittart, 
they were not simply ‘appeasing’ Mussolini because they feared Nazi Germany, but 
were wholehearted supporters of Italy’s cause. For them Mussolini was not simply a 
‘lesser dictator’, but rather a completely different phenomenon from Hitler. Their 
activity in the British Parliament and among the upper classes was parallel to that of 
the Italophiles who wrote in the English Review and in the British-Italian Bulletin.
Grandi worked in close contact with Lord Lloyd, who followed his advice and 
discussed several issues with him before preparing speeches in favour of Italy in the 
House of Lords. Lloyd believed that if Britain sought to counter Fascism, that would 
open the doors of the West to Bolshevism. Mussolini was also friendly with Lloyd and
13Qinvited him to Rome several times. When he met Lloyd, Grandi stressed in 
particular the ‘dangerous alliance’ between Eden and Litvinov. He despised Vansittart 
as ‘one of the deceitful authors’ of the situation that had developed between Italy and 
Britain during the previous few months.140
Grandi considered Amery together with the bankers of the City of London as 
the most important figures in his efforts to win Conservative support. In 1935 Amery 
published a book in which he expressed immense admiration for the Duce.141 He 
described post-war Italy as a country on the verge of Bolshevism until Mussolini had 
saved it. The latter possessed ‘that all-round virtu, that talent for creation and 
reorganisation, which marked his two greatest fellow-Italians, Julius Caesar and 
Napoleon Bonaparte’. Mussolini’s feelings toward Italy were comparable to those 
expressed by Dante, Petrarch and Leopardi. His regard for the dignity of both king 
and papacy demonstrated the historical continuity of Fascism with Italian 
traditions.142 The weight of tradition was important to a right-wing conservative, and 
Amery saw it as the main difference between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The 
essence of Fascism was the Corporative state, while the dictatorship simply ‘an 
incident, indispensable for the immediate purpose’; Hitler, by contrast, came from the
138 Grandi to Mussolini, 25 February 1936, DDI, 8, HI, 297, p. 362.
139 Mussolini to Grandi, 19 October 1935, ASMAE, Gab 248, 1935.
140 Grandi to Mussolini, 17 October 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
141 Leopold Stennet Amery, The Forward View (London: Jeoffrey Bles, 1935).
142 Amery, Ibid., pp. 134-135.
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Prussian ruling tradition, and was anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic. His racial theories, 
Amery thought, were ‘fanatic nonsense’.143 In 1936, Amery dedicated a smaller book 
to the German question, in which he explained that Germany did not really need 
colonies, while Italy’s need for space and raw materials justified its claims.144 He sent 
The Forward View to Grandi, asking the ambassador to give it to the Duce in the hope 
that the latter might read at least the chapter about Fascism. Grandi asked Mussolini 
to write a short letter of appreciation to Amery as soon as possible, together with his 
opinion of the book. He believed that Amery, after a letter from the Duce, would do 
anything Grandi asked him.145
Although the Italophiles always showed admiration for and faith in Mussolini, 
Italian anti-British activity in Africa or the possibility of an Italo-German agreement 
caused them increasing anxiety. As early as October 1935, Lord Lloyd told Grandi 
that he had noticed a growing belief in England that Mussolini’s real aims were 
directed against British interests in Egypt and against the British naval position in the 
Mediterranean. He mentioned ‘Italy’s enormous and ever-increasing cultural 
propaganda in Egypt’, to which Grandi had little answer. Lloyd also touched upon 
several articles by Virginio Gayda about the mare nostrum, part of a larger 
propaganda campaign that questioned England’s rights in the Mediterranean, and 
reported to Grandi that he had heard rumours among British conservatives about a 
‘working arrangement between Italy and Germany to that end - not to be realised 
quite immediately perhaps, but in the next three or four years’. The Ethiopian 
adventure allegedly represented only one part of the plan.146 Whenever he received 
letters of that kind, Grandi organised meetings in which he sought to deny all 
allegations. He was evidently able to convince the Italophiles, since they continued 
their pro-Italian activity. He found their attitude typical of imperialist conservatives, 
but typical too of a more general British psychology, and reminded Mussolini of the 
difficulties in dealing with ‘these stubborn, ignorant and heavy people’: ‘they are like 
fishes, which dart away from your hand at the very moment when you feel you have 
caught them’. That Grandi was not fully aware of the extent of Italy’s growing
143 Amery, Ibid., pp. 141-143.
144 Amery, Hitler’s Claims for Colonies (London: Trustees for Freedom, 1936), p. 3.
145 Grandi to Mussolini, 19 October 1935, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 39, f. 93, sf. 1, ins. 1.
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contacts with Germany seemed evident from his letter to Mussolini in regard to 
Lloyd’s letter: ‘I draw your attention to the part of the letter regarding alleged Italo- 
German agreements’.147
Lord Mottistone likewise contributed to Fascist propaganda in the House of 
Lords. He challenged anti-Fascist positions and prepared his speeches in collaboration 
with Grandi. He was accustomed to asking the ambassador for information and 
material to help him prepare his speeches, and to sending drafts to Grandi to look 
over before addressing Parliament. Sometimes he asked Grandi to supply falsified 
documents to use as evidence, which Grandi provided only after Mussolini had read 
and approved them.148 On one occasion, Grandi and Mussolini decided to write a 
bogus letter from De Bono to Mottistone in which De Bono explained the present 
situation at Asmara, denying allegations of ill-treatment and bombing in Ethiopia, and 
describing the help the Italians were giving to the local population. Both De Bono and 
Mottistone were aware of the fake letter, which Mottistone needed for one of his 
speeches.149 Mottistone was convinced that he was working for a better understanding 
between Britain and Italy. He considered Italy ‘a great country’, and felt a deep 
admiration for Mussolini and Rome.150
At the end of the Ethiopian war, the Italophiles expressed their admiration for 
Mussolini to Grandi. However, it was evident from their letters that their main feeling 
was relief. Now that the Italian adventure in Africa was over, they hoped that the 
Anglo-Italian relationship could once more improve. They were willing to travel to 
Italy even more and to increase the number of Anglo-Italian events in London right- 
wing clubs. According to Charles Petrie, who was also one of the organisers of the 
‘1900 Club’, invitations to well-known Italians such as Marconi served ‘a most useful 
purpose’.151 Lloyd was optimistic that the end of the Ethiopian war marked a new era 
in international politics. He believed that public emotions would diminish ‘with the 
fait accompli*. Grandi’s letters to him were very affectionate and conveyed the sense 
that they had fought a battle together, although with more challenges to come: ‘not
147 Grandi to Mussolini, 23 October 1935, ASMAE, ibid. In the same letter he also revealed that his 
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only the spirit of friendship is to be restored but an ‘entente’ established between our 
two countries. They have the same problems to face and hold the same solutions for 
the future of Europe’.152 Amery shared the feelings of admiration for Mussolini (who 
had sent Amery a signed picture of himself via Grandi) and of optimism for the 
future: ‘I think things are steadily moving our way and that Germany can be 
persuaded in the end to guarantee the peace of all the frontiers of Europe - providing 
it is clearly understood that Russia is not Europe’.153
Austen Chamberlain took a more cautious line and warned Grandi that the 
future was ‘still in the balance’. He wondered if Mussolini was really great enough to 
be ‘moderate and wise in victory’, which was ‘the sharpest test of statesmanship’. In 
his view, Mussolini should have been content with placing Ethiopia under a 
mandate.154 Grandi acknowledged that many difficulties still existed, but considered 
Austen Chamberlain’s speeches in the Lords as ‘the new start, the rebuilding, after 
this momentous year, and, I hope, the beginning of a new real friendship between our 
two countries’ and thanked him not only as an Italian but also as a European.155
The most pro-Italian figures in the House of Lords were Lloyd and Mottistone, 
although they were increasingly joined by Sir John Lawrence Stonehaven and Lord 
David Malcom Mansfield, who belonged to an organisation called the ‘Imperial 
policy group’ and strongly opposed sanctions. The division within Britain over 
sanctions, according to Grandi, was no longer bound to the issue of sanctions itself 
but extended to the future orientation of British foreign policy. Those who opposed 
sanctions believed that Germany was Britain’s chief potential enemy and that Britain 
consequently needed an agreement with Italy in Europe, in the Mediterranean and in 
Africa. From being a minority, they were increasing remarkably thanks to Italian 
victories in Ethiopia. Those who supported sanctions on the contrary believed that a 
historic conflict had already begun between Britain and Italy.156 It was evident from 
some letters from Italophiles to Grandi that they perceived their campaign in both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords as a battle for the future of Britain and 
not only for the Italian cause. That was clear especially in spring 1936, when Italian
152 Lloyd to Grandi, 18 May 1936; Grandi to Lloyd, 23 May 1936, ibid.
153 Amery to Grandi, 25 October 1936, ibid.
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141
victories in Ethiopia helped the Italophiles’ pro-Italian struggle. In March 1936 Lord 
Phillmore met Grandi, informed him of the Italophiles’ vigorous activity, and took the 
occasion to ‘express once again his admiration and loyal cordiality to the Duce’.157
Conclusion
Unlike most British conservative imperialists, the Italophiles supported the 
Italian cause during the Ethiopian War because they were genuinely, and even 
romantically, pro-Italian and pro-Fascist. Their fight to preserve Anglo-Italian 
friendship was not simply dictated by fear of Hitler, although Hitler’s shadow seemed 
to be always present as a threat to the European order. Grandi’s letters to Mussolini, 
in which the ambassador explained his activity among the Italophiles, showed the 
continuous conflict between the good relations he established with them and Italy’s 
deliberate creation of an Anglo-Italian rivalry in Italy. The next chapter on Italian 
fascism and British society will investigate the consequences of that campaign. With 
Italian and German intervention in the Spanish Civil War, Grandi’s work in London 
in sustaining an effective Anglo-Italian relationship once more became very 
difficult.158
157 Grandi to Mussolini, 9 March 1936, ASMAE, Gab 257 (1936), f. 3; see also Grandi to Mussolini, 6 
March 1936, DDI, 8, m , 371, pp. 435-36.
158 Goldman, ‘Sir Robert Vansittart’s Search for Italian Cooperation against Hitler’, p. 129; William C. 
Mills, ‘The Chamberlain-Grandi Conversations of July-August 1937 and the Appeasement o f Italy’, 
International History Review, 19, 3 (1997), pp. 594-619; MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny: 
Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 97.
142
Chapter 5
Resistance and Decline 
the Fasci Italiani all’Estero in Britain, 1938-1939
When I think about the destiny of Italy, when I think about the destiny of Rome, when I 
think about all our historical events, I am brought to see in all this development the 
infallible hand of Providence, the infallible sign of the Divinity.1
The transformation of the Italian community of London into a corporative and 
imperial community, begun in the course of the Ethiopian war and solemnly 
announced by Dino Grandi at the end of 1937, continued until the end of the Grandi 
era. In fact, only Italy’s declaration of war on Britain brought Fascist activities in 
London to an end. After the conquest of Ethiopia, and especially after British 
recognition of the Italian empire in April 1938, the attempt to improve Anglo-Italian 
relations was continuously interrupted by Italy’s pro-German foreign policy, and was 
also complicated by the continued intervention in Spain. The crisis reached a climax 
with the racial laws of 1938. While the next chapter analyses Grandi’s activity among 
the British right and his attempt to balance the pro-Italian policy of the right-wing 
Conservatives with the Rome-Berlin Axis, the present chapter focuses on the activity 
of the Fasci among Italian communities in Britain during the last two years of 
Grandi’s era.
At the end of 1937 the foreign secretary, Galeazzo Ciano, suddenly decided to 
dismiss Piero Parini, the zealous organiser of the Fasci Abroad since 1928. Beyond 
the formal explanation, namely a question of financial mismanagement, it is 
important to understand whether the change at the general secretariat also involved 
substantial changes in policy, and whether this had an impact on the activity of the
1 Mussolini, inLetture classe quinta. Scuole italiane a li’estero (Rome: Fasci italiani all’estero, 1938), p. 
27.
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Fasci in Britain, and consequently on Anglo-Italian relations. At the same time, 
Italian foreign policy secured greater coverage in the Fascist newspaper published for 
Italians in Britain, and also in the teaching programmes of Italian schools. From the 
end of 1937 onward, the Fasci also organised the communities outside London into 
corporations; the fascistisation of small communities met a number of difficulties and 
proved less successful than it had first appeared at the end of the Ethiopian war.
Until May 1940 the organisation of schools, summer camps, dopolavoro, and 
other assistance institutions in London continued as if Italy were not going to enter a 
war that the London Fascio, the consulate and the embassy regarded as solely British: 
the moral and financial efforts of the Italian government for the education of Italians 
abroad had to continue, in theory until the conflict was over. This raises the question 
of the role of the Fasci Abroad within Italian foreign policy at the end of the 1930s: 
the chapter analyses the part that the spiritual preparation of the Italians abroad 
played in the preparation of the country for the war fought against Britain from June 
1940 onward.
The Italian Fasci Abroad after Parini
The news of his own dismissal, after ten years of dedicated and enthusiastic 
work for the Italians abroad, came quite unexpectedly to Parini. His letters to 
Mussolini and to Grandi show shock and desperation; he sought at the same time to 
prove his innocence and to regain his position. Ciano informed Parini that the reason 
given for his dismissal was that he had been responsible for excessive expenses in the 
organisation of the Fasci. In response he not only justified his financial administration 
by reporting all expenses (and reminding the Duce that they had always been agreed 
by the foreign ministry) but also presented his personal crisis as a moral drama. 
Above all, Parini did not want the Duce to believe that he had been dishonest:
If I am expelled so suddenly, in Italy and abroad major misconduct will be 
attributed to me, which will ruin my name with diffidence and suspicion. I 
therefore appeal to your heart o f  Leader for an act o f  generosity and leniency that 
may avoid a moral contamination o f  my past as a Fascist, as a fighter and as a
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soldier of Mussolini’s Revolution. Whichever Your decision, Duce, I wish to 
reaffirm my untouched faithfulness of soldier, as in all battles I fought following 
Your orders.2
When he provided data about his administration, he admitted that he had 
invested considerable sums of money in the building of schools and summer camps 
for the Italians abroad; not only were these buildings necessary, he argued, but also all 
the expenses of the general secretary had been audited annually by the Italian 
financial administration. In the tones that disappointed Fascists always used in writing 
to Mussolini,3 he expressed his regret, in terms of the deepest pain mixed with flattery 
and unconditional love:
The bitter pain that wrings my heart in these days, especially knowing that I have 
made You sad, is, I swear, the harshest punishment .... You, as Caesar, do not 
condemn without having listened and I dare to ask you the privilege to be 
admitted to Your presence.4
However, Mussolini did not seem interested in Parini’s fate. He showed a 
peculiar lack of sympathy for and gratitude toward a man who so successfully 
dedicated his life to Fascism abroad.5 It was indeed likely that, if Parini had made 
mistakes, it was as he claimed because of ‘passion and faith, never from scepticism or 
carelessness’. The seven million lire of mortgages he had undertaken on buildings 
worth an estimated 30 million lire, were ‘worth the age in which the Italian empire 
had been bom’. Yet his major successes were not simply financial: 130,000 children 
of Italians abroad had had the opportunity to get to know their Fatherland; Italian 
schools, Fasci, Case d ’ltalia and Dopolavoro organisations had appeared all over the 
world; between 1928 and 1938 the number of Italian teachers abroad had increased 
from 700 to 2,000; and 8,000 wives of Italians abroad had given birth to their children 
in Italy, thus avoiding their naturalisation outside Italy. When the Ethiopian war 
broke out and the League’s sanctions were applied, the emigrants had sent about
2 Parini to Mussolini, 7 January 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 128.
3 See Salvatore Lupo, II fascismo. La politica in un regime totalitario (Rome: Donzelli, 2000),
especially the chapter on ‘Mussolini e i suoi uomini’, pp. 398-413.
4 Parini to Mussolini, 12 January 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 128.
5 This may be seen as a lesser though significant example o f Mussolini’s cruelty and vindictiveness
underlined by Denis Mack Smith in a recent criticism of De Felice’s statement, in his biography of 
Mussolini, that ‘the Duce was not a cruel man’ (Mack Smith, ‘Mussolini: Reservations about Renzo De 
Felice’s Biography’, Modem Italy, V, 2, November 2000, pp. 208-209).
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160,000,000 lire to Italy, over 4,000 emigrants volunteered to serve in Ethiopia, out 
of the more than 12,000 Italians who applied for service there:
If we compare this data to that of the Italians who volunteered from 1915 to
1918, we shall have a sure sign of the incredible progress of patriotism of Italy’s
sons, the majority of whom had been bom abroad.6
The children who came back from summer camps were filled with enthusiasm, new 
ideas, faith, and health: any mistake that had been made, Parini swore, had been made 
for these children, ‘and they have never betrayed us’.7
Parini also wrote to Grandi informing him about his personal situation. Yet 
these were clearly letters to a friend, from whom he did not appear to expect any 
practical help. Toward the end of 1938, he finally seemed to have accepted his fate, 
although he still remained fearful that his personal situation had not been clarified to 
Mussolini.8 One aspect was clear by then: neither Mussolini nor Ciano made any 
precise accusation against Parini, whose letters remained simply unanswered. As had 
happened in 1932 to Grandi, and repeatedly to other members of the Fascist party, 
Mussolini’s decision to dismiss someone did not need justification. The most likely 
reason for Parini’s dismissal may therefore be found in Ciano’s diary, in which the 
foreign secretary recorded his indignation that in September 1937 Parini had sent a 
proclamation to the Italians in Germany without informing the foreign ministry: ‘he 
has lost any sense of proportion’.9 Ciano immediately decided that Parini should be 
removed, a solution Mussolini ordered anyway in January 1938 because of the alleged 
waste of money in the management of the Fasci.™ According to Ciano’s diary, Parini 
might have spent too much money, but the principal problem was that Parini had 
claimed too much independence from the foreign ministry. His replacement by Attilio 
De Cicco, who was already a functionary of that ministry, was thus meant to 
strengthen the links between the Fasci Abroad and the ministry.11 The change
6 Parini to Mussolini, 15 January 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 128.
7 Parini to Mussolini, 1 February 1938, ibid.
8 Parini to Grandi, 2 February 1938, ibid; Parini to De Revel, no date but attached to a letter sent to 
Grandi on 15 Oct 1938, ibid.
9 Galeazzo Ciano, Diario 1937-1943 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1980; first ed. 1946), entry for 21 September 
1937, p. 39.
10 Ibid., entry for 6 January 1938, p. 84.
11 De Cicco was a ‘first hour’ Fascist: squadrista at Foggia, he participated in the March on Rome, and 
was vice-director o f the Fasci abroad from August 1936. He remained general secretary o f the Fasci
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occurred at the point at which Italy left the League of Nations, and strengthened its 
alliance with Germany, and may be considered as part of a general attempt from 1938 
onward to strengthen Italian totalitarianism and Mussolini’s personal dictatorship.12 
The fact that the summer camp organisation continued to expand - financially as well 
- in 1938,13 suggested that Parini’s removal was not due to financial reasons but to a 
shift in policy. For example, L ’Italia Nostra never mentioned the new chief of the 
Fasci Abroad; while it had always presented Parini as the father of the Italian children 
abroad and as leader and organiser of the Fasci throughout the world, De Cicco’s 
personality never emerged.14 It was now Ciano himself who became the organiser of 
the Fasci, even of summer camps, the ‘direct gerarca of the Italians abroad’.15
Some changes in the organisation of the Italian Fasci Abroad did occur at the 
beginning of 1938. In February the foreign ministry ordered the Fasci to adopt a new 
measure of subscription. Instead of asking Italian communities to subscribe for every 
new initiative, the Fasci were ordered to ask for annual subscriptions, which were 
then distributed among the various activities. This was intended to alleviate the 
financial strain on Italian emigrants, who were experiencing economic difficulties in 
most countries, but most importantly had the advantage of marking a distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Italians. Indeed, never before 1938 had the control on 
Italians abroad had been so strict. According to Bastianini,
the single subscription.... will serve to indicate the roles of the good Italians, who 
must consider the registration of their names in the albo d'onore of the 
subscription as the accomplishment of an absolute duty to the Fatherland. The 
names of the absentees must be signalled and presented as evidence. Today all 
Italians must feel proud to march on the new path of imperial Italy.16
until 1943 and joined the Said Republic (Mario Missori, Gerarchie e statuti del PNF. Gran Consiglio, 
Direttorio nazionale, Federazioni provinciali: quadri e biogrqfie, Rome: Bonacci, 1986, p. 197).
12 On Mussolini’s attempt to accentuate the regime’s totalitarian features, see Alberto Acquarone, 
L ’organizzaziom dello stato totalitario (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), pp. 307-309; Emilio Gentile, La via 
italiana al totalitarismo. 11 partito e lo Stato nel regime fascista (Rome: La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 
1995).
13 ‘Bagni d’italianita - 18 mila giovani figli d’ltaliani all’Estero in Patria’, II Legionario, n. 17, 20 June 
1938, p. 6.
14II Legionario mentioned De Cicco only once, simply to inform about his appointment, on 31 August 
1938, n. 24, p. 14.
15 L 'Italia Nostra, 24 June 1938, p. 2; ‘S.P.Q.R - Cives Romani Sumus’, ibid., 1 July, n. 491, p.l.
16 Bastianini to all Italian embassies and consulates, 14 February 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
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In June, De Cicco announced that the statute of the Fasci had been modified 
according to the new statute of the Partito Nazionale Fascista. Symbolism also 
underlined the change: the banners of the Legions of the Fasci Abroad that went to 
fight in East Africa became the new ensign of the Fasci}1 After a long period in 
which the general secretariat had directly supervised the activity of the Fasci, it was 
now decided to decentralise the organisation in order to make it more efficient Four 
delegations were created at the general secretariat: one for Europe, one for America 
and Australia, one for Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean, and one for the youth 
organisation abroad, the Gioventu Italiana del Littorio alVEstero. New positions were 
also created at the periphery: the ispettorato di zona, which had to control the Fasci 
of a national, or multi-national, area; the segretario di zona, who controlled the Fasci 
of a consular area (a region within a country); the secretary of the Fascio and the 
fiduciario di sezione. The system became therefore more hierarchical than it had 
beea The secretaries of the Fasci no longer needed to communicate directly with the 
general secretary, but rather with the segretari di zona and the latter with the ispettori 
di zona, who then corresponded with the general secretary. The new statute also 
established that, since embassies and consulates were the highest authorities of the 
regime abroad, the Fasci had to be subordinated to them, although they were 
administratively independent. In particular, the ispettore di zona had to be in tune 
with the embassies and consulates in order to avoid having the Fasci* s activities clash 
with local politics. In fact, this supposed decentralisation resulted in a greater control 
of the centre over the periphery. Such a hierarchical organisation likewise favoured 
greater control by the Fasci over the Italian communities, and ultimately served the 
building of the totalitarian system: the joint work of the Fascio with the consulate 
meant that both were working for a common cause, since ‘in a totalitarian regime 
such as Fascism the State is the party and the party is the State’.18 The adaptation of 
the new statute of the Fasci to that of the PNF did not however mean that the Fasci 
Abroad moved under the jurisdiction of the Party. On the contrary, their activities 
remained under the supervision of the embassies, and ultimately of the foreign 
ministry, of which the general secretary remained part. Rather than the Fasci
17 ’Statuto dei fasci italiani all’estero’, 1938, article n. 2, ibid.
18 L Italia Nostra, 28 January 1938, n. 469, p. 4.
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becoming influenced by the PNF, it was the PNF that lost independence.19 The area 
mostly under the influence of the Party was the Gioventu Italiana del Littorio 
all'Estero (GILE), since the Gioventu Italiana del Littorio (GIL) was controlled by 
the PNF. However, although the GILE was organised along the lines of the GIL, it 
was still controlled by a delegation of the general secretariat of the Fasci Abroad, and 
therefore, from a practical point of view, by the foreign ministry, and only from an 
organisational point of view by the Party.
New rules likewise applied to membership of the Fasci. Whenever 
ascertaining the suitability of an applicant, secretaries had to check his ‘military 
position in time of peace and especially in time of war’, and his or her ‘political and 
moral conduct’. The subscription fee was reduced to a fixed sum of 12 lire per year, 
which all Italians could supposedly afford to pay. The general secretary had to be 
informed of those who offered more: in this way, a form of Fascist solidarity was 
established, ‘which honours the wealthy camerata and does not humiliate the 
earnerata temporarily in need’. The main duty of women remained to help the Fasci 
in assisting the Italians in need. To the usual official Fascist celebrations, namely the 
foundation of the Fasci di Combattimento (23 March), the Natale di Roma (21 April), 
the March on Rome and the First World War victory (celebrated together between 28 
October and 4 November), a new one was added, the foundation of the Empire on 9 
May.
The GILE was ordered to expand as much as possible: its leaders, together 
with ambassadors and consuls, had to begin ‘effective work to increase youth 
membership’.20 The mission of the GILE was, even more than previously, one of 
military training, since the War Office called for a voluntary recruitment of 4,000 
pupils of the GIL, which also included youths living abroad.21 Another major area of 
action concerned the dopolavoro, which played a fundamental role in the attempt to
19 ‘Segreteria Generate dei Fasci all’Estero - Circolare n. 859700-C’, Attilio De Cicco to all secretaries 
of the Fasci abroad, to all embassies and consulates, June 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2. On the new 
phase o f the PNF from 1938, see Paolo Pombeni, ‘D partito fascista’, in Angelo Del Boca - Massimo 
Legnani - Mario G. Rossi (eds), It regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome-Bad: Laterza, 1995), p. 
205; Pombeni, Demagogia e tirannide. Uno studio sulla forma-partito del fascismo (Bologna: H 
Mulino, 1984).
20 De Cicco to all GILE commanders, to all embassies and consulates, 10 November 1938, ASMAE, 
AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
21 General Secretary of the Fasci abroad to all GILE commanders, to all embassies and consulates, 10 
November 1938, ibid.
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organise the communities into corporations.22 The principal duty of Fascists abroad 
was above all to send their own children to Italian schools:
on this aspect the secretaries of the Fasci must be intransigent by proposing 
adequate disciplinary measures against those who - without any justification - 
refuse to send their children to our schools.23
The decline o f a 1wonderful community ’
When Giovanni Telesio handed over the secretaryship of the London Fascio to 
Bernardo Patrizi on 18 January 1938, the Fascio had almost 1,000 members.24 The 
GILE numbered 1,371; and 140 children from London (200 from the whole of 
Britain) had been to the camps in Italy in the summer of 1937. The dopolavoro had 
been created in the previous few months, and was divided into three groups: the 
Circolo del Littorio, with 940 members; the Mazzini e Garibadi in the Clerkenwell 
area with 210 members; and the sport section at Edgware with 236 members and four 
different sections (tennis, bowls, football and athletics). Apart from the usual 
organisations (the Alpini, the Mutuo Soccorso Mazzini e Garibaldi, the Ex- 
Servicemen), the new ones were created as corporations, such as the Associazione 
esercenti di ristoranti e caffe and the Associazione tra gli importatori ortofrutticoli ed 
agrumari.25 During the previous year, the Ambulatorio of the Fascio had visited 2,123 
children and had paid for 27 children to be cured in the Italian hospital. During the 
same year, the legal office of the Fascio had given free advice to more than 250 
Italians. 766 Italians were at the time subscribing to L Italia Nostra.26 In March 1938
22 Ciano to the General Secretary of the Fasci abroad, 29 January 1938, ibid; De Cicco to all embassies 
and consulates, ‘Circolare n. 50’, no date but shortly after 29 January 1938, ibid.
23 Segreteria Generale dei Fasci Italiani all’Estero, Disposizioni the regolcmo la vita e le attivita delle 
organizzazioni fasciste all'estero (1938), ibid.
24 The male fascio had 818 members and 187 applicants waiting to be accepted; the female fascio had 
120 members and 33 applicants (‘Verbale delle consegne al cambio della guardia del fascio Amaldo 
Mussolini’, Telesio and Patrizi to Grandi, 18 January 1938, ibid). See also ‘H cambio della guardia al 
Fascio ‘Amaldo Mussolini” , L ’Italia Nostra, n. 468, 21 January 1938, p. 1.
25 ‘Corporativismo in marcia - L’assemblea costitutiva dell’associazione fra gli importatori orto-frutticoli 
ed agrumari’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 14 January 1938, n. 467, p. 1; ‘Corporatismo in marcia - Verso 
l’associazione degli importatori di vini?’, ibid., 4 February, n. 470, p. 4.
26‘Verbale delle consegne al cambio della guardia del fascio Amaldo Mussolini’, Telesio and Patrizi to 
Grandi, 18 January 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
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the newspaper described the London community as the finest Italian community in 
the world:
It is not an exaggeration to describe the Italian community of London as 
wonderful. We do not believe it is possible to find in any other country on earth, 
even in places where Italians exemplify every magnificent civic and patriotic 
virtue, such a compact, enthusiastic, harmonious and Fascist community.27
The corporative direction of the community continued under Patrizi. In May 
1938 the Fascio instituted a new workers’ organisation, the Associazione Nazionale 
Fascista dei Lavoratori. Patrizi was very pleased about the response the new 
organisation received from the community, since within a few days 200 Italians had 
already subscribed to it. Yet the major reason for satisfaction, he reported to Grandi, 
was the attitude of the community toward Fascism: in his speech to the community at 
the end of 1937, the ambassador had encouraged the participation of Italians, and they 
now seemed to be more active than ever before, and showed themselves increasingly 
willing to accept responsibilities. The most actives were to be found among the 
members of the ex-servicemen organisations and of the Associazione Caffettieri, 
which was an outstanding example of a Fascist corporation abroad. Although the 
financial situation of the Fascio was improving at the time, the Fascio had not been 
able to keep the restaurant in the Casa d'Italia open during weekdays. A group of 
about 60 Fascists, most of whom were members of the Alpini and of the Associazione 
Caffettieri, decided to rescue the restaurant by submitting a tender and by offering 
500 pounds sterling as annual rent.28 They constituted the ‘Italian Catering 
Association Limited’, later officially approved by the consulate.29
Corporativism and autarchy became part of the same effort toward organising 
the community in totalitarian fashion. The slogans that had frequently appeared 
during the period of sanctions, asking Italians to buy only Italian products, continued 
into 1938. The products advertised were generally those sold by the new corporations: 
for example in February, shortly after the foundation of the organisation of citrus-fruit 
sellers, new slogans appeared such as ‘Italian housewives do use Italian lemons’ and
27 ‘La collettivita italiana “meravigliosa”’, L ’Italia Nostra, 18 March 1938, n. 476, p. 1.
28 Patrizi to Grandi, 6 May 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
29 Biondelli to foreign ministry and to the London embassy, 13 June 1938, ibid.
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‘Italian chefs do prefer Italian lemons’.30 In April, L 'Italia Nostra calculated that if all 
40,000 Italians who lived in Britain bought only Italian fruit and vegetables, they 
would give Italy about 1,000 pound sterling per day. The Fascio presented autarchy 
abroad as part of the regime’s permanent state of war:
The regimes entrusts your consciousness with such activity, and no one could 
ever control your consciousness. It will be an unknown and unacknowledged 
effort, comparable to the effort of a soldier in a trench. But is was exactly the 
unknown soldier who won both the war of 1918 and die Ethiopian War.31
Linked with autarchy and with the new empire was the myth of repatriation. 
Italy, it was claimed, no longer needed other countries’ help, either in terms of 
imports or of emigration. That did not mean that Italy intended to withdraw from its 
project of world expansion: emigrants who were successful abroad because of their 
skills were required to remain abroad and continue their economic (and possibly 
political) activity. But poor emigrants had to return to Italy, where, thanks to the 
empire and to Fascist economic policy, jobs were now supposed to be available to 
everybody. The regime’s propaganda thus reflected two major dreams of the 1920s 
and 1930s: the Fascist dream that the Italian abroad would no longer be a working- 
class emigrant, and the emigrant’s eternal dream to return to his or her own country.32
From the correspondence between the London Fascio, the London embassy 
and the Italian foreign ministry, it is evident that the control of the Fascio over the 
Italians increased considerably from 1938 onward. That confirmed MI5’s belief that 
Italian Fascists were working as spies in the community and reporting information 
about the non-Fascists to the embassy. However, the increase in control also served to 
identify those Italians who were facing economic problems and needed help. The 
Fascio began reporting about almost everybody in the community, be they members 
who needed help or letters of recommendation or anti-Fascists who needed to be 
threatened. The general secretary’s renewed insistence on strict application of the
30 L 'Italia Nostra, 18 February 1938, n. 472, p. 2.
31 ‘La relazione dell’ispettore dei fasci delle isole britanniche’, ibid., 1 April, n. 478, p. 1 (cont. at p. 4). 
A similar appeal to the Italians in Britain came also from II Legionario (‘Inghilterra’, n. 11, 16 April 
1938, p. 26).
32 ‘La colonizzazione demografica in atto nell’impero’, L 'Italia Nostra, 15 April 1938, n. 480, p. 8; ‘La 
costituzione di una commissione permanente per il rimpatrio degli italiani dall’estero’, ibid., 2 December 
1938, n. 513, p. 1; ‘D rimpatrio di connazionali dall’estero. Un prirno scaglione di mille italiani’, ibid., 3 
March 1939, p. 1. ‘Rimpatrio degli italiani all’estero’, II Legionario, n. 32, 20 November 1938, p.l
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rules for admission to the Fasci was also a reason for investigating more fully the 
backgrounds of those who asked to become members. According to the statute, rules 
‘did not need commentary’, which meant the authorities of the Fasci had to respect 
them without discussion. Yet cases occurred in which the secretary of the London 
Fascio asked to be allowed to make exceptions, particularly in the case of rich, 
influential employers who could be useful members. Two Italian brothers, Giovanni 
and Ernesto Quaglino, offer one such example: they had previously asked for British 
citizenship, but later withdrew their applications, choosing instead to apply for Fascio 
membership. To have asked to become British was of course enough to prevent the 
Fascio from accepting them, since that was considered a most anti-patriotic gesture. 
Yet as Patrizi explained to the general secretary, the Quaglino brothers represented 
‘English interests worth millions of pounds’, and it clearly did make a difference if 
they presented themselves to the British as Italians and Fascists. Secondly, the two 
brothers represented one of the top hotel groups in London, which was not only a sign 
of prestige for Italy in a foreign country, but also meant that they employed hundreds 
of their compatriots. Hence if they were part of the Fascio, it ‘would facilitate the 
work of assistance and penetration among Italian employees, which would not happen 
if the Quaglino were not part of the Fascio \ 33
Arturo Magnocavallo, who replaced Patrizi as secretary of the Fascio in 
September 1938, continued to strengthen control over Italians in London. They were 
divided into good Italians - to be defended and recommended - and bad Italians - to be 
identified and reported to Rome. The consul also acted as a defender and mediator 
with the British authorities on behalf of the rights of Italians who needed, for 
example, permanent work permits and were part of the Sindacato Lavoratori Italiani. 
The reason given by the consul for doing so was that they were ‘wonderful and hard­
working fellow-countrymen who during their long residence in London had always 
maintained irreproachable conduct’.34 Recommendations to help Italians find good 
jobs or to become part of the Fascio depended on their being ottimi italiani, a status 
that could only be verified by establishing if the rest of the community held them in 
high esteem as hard workers and patriots. Patriotism needed to be proven. For
33 Patrizi to the General Secretary, 18 March 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
34 Magnocavallo to Biondelli, 19 December 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1068, f. 1.
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example, emigrants who, despite financial difficulties, sent their children to Italy 
because they wanted them to receive a complete Fascist education were cited as 
models. So, too, were those emigrants with the almost mandatory large family,35
However, control over Italians abroad also took the form of calumny and 
denunciation, typical means of Fascist control in Italy since the very beginning of 
Mussolini’s government.36 The surveillance of Italian communities was based on the 
creation of feelings of generalised suspicion. Italians who had no open political views 
were suspected of being subversive. Whenever they travelled to Italy, the police 
stopped them at the Italian border and searched them. Rather than the OVRA, it was 
the activity of the Fasci that served as a means of control, a function that facilitated 
the emigrants’ integration into the regime.37
The spy system also acted within Fascist institutions. At the beginning of 
January 1939, the President of the Circolo del Littorio, Enrico Andrea Abbiati, 
organised a vigilance commission, whose members had to check that no one in the 
Circolo acted in opposition to any of the rules of the statute.38 From several letters 
between the secretary of the Fascio and the consul it is possible to see that many 
Italians had been watched regularly in earlier years; yet between 1938 and 1939 the 
consulate required the Fascio to provide an update about them. Information usually 
came to the secretary of the Fascio from anonymous ‘voices’, which meant from 
someone within the community. The ‘voices’, for example, provided information for 
a number of years that the owner of an Italian restaurant in the West End, Abele 
Giandolini, who employed Italian staff, secretly held anti-Fascist views. Although no 
one ever found proof - and for the previous three or four years nothing was ever 
reported about his political opinions - in 1939 the consulate asked for information 
about him. Someone promptly reported to the secretary of the Fascio that not only 
was Giandolini no longer suspected of anti-Fascism, but that he even contributed
35 Magnocavallo to General Secretary, 17 January 1939, ibid; Patrizi to Capodanno, 6 February 1939, 
ibid.
36 Mimmo Franzinelli, Delatori. Spie e confidenti anonimi: Varma segreta del regime fascista (Milan: 
Mondadori, 2001).
37 Franzinelli, I  tentacoli dell’OVRA. Agenti, collaboratori e vittime della polizia politica fascista 
(Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1999), p. 170; see also Romano Canosa, I  servizi segreti del Duce. I  
persecutori e le vittime (Milan: Mondadori, 2000). For an interesting comparison with Nazi Germany, 
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38 Magnocavallo to the Fascist Celeste Orsi, who was asked to be part o f that commission, 25 January 
1939, ASMAE, AL, b. 1068, f. 1.
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financially to several Fascist assistance institutions. The Fascio also knew about his 
earnings and investments both in Britain and in Italy.39 Another case was that of anti­
fascists who had converted to Fascism, which in most cases occurred during the 
Ethiopian war, but who were still watched in 1939: the Fascio continued to check on 
them and to report on their affiliations and on their private life.40 It was enough to fail 
to be part of the Fascio to be the subject of enquiries, even in the case of ‘good 
Italians’ who simply showed no public political attitude.41
One form of control openly employed was the interrogation of Italians who 
appeared to be informed about other Italians’ anti-Fascism. Rome sometimes 
requested information on particular individuals in London. In January 1939, the 
general secretary of the Fasci Abroad ordered the London Fascio to interrogate the 
Fascist Enrico Abbiati, himself a member of the Direttorio of the Fascio, because he 
knew from Emilio Sala, a fellow-countryman who was also member of the Fascio, 
about the anti-Fascist behaviour of an Italian emigrant, Angelo Tosetti. Both Sala and 
Tosetti were employed by the same English industrialist. During a journey to London, 
talking with both the English employer and Sala, Tosetti apparently expressed 
‘shameful’ opinions about the regime and the Duce. However, interrogation of 
Abbiati and Sala did not produce a ‘concrete version’, because the latter refused to 
collaborate. The secretary of the Fascio thus decided that they should confront each 
other. When this happened, Sala again refused to give information and claimed he did 
not want anyone to be accused on his evidence. He concluded by saying that if he ever 
told anything to Abbiati, he was ready to bear the consequences himself. This case 
showed the difficult position of Italians who were members of the Fascio and at the 
same time worked for a British firm. For Sala, to denounce anyone else employed in 
the same firm meant the risk that the employer would find out about it and possibly 
sack him.42 Work relationships with the British, the denunciation of anti-Fascists and 
fear of being interrogated by the Fascio, all contributed to creating an atmosphere of
39 Magnocavallo to Biondelli, 5 February 1939, ibid.
40 See for example the case of the ex-socialist Giuseppe Sinicco, wrongly classified as an ex-anarchist by 
Magnocavallo, who also mistook the year of Sinicco’s conversion to Fascism, which did not happen in 
1933 but during the Ethiopian War. ‘Oggetto: Sinicco Giuseppe fii Luigi’, Magnocavallo to London 
consulate, 6 April 1939, ASMAE, AL, b. 1068, f. 1; see also Sinicco, Le memorie di im calzolaio da 
Borgognano a Londra (Udine: Pellegrini, 1950); ACS, CPC, b. 4829, f. 3597.
41 ‘Oggetto: Beschizza Angelo di Lazzaro’, Magnocavallo to consulate, 11 April 1939, ASMAE, AL, b. 
1068, f. 1.
42 Magnocavallo to General Secretary, 5 July 1939, ibid.
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mutual suspicion throughout the community, even - and perhaps especially - among 
the Fascists themselves.
Control over Italians increased even more when the regime inaugurated the 
census of the Jewish Race started in September 1938, following Mussolini’s 
proclamation of the racial laws. The census applied also to Italian communities 
abroad,43 and in November 1938 the embassy sent the following demand to its 
consulates throughout Britain:
Please urgently communicate the names of die consular employees who appear to 
be of Jewish religion or of Jewish descent by listing also the uncertain cases. 
Enquires must be extended also to these employees’ wives.44
Anti-Semitism in Italy was not simply a consequence of the alliance with 
Germany, but a part of the regime’s propaganda about the improvement of the Italian 
race, which was based, especially after the Ethiopian War, on the concept of 
‘superiority of the Italian blood’.45 Persecution of the Jews nevertheless came quite 
unexpectedly to the Italian communities in Britain. L'ltalia Nostra had always 
emphasised an extreme nationalism and the improvement of the race through the 
education of children, especially when promoting the summer camps and the 
activities of youth organisations. Yet in this case, as with the Italo-German Alliance 
two years earlier, Italian anti-Semitism appeared in the newspaper very suddenly. The 
racial laws were not preceded by any explanation, nor had the newspaper ever 
mentioned Jews or even German anti-Semitism before. At the beginning of 1938 
L 'Italia Nostra had for the first time put forward the view that some countries needed 
to reduce Jewish influence.46 The first article on the question of race in Italy appeared 
in August and included a quotation of a speech by Mussolini during a visit to a 
summer camp of Avanguardistr.
You must know, and everybody must know, that on the question of the race we 
shall also shoot straight. To say that Fascism has imitated someone or something 
is simply absurd.47
43 Ciano to all employees of the foreign ministry administration, 23 September 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 
1095, f. 2, sf. ‘Personate locale. Censimento razza ebraica’.
44 Grandi to consulates in London, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Cardiff 24 November 1938, ibid.
45 Michele Sarfatti, Mussolini contro gli ebrei. Cronaca dell’elaborazione delle leggi del 1938 (Turin: 
Zamorani, 1994), p. 8; David Bidussa, llm ito  del bravo italiano (Milan: II Saggiatore, 1994), p. 10.
46 ‘Come il mondo si orienta verso Roma’, L Italia Nostra, 1 January 1938, n. 466, p. 1.
47 ‘H duce e la razza’, ibid., 5 August 1938, n. 496, p. 2.
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The explanation came only a week later. The newspaper claimed that it was 
hardly surprising that Italy felt the need to deal with the racial problem, and rejected 
the accusation that Italy had only copied the German example. Like most Fascist 
newspapers abroad,48 L ’Italia Nostra chose to downplay the Jewish question and to 
focus on the strengthening of the Italian race in general. Reporting an article 
previously published in II Legionario, L ’Italia Nostra claimed that the racial laws had 
emerged through the autonomous processes of Italian history. Moreover, the Italian 
theory of race was different from the German one: Italy, it was alleged, never saw the 
matter as a question of supremacy of one race over the others, but only of distinctions 
between races. As the newspaper emphasised, one great event had caused the racial 
problem to become an urgent one: the conquest of the Empire, from which arose the 
question of the relationship between Italians and Africans. Yet independently of the 
colonial question, the defence of the race was something the regime had been 
building upon since its very beginning; the summer camps were vital in this:
How can we define this wonderful performance, which renews itself every year, 
of thousands and thousands of young Italians, Italians by name and by blood, 
who come to our summer camps to the sea and to the mountains from all over the 
world, in order to draw more deeply the consciousness of their origins from the 
native soil? How can we define it if not the expression of the defence of the race?
It was thus evident that, even in this field, Mussolini’s Italy had not been 
imitating, but rather anticipating other countries.49 Italian racism, according to 
L ’Italia Nostra, started as early as 1919; Mussolini underlined the importance of the 
defence of the race during a party congress in 1921. The press made evident the 
beneficial results of the regime’s policy over race: in 1938 L ’Italia Nostra proclaimed 
that the average height of Italians was ‘in progressive increase’.50 And II Legionario
48 De Felice, Storia degii ebrei italiani soiio iifascismo (Turin: Einaudi, 1961), p. 387.
49 ‘La difesa della razza - Concezione italiana e fascista’, L liaiia Noslra, 12 August 1938, n. 497, p. 2 
(originally in II Legionario, n. 21, 1 August 1938, p. 1). As underlined by Paola Di Cori, anti-Semitism 
began to threaten Italian Jews from 1935 onward, due to the colonial adventure in Africa, which 
stimulated the emergence o f a detailed ideology about the purity o f Italian race (‘Le leggi razziali’, in 
Mario Isnenghi, ed, Iluoghi della memoria. Simboli e miti dell’Italia imita, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1996), 
p. 469.
50 ‘La politica razziale del fascismo - La statura media degli italiani in progressive aumento’, ibid., 26 
August 1938, n. 499, p. 3.
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published a list of Mussolini’s speeches about the question of race from 1920 
onward.51
Certainly a solution to the problem had become urgent when Mussolini 
founded the empire in Ethiopia. As Italian families began moving to Africa it was 
crucial, from the Fascist point of view, that they not mix with the local population and 
remained racially pure. II Legionario explained that racial laws and the Jewish 
question were a consequence of the empire: ‘history has taught us that empires are 
conquered through weapons, but are maintained through prestige’.52 L Italia Nostra, 
although less openly, hinted that anti-African racism was linked with anti-Semitism: 
‘to discriminate does not mean to persecute. This must be told to the all too many 
Jews of Italy and of other countries’, in order that they refrain from ‘panic’, 
‘haughtiness’, and ‘useless lamentations’. The census was necessary in order to make 
Jewish participation in the nation’s life proportional to the number of Jews living in 
Italy. Moreover, LItalia Nostra continued, the Jews had always been racist 
themselves by claiming to be the chosen people; the ‘equation’ between Semitism, 
Bolshevism and Freemasonry had been ‘historically accepted’ all over Europe in the 
last twenty years.53 However, unlike II Legionario, which insisted on the Jewish 
question and attacked the Jews in several issues, L Italia Nostra tended to describe 
the racial question as part of a more general defence of the Italian race.54 The racial 
question itself soon disappeared from the newspaper until March 1939, when an 
isolated article reminded readers that in East Africa it was necessary to maintain a 
clear separation ‘between the dominant race and the dominated race, between the 
Aryan and the Semite, between the white and the black’; the mixing of those races 
would diminish the prestige of the colonisers and eventually bring them to decay,55
In a curt letter of February 1939, Ciano confirmed the regime’s intention to 
expel Jews from the diplomatic service:
With reference to previous communications on this subject, I shall wish to receive
an urgent guarantee from Your Excellency that all Jewish personnel - whatever
51 ‘Mussolini e l’idea della razza’, II Legionario, n. 26, 20 September 1938, p. 17.
52 ‘II problema ebraico’, ibid., n. 29, 20 October 1938, p. 5.
53 ‘H clima e maturo per il razzismo italiano’, L 'Italia Nostra, 12 August 1938, n. 497, p. 2.
54 For the anti-Semitic stance of II Legionario, see in particular: ‘Gli ebrei in Italia’, n. 6, 26 February 
1938, p. 9; ‘II fascismo e i problemi della razza’, n. 20, 20 July 1938, p. 4; ‘La difesa della razza e il 
problema ebraico in Italia’, n. 25, 10 September 1938, p. 4.
5 ‘La colonizzazione italiana in A ,0 .\ ibid., 10 March 1939, n. 527, p. 2.
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the level of their employment [...]- have been reported to this Ministry so that it 
is possible to proceed to dismissal.56
It is difficult, on the basis of very few documents on this subject, to measure 
the reaction of the Italian community to racial laws. According to De Felice’s study of 
Italian anti-Semitism, both Italian diplomatic representatives and Fascist propaganda 
abroad tended to apply the racial laws with a light touch.57 The London embassy and 
Italian consulates in Britain nevertheless carried out the census and respected the 
orders received from Rome. This was also because, as Ciano’s letter made clear, it 
was the foreign ministry’s prerogative to dismiss Jewish employees of embassies and 
consulates, since they were part of the diplomatic service. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
the racial laws complicated Grandi’s relations with the British establishment. The 
hostile letters he received from British sympathisers who were nevertheless horrified 
by Italian anti-Semitism may also suggest that the relationship between the Italian 
community and British society was worsening. Unlike the BUF campaign, which 
since 1934 had been almost totally focused on anti-Semitism, the London Fascio had 
never demonstrated any interest in it. While BUF supporters saw the Jews as rich 
foreigners who were exploiting the British, the Italian Fascists in Britain do not seem 
to have made an issue of people of Jewish origin, be they Italian or British. The 
correspondence of the Fasci with the embassy and of the embassy with Rome, as well 
as the available files of the British Foreign Office and of MI5 give no indication of 
anti-Semitism within Italian communities. From the autobiographies of Italians who 
lived in London in the 1930s, it was evident that most Italians who embraced Fascism 
were at the same time, for obvious reasons, interested in maintaining good relations 
with Britain; none mention racial issues, nor the purported existence of a Jewish 
question,58
When the Italian authorities began to introduce anti-Semitic measures into the 
London community, even the secretary of the Fascio and the embassy seemed 
unwilling to persecute Italian Jews who were members of the Fascio. When Italians
56 Ciano to all embassies and consulates, 6 February 1939, ASMAE, AL, b. 1095, f. 2, sf. ‘Personale 
locale. Censimento razza ebraica’.
57 De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, p. 386.
58 Elena Salvoni, Elena: A life in Soho (London: Quartet Books, 1990); Calisto Cavalli, Ricordi di un 
emigrato (London: La Voce degli Italiani, 1973); Charles Forte, Forte: The autobiography o f Charles 
Forte (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986).
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of Jewish origin had been good Fascists and were presently useful to the community, 
the authorities of the Fascio and of the Italian schools abroad could not understand 
why they had to get rid of them. Magnocavallo, director of school at the Circolo del 
Littorio and later secretary of the Fascio, was reluctant to sack an Italian teacher, 
who, besides being married to the director of the Credito Italiano in London, was the 
only teacher holding a teaching diploma in mathematics. Moreover, she had always 
discharged her duties admirably, and had even given her salary to Fascist charitable 
activities. He convinced consul Giuseppe Biondelli to ask the foreign ministry if she 
could remain in service at least for another year.59 Similarly in December 1938, the 
secretary of the London Fascio obtained the support both of Grandi and of the consul 
to ask the Italian ministry of interior to make an exception in favour of a Jew who had 
been a member of the Direttorio and a former war volunteer.60 Over the following 
months, Magnocavallo nevertheless continued his investigation into the racial origins 
of members of the Fascio.61
The atmosphere of surveillance within the community and of anxiety over 
international events was accompanied, especially in 1939, by a general worsening of 
the morale and economic conditions of Italians. Some emigrants were sufficiently 
alarmed to cease to send their children to Italian schools, and those who could afford 
it moved back to Italy. This led to a worsening of the financial conditions of the 
Fascio. By March 1939 the newspaper could not afford to buy propaganda 
photographs sent from Italy, and had to ask to the general secretary in Rome for 
financial support. In the same month the paper was reduced to four pages. In July the 
Fascio informed the general secretary that Italian Fascists in London were not sure 
that they could organise a journey to the Autarchic Exhibition in Turin because of the 
difficult conditions in which they were living.62 The general secretary’s request that 
the Fascio found a section of the GUF in London likewise received a negative answer. 
After almost five months of attempts to find Fascist university students in the city, the
59 ‘Insegnante di aritmetica presso la Scuola media’, Biondelli to foreign ministry, 22 September 1938, 
ASMAE, AS (1936-45), b. 87 (‘Gran Bretagna 1938^10’), f. m , sf. 3 (‘Londra’).
L ondon Fascio to Augusto Assettati (Bastianini’s capo di Gabinetto), 9 December 1938, ASMAE, 
AL, b. 1068, f. 1.
61 See Magnocavallo to consulate, 31 March 1939, ibid.
62 Magnocavallo to General Secretary o f the ‘Agenzia d’ltalia e delTImpero’, 3 March 1939; 
Magnocavallo to Rampagni, 28 June 1939; Magnocavallo to General Secretary, 3 July 1939, ibid.
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Fascio had to explain its failure by the absence of ‘Fascist elements’.63 Even the 
corporations, the pride of the Fascist community in 1937 and 1938, began to appear 
weak and inefficient. Particularly after the international crisis of September 1938, 
when Germany’s preparations to invade Czechoslovakia seriously threatened the 
world peace, coffee-shop owners seemed less committed to their corporation than 
previously. A meeting of the organisation in January 1939 revealed that many 
members were ready to offer moral solidarity, yet were not as ready when the 
organisation requested financial solidarity in the form of the purchase of shares.64 In 
June they were still discussing the same question: the organisation, from being a 
‘moral strength’ had to become an ‘economic strength’, and what used to be ‘feeling’ 
had now to become ‘interest’. The Fascist ideal of the London community remained a 
dream:
We dream of die day when every Italian shop will be part of a corporation and 
will be able to satisfy all its needs directly from its own corporation .... And we 
can see ever further... if one day the interests of one member, or of a group of 
members, or of the whole community, were threatened, our unity will be the best 
defence.... At the same time the economic and numerical power of the 
organisation will render us more respected by the country in which we live.65
Fascistisation Must Continue: Fasci and Schools face the War
At the end of the 1930s, the Fasci still considered the Italian schools abroad as 
the most powerful element against ‘de-nationalisation’.66 Their programmes did not 
change significantly from the previous years, especially for younger children in the 
primary schools. However, for older children, especially those in the intermediate 
classes aged between nine and thirteen, the programmes showed increased attention 
to the teaching of history, geography, and international events, which were used to
63 Magnocavallo to General Secretary, 23 January 1939; Magnocavallo to General Secretary, 14 June 
1939, ibid.
64 ‘Relazione dell’assemblea generale dell’Associazione Caffettieri Italiani di Londra tenuta il 19 gennaio 
alia Casa del Littorio’, L ’Italia Nostra, 3 February 1939, n. 522, p. 5.
65 ‘La fondazione dell’Associazione Caffettieri Italiani di Londra’, ibid., 23 June 1939, n. 542, p. 1.
66 This was perceived also outside London: see ‘Scuola italiana di Liverpool’, Giovanni Palmeri 
(secretary o f the Liverpool Fascio) to Liverpool consul Count Ottavio Gloria, 1 June 1938, ASMAE, 
AS, (1936-45), b. 87, f. m , sf. 7.
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highlight Italy’s position in the world. This did not simply relate, as previously, to 
Italy’s contribution to world civilisation, but extended to Fascist Italy’s contribution 
to major changes in world politics and geography.
In 1938 the schools seemed to be working successfully. This reflected a period 
of improvement in Anglo-Italian relations: in March Anthony Eden left the Foreign 
Office, in part due to a Grandi intrigue, and the ambassador was more than ever 
celebrated as the hero and the ‘duce’ of the community; in April Britain recognised 
the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, as Neville Chamberlain implemented his policy of 
appeasement toward Italy, which L Italia Nostra often acknowledged. Anti-British 
propaganda was less intense even in Italy; the massive number of anti-British 
publications from the Ethiopian War period was temporarily interrupted from 1938, 
to begin again in 1940. This reflected no substantial shift in foreign policy, but rather 
the belief that Italy was now in the position to face Britain on equal terms. The 
conquest and recognition of the empire and the campaign in Spain created a new 
confidence in Italy’s universal mission. In a book published in 1938, the universal 
Fascist Asvero Gravelli underlined the inevitability of Italy’s destiny as that of a 
civilisation re-bom after thousands of years. The ‘infallible hand of Providence’, the 
‘infallible sign of the Divinity’ emphasised by Mussolini’s words for the schools 
abroad, was evident, Gravelli argued, in Ethiopia and in Spain. He defined Mussolini 
as ‘eternal’, ‘infinite’, and as the man who represented History as opposed to the 
rootless daily round. Unlike leaders in democratic countries, who were merely 
politicians, Mussolini was the reincarnation of an ancient glorious history and 
expression of a new age.67 The shift in propaganda thus reflected this new self­
perception, rather than any genuine pro-British feeling.
The situation of the Italian schools in London differed according to the areas 
in which they were situated. The school at the Istituto del Littorio continued to be 
celebrated as the finest example of a united, fascistised and imperial community. It 
was the only daily school in London, since the other schools were held in the 
evenings, no more than twice a week, and were situated in the poorer areas of the city 
where the majority of Italians lived. In January 1938, ninety-seven students were
67 Asvero Gravelli, Uno e molti. Interpretazioni spirituali di Mussolini (Rome: La Nuova Europa, 
1938), p. 12; p. 24.
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registered at the daily school.68 If discipline caused no problems and most students 
spoke good Italian, this was entirely due to the fact that only children of rich families, 
Grandi’s children included, went to the Istituto. Most of these children came from 
families of coffee-shop owners, who appeared to be the most fascistised social group 
in London. They were generally prosperous, occupied all day with their business, and 
happy to leave their children all day at the Istituto, where after school hours the 
children could take part in sports. Unlike poor Italian families, they did not need to 
put their children to work at an early age. This situation was certainly not a 
demonstration of the classless society of which the Fasci had always boasted, and as 
the Fascist organiser Ada Fantozzi remarked several times, was a serious limitation on 
the penetration of Fascism into the community. She often reminded the Italian 
consulate and the foreign ministry of the importance of creating a daily school in the 
area between Soho and Clerkenwell, because although some families did not send 
children to the Istituto because it was far away, and others did not because they were 
‘snobbish’ and believed English schools to be better, for many Italians the problem 
was merely economic. Not only were registration fees high, but the refectory, books 
and bus service were expensive. In particular, the bus service was vitally important, 
because the school was situated in a non-Italian area, and the bus fee created further 
problems in convincing the parents to enrol their children. Another issue of concern 
for parents was the teaching of English, which according to the Fascio did not require 
more than one hour per day. On the contrary, several parents realised that, however 
important it was for their children to maintain italianita, they also needed to speak 
and write English as well as the natives in order to enjoy a chance of success in 
British society. A number of parents asked for an Italian school which taught in 
English. This the Fascio considered to be narrow-minded, a sign of not having 
understood the crucial role of the Italian schools in a foreign country.69
At the end of 1938, the students registered at the ten Italian night-schools in 
London were 906, 801 of whom were actually attending. The classes, normally held
68 They were divided according to age: 13 at the Casa dei bambini (kindergarden), 15 in the first class, 
16 in the second, 25 in the third, and 28 between the forth and the fifth classes. ‘Prima relazione 
trimestrale sul funzionamento della scuola elementare diuma’, Ada Fantozzi (director o f the schools) to 
foreign ministry - Direzione Generate Scuole, and to London consulate, 27 January 1938, ASMAE, AS 
(1936-45), b. 87, f. m , sf. 3.
69Ibid.
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twice a week, took place in rooms supplied by the London City Council and the 
Catholic Church. According to Ada Fantozzi’s reports, the schools were very 
successful: most students spoke good Italian and were acquainted with the major 
events in Italian history and of the Fascist ‘revolution’, as well as an understanding of 
the geography of the peninsula and of its colonies.70 The most effective means to 
create national consciousness among children who experienced a Fascist atmosphere 
only twice a week, and spent the rest of their time in difficult ‘spiritual conditions’, 
was the teaching of history linked with geography. This included, for example, 
programmes that linked the history of the Risorgimento to the age of Augustus and to 
the geography of Alma Roma.
A new school was founded in 1938. It was a ‘secondary course’, intended for 
girls only since it was held in the rooms of Don Bosco nuns. It was dedicated to girls 
of poor families who had to work and study at the same time. This created obvious 
attendance problems; indeed only two-thirds of the registered students were actually 
able to regularly attend to the courses, and the school could only meet once a week. 
The aim of the course was ‘Italian education’: ‘formation of a national consciousness, 
stimulus of desire for culture, appreciation of beauty’. According to Fantozzi, one of 
its major achievements was to stimulate the girls to start collecting Italian poems to 
teach their children once they became mothers: ‘they have understood the national 
problem as a problem of language, and this gives us certainty that these girls will be 
good Italian mothers’.71
The programmes of Italian schools in 1938 and 1939 clearly reflected the 
recent changes in Italy’s foreign policy: first and foremost, schools celebrated the 
Empire. Alongside speeches by Mussolini and by other Fascists, readings assigned to 
pupils also drew on the writings of famous Italian poets such as Giosue Carducci and 
Ugo Foscolo, and several stories set in Ethiopia. Most of them were politicised: they 
emphasised Italy’s mission of civilisation in Africa and presented Badoglio and 
Graziani as Roman heroes of the renewed Empire.72 They described the continuity of
70 ‘Scuole serali’, Biondelli to foreign ministry and to London embassy, 10 June 1938, ibid.
71 ‘Relazione finale sul funzionamento delle scuole serali italiane di Londra’, report signed by Ada 
Fantozzi and carrying the stamp of the consulate-general, no date but attached to report of 11 August 
1938, ibid.
72 See especially ‘Vigilia d’impero’, in Letture classe quinta, pp. 22-24; ‘La vita al campo del 
maresciallo Badoglio’, ibid., pp. 231-235; ‘Diavolo ed Arcangelo’ (about Graziani), ibid., pp. 242-243.
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Rome in history as a divine mystery and as a necessity for the world order.73 To 
remind the Italians abroad that they were part of this destiny, some readings included 
letters from mothers and wives of soldiers who had volunteered in East Africa and 
died for the Empire, symbolising a sacrifice that embraced all, men as well as women. 
At the proclamation of the Empire, Mussolini had reminded them that death was ‘the 
sublime test of discipline’.74 However, the school readings made no mention of the 
racial problem, of the racial laws in Italy, or of the purported existence of a Jewish 
question.75
If the final collapse of the Fascist community of London came with Italy’s 
entry into the Second World War, it had in fact begun during the week of 
international crisis in September 1938. It was only temporarily alleviated by the 
international agreement at Munich between Britain, France, Germany and Italy, and 
seemed irreversible with the Pact of Steel, the military alliance between Italy and 
Germany signed by Ciano and the German Foreign Secretary von Ribbentrop in 
Berlin in May 1939, and with the outbreak of war in September 1939. The Fasci 
nevertheless continued their activities as if the international crisis were soon going to 
end. Italian diplomacy continued to work for the community’s institutions, organising 
events as usual (schools, summer camps, Befana fascista, and political celebrations), 
and the Italian foreign ministry continued to finance those activities. Yet the 
community was changing. During the September crisis, Ada Fantozzi blamed the 
Italians for not being courageous enough. She divided the community into three 
categories: the cowards, who immediately left for Italy because alarmed by war 
preparations in Britain; the worried ones, who decided to withdraw their children 
from the Italian schools; and the good ones, who continued to send children to the 
schools with the usual enthusiasm. Her description of the ‘few good Italians’ 
suggested the idea of a return to the origins of Fascism abroad, when it was 
represented by only a handful of revolutionaiy pioneers. That ideal was proposed 
again by Gravelli in 1940, when he insisted that the PNF itself needed to return to the
73 ‘Roma’, ibid., pp. 146-147.
74 ‘Le voci del sacrificio’, ibid., pp. 87-91.
75 Only one reading hinted at the superiority of the European race over the African race (‘La prossima 
volta’, ibid., pp. 48-50). The programmes of the school year 1938-39 are in ASMAE, AS (1936-45), b. 
87, f. m , sf. 3.
165
intransigence of its origins.76 In a book published after World War II, Camillo 
Pellizzi, founder of the London Fascio in 1921 and the major intellectual of the Fasci 
Abroad, underlined once again that the Fascist ‘missed revolution’ was due to lack of 
revolutionary courage; as the situation in Britain demonstrated, Fascism needed the 
‘few good’ patriots, not the ‘cowards’ or the uncertain.77
Despite the Fascist need for patriots, in times of difficulty and uncertainty 
about the future families worried about practical issues rather than about children’s 
italianita. Italians were seeking to defend the results of their labour and were 
obviously worried that war might bring everything to an end. In poor and out-lying 
areas such as Hackney, the Fascio complained that parents did not look after the 
children, who were free to do whatever they wanted. This resulted in lack of 
discipline and in irregular attendance at school. Fear of an international crisis was 
probably the cause of a shortage of teachers from Italy that was evident for the first 
time in 1939. During the school year of 1938-39 teachers were recruited mainly 
locally. The difficulty in finding Italians who could act as teachers was solved by the 
employment of nuns: three qualified teachers and nine nuns of the Don Bosco order 
worked in the London schools during that year.7® The Fascio praised the nuns as 
missionaries of italianita, which showed the extent to which the Church and Fascism 
had come together. The Catholic Church thus came to rescue the most important 
Fascist institution, the schools, at the moment of their greatest difficulty. However, it 
was the Church rather than the Fascio that derived greatest advantage of the situation. 
Indeed, following the racial laws, the alliance with Germany, the crisis in Anglo- 
Italian relations, and consequently the loss of support for Fascism from part of the 
Italians in Britain, the Church seized the opportunity to increase its own role in the 
community.79 The nuns did not simply replace teachers previously sent from Rome, 
but apparently demonstrated an extraordinary degree of enthusiasm and dedication.80
76 See Gravelli’s foreword to Partito Nazionale Fascista, Vademecum dello stile fascista. Dai fogli di
disposizioni del segretario del partito, edited by Gravelli (Rome: La Nuova Europa, 1940), pp. 5-14. 
^Camillo Pellizzi, Una rivoluzione mancata (Milan: Longanesi, 1948), p. 137.
78 ‘I* relazione trimestrale sul funzionamento delle scuole serali’, Ada Fantozzi to General Direction of 
the Italians Abroad and the Schools, 30 January 1939, ASMAE, AS (1936-45), b. 87, f. DI, sf. 3.
79 According to Francesco Malgeri, the long relationship between Fascism and the Church seemed, 
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Not only did the Fascio pretend that schools continued to work as usual, but it 
also blamed the British government for being excessively alarmist and for giving the 
‘impression of an imminent war’ by distributing gas masks, preparing trenches and 
unleashing allegedly hysterical war propaganda from the newspapers during the first 
months of 1939. Even after the beginning of the war, the Fascio claimed that the 
British fear of German air attacks was exaggerated.81 The history and geography of 
Italy continued to be the major topic taught in the schools throughout 1938-39. The 
Fascio continued to believe it important to commemorate all the glorious dates of 
Italy’s history and to keep the students updated with ‘the events which symbolise a 
step forward in the rise of imperial Italy’.82 The records of the Fascio and of the 
schools give the impression that those responsible either believed that Italy would 
never become involved in the war, or that it would soon end. Until then, everything 
had to continue. While English schools closed, Italian schools had to remain open, 
with or without bombing. In October 1939, the Inspector of the Fasci in Britain, 
Patrizi, proudly recalled that, despite the conflict, the Italian government had never 
stopped assistance for and financing of the organisation of the Fasci, or of Italian 
schools, hospitals, welfare activities, and summer camps. The outbreak of the war had 
not been enough, he argued, to interrupt such efficient and continuous activity. 
Because of the threat of a blitz over London, the daily primary school moved to the 
countryside, but the war was regarded as a temporary problem. For the moment it was 
enough to move the schools, or to provide a bus service for Italians now living outside 
London.83 Since the city was completely blacked-out from five o’clock onward, it 
became impossible to hold classes in the evenings; the consulate reopened as morning 
schools six out of the eleven evening schools. Although only about 150 children were 
attending, this was nevertheless a remarkable achievement. Ada Fantozzi was proud 
to confirm that the Fascio had taken 150 children ‘out of the streets, and now they
cattolica’, in Simonetta Soldani and Gabriele Turi, Fare gli italiani. Scuola e cultura nell'Italia 
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live in an Italian atmosphere5.84 It was a ‘beautiful victory, an almost complete 
success, which gives us certainty of what the work of tomorrow will be5.83 Apart from 
one qualified teacher, nuns were again doing most of the teaching. Since most 
families had moved to the countryside, it became necessary to pick up the children by 
bus everyday from different areas outside London. Despite petrol rationing, thanks to 
the action of the consulate, buses continued to provide an efficient service. Drivers 
and assistants received instructions on how to act in case of bombing along the way. 
The refectory continued to be as good as it had been in the past. This situation lasted 
until May 1940, when military events made it necessary to shut down the schools, and 
a number of Italians were voluntarily repatriated. Even then, the Ambassador 
Bastianini explained this measure by blaming increased danger in London, not the 
growing likelihood of Italy's intervention.86
Outside London
The spiritual and financial condition of Italian communities outside London 
was definitely worse than in the capital. Communities were qualitatively and 
quantitatively weaker: they received less attention from Rome; they lacked the 
presence of a ‘mythical5 Fascist such as Dino Grandi and of skilled intellectuals such 
as Camillo Pellizzi; and they were generally poorer, since they were situated in less 
prosperous areas of the country in a time of economic crisis and the threat of war.
In March 1938 the secretary of the Fascio of Manchester informed the London 
Fascio that those who worked for his organisation numbered only a few volunteers 
without experience; they needed to do paid work, and so could dedicate little time to 
the Fascio. Yet even in 1939 this did not stop the organisation of celebrations and 
gatherings, for example the Natale di Roma or the Befana Fascista, nor the running of 
a primary school.87 The Liverpool Fascio even managed to organise its first
84 ‘Scuole serali. Corsi d’italiano’, Ada Fantozzi to General Direction of the Italians Abroad, no date but 
shortly before Christmas 1939, ibid.
85 Ada Fantozzi to General Direction of the Italians Abroad, 22 December 1939, ibid.
86 ‘Chiusura scuole’, telegram from Bastianini to foreign ministry, 14 May 1940, ibid.
87 C. Floriani (secretary o f the Fascio o f Manchester) to the Inspector o f the London Fascio, 23 March 
1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2; Floriani to Patrizi, 11 February 1939, ibid.
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corporation, the Associazione importatori ortofrutticoli ed agrumari, and intended to 
create another one among coffee-shop owners.88 However, consular reports showed 
that not only Manchester, but also Liverpool, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and in general the 
whole area of Northern England was showing serious symptoms of quantitative 
decline. Fewer Italians were arriving as emigrants and more were integrating into 
British society and leaving their community. The gravest sign of this crisis was the 
‘shocking decrease in the school population of all Italian schools of the area’, where 
the Italians who were bom in Italy were extremely few; most children had been bom 
in England and had no interest in their parents’ country. The fact that the children 
spoke Italian only during their few hours at school suggested that their parents did not 
care about their children’s italianita, or simply that they worked all day and had no 
time to think about it. Moreover, if parents wanted the children to improve their 
social status, they knew that it was better for them not only to enter business as 
British subjects, but also to move to Southern England, where it was easier to find 
jobs.89 Similar problems existed in Manchester, where the community was 
continuously diminishing, rendering it difficult to organise Fascist activities. The 
consulate could not even afford to maintain a proper Casa d'ltalia, simply because it 
lacked the minimum number of members. The Fascists instead rented a room for their 
monthly meetings, and the premises were in such an unhealthy state that it was not 
possible to invite women. For this reason the consular agent in Manchester decided to 
transform part of his own house into a ‘Casetta d ’lta lia '90 Gatherings and 
celebrations were used as an attempt to reunite the otherwise dispersed community.91
The most difficult time before the war broke out was the Czech crisis of 
September 1938, during which several Italians applied for British citizenship. Among 
them, Patrizi sadly admitted, were many members of the Fasci. This happened 
especially in South Wales, an area particularly hit by the economic crisis.92 Indeed, 
although the Casa d ’ltalia in Cardiff was operating and holding regular meetings, the
88 From Liverpool consulate to London consulate and embassy, and to the foreign ministry, ibid.
89 ‘Visita alia collettivita italiana di Newcastle-on-Tyne Fasci del distretto del R. Vice Consolato GILE’, 
consul o f Liverpool to foreign ministry and to the London embassy, 11 March 1938, ibid.
90 ‘Casa d’ltalia’, consular Agency of Manchester to Count Ottavio Gloria (consul o f Liverpool), 28 
March 1938, ibid; Fascio di Manchester - Casa d’ltalia’, consul o f Liverpool to the foreign ministry and 
to the London embassy, 8 April 1938, ibid.
91 Consul o f Liverpool to foreign ministry and to the London embassy, 31 May 1938, ibid.
92 Patrizi to General Secretary, 4 November 1938, ibid.
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Italians who lived in South Wales were dispersed in small communities and it was 
difficult for the Fascio to gather all of them for meetings and celebrations in 
Cardiff.93 In addition, the financing of Italian schools, despite the Italian foreign 
ministry annual subscriptions, was creating problems because of the economic crisis 
and of unemployment in that area of Britain. The Cardiff consulate decided to reduce 
teachers’ wages; they apparently accepted the reduction and collaborated with 
enthusiasm, yet further contributions from the foreign ministry were necessary in 
order to keep the schools open.94
Similar difficulties existed in Scotland, although the Glasgow Fascio was 
relatively well organised. The Casa dltalia  occupied a central position, since the 
community was dispersed in different areas of the town, due to the jobs of the 
emigrants, who were mainly shopkeepers (selling primarily fish or ice cream) and 
restaurant owners, and could not establish their businesses all in the same area. In 
1935 the Fascio bought a new and luxurious building for the Casa dltalia ; it also 
contained the dopolavoro, the Dante Alighieri Society, the GILE and the schools. 
Rooms for playing pool and for dancing were available, along with a restaurant. The 
area was safe, which was important because the children had to go to school on their 
own at night.95 However, outside Glasgow the conditions of the Fasci were not as 
good. In February 1938 the Glasgow consul visited the towns of Aberdeen and 
Dundee, and his report to the foreign ministry showed that the situation was 
problematic. The community in Aberdeen, containing around 600 Italians, mainly 
consisted of fruit and fish merchants, and ice cream vendors. Very few were 
unemployed and the children had to help their parents in the shops, which generally 
remained open until late in the evening. That meant that the most important Fascist 
activities, such as the dopolavoro, the schools and the GILE, were almost non­
existent. Most emigrants came from the same area of Italy (Borgotaro and 
surroundings) and were generally related to each other. That circumstance, along 
with their almost total lack of education, had made it impossible to find anyone who
93 ‘Dopolavoro’, consul of Cardiff to foreign ministry and to the London embassy, 16 September 1938, 
ibid.
94 Cardiff consulate to foreign ministry and London embassy, 5 November 1938, ASMAE, AS, b. 87, f. 
Ill, sf 2.
95 ‘Organizzazioni dopolavoristiche alTestero e case d’ltalia’, Glasgow consul to foreign ministry and to 
the London embassy, 2 March 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
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could act as a leader and give direction to the rest of the community. The school was 
not operating because the only teacher in the community was the wife of the secretary 
of the Fascio, and had moved to Italy. Yet the worst aspect, from a Fascist 
perspective, was that several Italians had recently acquired British nationality, and an 
entire generation was growing up with Scottish mentalities and habits. In general, the 
consul concluded, it was a good community, but needed firm direction from a 
talented teacher.
Even worse was Dundee, where the characteristics of the community were 
similar to those of Aberdeen, ‘with an even greater state of neglect and indifference’. 
The Fascio had been ‘for a long time in complete ruin’; the dopolavoro, the schools 
and the GILE did not exist. The ‘best elements’ of the community refused to accept 
Fascist positions at all, although they declared themselves to be good and loyal 
Italians. The only possible solution, according to the consul, was to send a Fascist 
teacher from Italy who could act at the same time as consular agent, secretary of the 
fascio and teacher of the school.96 The main problem, especially in small and 
peripheral communities, thus seemed to be not anti-Fascism, which consular reports 
never mentioned, but a lack of interest in Fascism and a reluctance to become 
personally involved and to take on responsibilities. The Italian government was also 
responsible for this situation, since it had made little effort in the past to fascistise the 
small communities, certainly not to the extent evident in London and in other major 
British cities. Once this situation had existed for a number of years, the temptation to 
become more integrated into British society, and even to become British, increased 
strongly due in part to the international crisis and fear of war. Between the spring and 
autumn of 1939, Magnocavallo reported that from Aberdeen to Southampton the 
number of Italians who applied for British citizenship was increasing. This included 
several members of the Fasci, who were immediately expelled.97
96 ‘Visita consolare ad Aberdeen e Dundee’, Glasgow consulate to foreign ministry and to the London 
embassy, 22 February 1938, ibid.
97 Magnocavallo to the General Secretary, 6 March 1939, ASMAE, AL, b. 1068, f. 1; ‘Riservata - 
Oggetto: Sezione di Southampton. Nazionali che hanno chiesto la cittadinanza inglese’, Magnocavallo 
to consulate, 21 September 1939, ibid.
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Conclusion
Italians in Britain hoped that Mussolini could find a solution to the European 
crisis, or at least that Italian neutrality could last indefinitely. Some emigrants had 
sons in the British army and obviously saw the possibility of Italy’s entrance in the 
war with horror. As Lucio Sponza has pointed out in a recent book on the Italians in 
Britain during World War n, the emigrants’ hope that Italy would not become 
involved in the War was not simply due to practical concerns, but also to their divided 
loyalties (their desire to remain Italians and to integrate into British society at the 
same time) and to a dramatic sense of uncertainty, not only about their own future but 
also about their very identity.98
Such difficulties influenced the activity of the Fasci. The articles of L Italia 
Nostra and the diplomatic correspondence make evident that even the Italian 
authorities in Britain hoped that Italy was not going to enter the war. Like the news of 
the Axis in 1936, news of the Anschluss and of the Pact of Steel were only briefly 
reported in the newspaper. The racial laws were applied mainly because of pressure 
from the foreign ministry in Rome rather than from any enthusiasm in Britain. 
L ’Italia Nostra reflected the embassy’s reluctance to persecute Jews. The newspaper 
supported racism with enthusiasm, yet that racism expressed itself not as open anti- 
Semitism, but rather claimed to seek the improvement of the Italian race, a viewpoint 
found in the newspaper throughout the 1930s. However this did not prevent the 
authorities from applying the racial laws, since control from Rome had increased due 
to the new centralised organisation of the Fasci.
The London consulate and the Fascio were first and foremost concerned with 
preserving the achievements of previous years. The Fascio sought to convince the 
Italians that the coming war was not really going to affect the community. The 
Fascists required the Italian communities in Britain to continue their corporative 
organisation and to support the Fatherland by introducing autarchy into their daily 
lives. Rather than asking the Italians to resist the war in general, the Fasci presented 
the new measures as forms of resistance to British society; British war propaganda
98 Lucio Sponza, Divided Loyalties: Italians in Britain during the Second World War (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2000), pp. 55-56; p. 69.
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and later the outbreak of war were the principal reasons for the massive increase in 
the applications for naturalisation. The situation was more striking outside London 
than in the city, and in reality communities in other British areas tended to disappear 
from the pages of the newspaper. Fascist efforts against such a decline were mainly 
evident in London, and in the schools in particular. The reopening of schools, the 
maintenance of expensive services in time of war, and even a willingness to accept 
risks and drive children to school by bus under the threat of air attack were major 
examples. Such resistance activity inevitably involved a small section of the London 
community, and brought the Fasci back to the age of the pioneers, to the original 
idea of the Italians abroad, ready to make sacrifices for the Fatherland in difficult 
times.
However, such spiritual and financial efforts did continue to play a role in the 
preparation of the Italians abroad for the war, which in Mussolini’s mind, especially 
following the Pact of Steel, was clearly going to be a war against Britain and on the 
side of Germany. To the same end, the regime continued to organise summer camps 
for children even after Italy’s entry into the war. The re-organisation of the Fasci 
Abroad in 1938 was part of that project. From diplomatic papers, and especially from 
the correspondence between Parini, Mussolini and Grandi, and from Ciano’s diary, it 
is indeed possible to suggest that Parini’s removal was due to the need to centralise 
the Fasci, and to increase the control of the foreign ministry over them as part of a 
wider attempt to strengthen totalitarianism and Mussolini’s personal dictatorship 
along the road to war.
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Chapter 6
The End of an Era 
Grandi between London and the Axis, 1938-1939
Set we forward; let a Roman and a British ensign wave Friendly together....1 
We will turn the Berlin-Rome Axis Pact into a Berlin axes Roma fact.2
Between the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938, anti-British propaganda 
in Italy persisted as intensely as during the period of sanctions. After Italy’s conquest 
of Ethiopia, Lord Lloyd had prepared a memorandum together with the British 
Foreign Office urging a visit to Rome, which the Conservative Italophile hoped that 
might convince Mussolini of the necessity for an Anglo-Italian agreement on 
Mediterranean issues and on propaganda. The British proposal included a deal over 
the exchange of information about Italian and British forces in the Mediterranean, and 
a request for the Italians to stop anti-British propaganda. The visit did not materialise, 
but the British Ambassador to Rome, Eric Drummond, now Lord Perth, thought that 
Lloyd’s memorandum might still be useful. Perth suspected that the Italians were 
using anti-British propaganda as a bargaining counter during any conversation that 
might take place. Both the Foreign Office and the ambassador believed that the 
Italians considered propaganda as a means of pressure on Britain in order to 
demonstrate that it would be better for the British if Italy was not hostile. Perth 
commented: ‘it is bad psychology on their part and smacks to our mind of blackmail, 
but it is typically Italian’.3
1 William Shakespeare, Cymbeline, Act V, Scene V, in Complete Works o f William Shakespeare 
(Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 1295. Quoted in a pamphlet by the British Union of Friends o f Italy 
(1938), ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 126.
2 Anonymous letter, without date but 1938, addressed to ‘Dear Dago Grandi’ and signed ‘Hail Hitler’, 
ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 131.
3 Perth to Sargent, 31 December 1937 and Sargent to Perth, 10 January 1938, PRO, FO, 371/22402, 
R89/23/22.
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A record of a conversation between Grandi and Neville Chamberlain at the 
beginning of February 1938 shows a similar perception of Mussolini’s foreign policy. 
It reveals Grandi’s difficulty in discussing matters such as the withdrawal of Italian 
troops from Spain or Italy’s commitment to Austria. Without any precise commitment 
from Italy on these crucial matters it was difficult for the British government to 
contemplate any agreement with Italy. Grandi told the British that ‘Italy must choose 
between Germany and Great Britain’, which was, the British Foreign Office 
memorandum reported, ‘exactly what Giolitti told the allies in 1914’. Moreover, the 
British suspected that Mussolini was saying ‘the same thing in Berlin’. Grandi told 
them that Italy would be even more bound to Germany if they did not agree soon. The 
memorandum continued: ‘but how can this be? How much closer can the Axis be? 
Italy has never found any difficulty in betraying her allies when she thought it was in 
her interest’.4
As a result of the continued confrontation in Anglo-Italian relations, L ’Italia 
Nostra kept on stirring up anti-British propaganda in London, mainly by attacking the 
Foreign Secretary, Eden (until his resignation in February 1938), along with the 
Anglican Church. The Italian newspaper believed that the Church, after having 
allegedly supported the League against Italy, was now supporting Eden’s anti-Italian 
foreign policy. In January, the claim made by the Bishop of London that Britain’s 
function in the world was comparable to that of a policeman unleashed an indignant 
protest from L Italia Nostra:
Why? And who has entrusted the British Empire with such a duty? .... There 
existed an era in world history which has taken its name from a glorious Queen of 
England.... That time has gone .... We do not recognise for England the function 
of international policeman. One would need strong hands. The English no longer 
have them.5
The following week, the newspaper informed its readers that the average Englishman 
was no longer the traditional blonde and tall type. The average Englishman tended 
now to have dark hair, dark eyes and to be only about one metre and 69 centimetres 
tall; moreover, he suffered from rheumatism.6 Opposed to this modest example,
4 ‘Memorandum on conversation of Grandi with British Government’, 15 February 1938, in Lord 
Harvey of Tasburgh Diaries, BL Manuscripts, Add. 56401, ff. 63-68.
5 ‘Polizia e poliziotti’, L ’Italia Nostra, 14 Jan 1938, n. 467, p. 2.
6 ‘The average man’, ibid., 28 January 1938, n. 469, p. 3.
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L \Italia Nostra represented the new Germans as a disciplined and proud people who 
had risen thanks to ‘the Fuhrer’s miracle’. Since the newspaper had almost never 
mentioned Italo-German friendship before, it became necessary in February to give a 
summary of its major stages, from the Ethiopian War to the Spanish Civil War, from 
the Axis to the present commitment to anti-Communism.7
Although the Spanish Civil War continued to complicate Anglo-Italian 
relations, two events interrupted L ’ltalia Nostra*s anti-British propaganda in 1938: 
Eden’s resignation in February and the British recognition of the Italian empire in 
Ethiopia with the Easter agreement in Rome. For his contribution to Eden’s fall, 
Neville Chamberlain was praised as a hero by the newspaper.
The shifts in the propaganda of L ’Italia Nostra, anti-British until February 
1938, pro-British until the end of the year and later almost neutral, reflected the 
complicated balance between Grandi’s relationship with Chamberlain and the British 
Right on the one hand, and Italy’s pro-German foreign policy on the other. Grandi’s 
failure was reflected in the last speech he gave to the Italian community of London 
before leaving Britain, based on a written text for which Mussolini and Ciano had 
given instructions and which they had carefully checked; it was violently anti-French 
and was addressed to a German-Italian gathering at the embassy.
Grandi between Ciano and Chamberlain
During the growing crisis over Austria in February 1938, Ciano had explained 
to Grandi that it was safe for Italy to improve relations with Britain and that Grandi 
should seek to convince the British to open discussions with Italy. Grandi saw Ciano’s 
request as a consequence of problems with Germany, as an ‘S.O.S. to London’, and a 
mistake because it was important to give the British the impression that the Axis was 
strong. He did not want Eden to seek an agreement with Germany without consulting
7 ‘Cinque anni di regime nazista’, ibid., 4 February 1938, n. 470, p. 2.
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Mussolini.8 Grandi was in favour of a pact with Britain, but knew that this was 
impossible while Eden remained at the Foreign Office. His efforts were therefore 
directed toward an agreement with Chamberlain that could bring Eden’s fall.9 Ciano 
thought that Grandi’s enthusiasm was exaggerated, and saw it as an attempt by the 
ambassador to claim the role of peace-maker with Britain, ‘an image that many 
Italians might even like’. But peace and war, Ciano emphasised, were entirely in 
Mussolini’s hands; no one could take upon themselves a personal role. At heart, 
Ciano believed, Grandi was dying for a rapprochement with the British and disliked 
the Germans.10 That the relationship between Grandi and Ciano was in 1938 and 1939 
one of competition and distrust is evident from both figures’ diaries. In February, 
Grandi confided to his diary that he had to take decisions without consulting Ciano 
and the Duce because they were not eager to make an agreement with Chamberlain. 
As a result, when Eden left the Foreign Office as a consequence of the conflict with 
Chamberlain over the policy toward Italy, the ambassador believed that Chamberlain 
and he had played the greatest part in an event which led to a genuine improvement in 
Anglo-Italian relations. Ciano thought it was important not to present Eden as a 
victim of Fascism, and decided that the press should explain Eden’s fall as a normal 
development within British government.11 Unlike Ciano, Grandi regarded it as an 
unforgettable event which marked the beginning of a new era. On the night of 19/20 
February, he wrote in his diary that his happiness was immense, and concluded: 
‘Chamberlain is tough’.12 From that moment onward, his co-operation with 
Chamberlain continued to be very close. Often Grandi did not even inform Rome of 
his activities because he believed his superiors would not understand the necessity for 
diplomacy: ‘they would have stopped me’.13 He recalled the moment when Eden 
entered the British Foreign Office in 1935 as an immensely sad day, but the day Eden 
left as one of the happiest moments in his life. Yet Grandi knew he now had to pay
8 Dino Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 3, pp. 2-3, entry for 18 
February 1938. See also Paolo Nello, Un fedele disubbidienie. Dino Grandi da Palazzo Chigi al 25 
luglio (Bologna: II Mulino, 1993), p. 287.
9 De Felice, Mussolini il duce, n, pp. 445.
10 Galeazzo Ciano, Diario J937-1943 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1980; first edition 1946), p. 95, entry for 7 
February 1938; p. 96, entry for 9 February 1938.
11 Ibid., p. 102, entry for 21 February 1938; Egidio Ortona, ‘La caduta di Eden nel 1938’, Storia 
Contemporanea, XV (1984), 3, pp. 477-494.
12 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 3, p. 16, entry for 19-20 
February 1938.
13 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ibid., sf. 4, pp. 6-8.
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for it. Rome did not recognise his role, and Mussolini ignored him. Ciano had first 
asked for his help, and now that Grandi had succeeded, Ciano acted as if Eden’s 
departure had been something bound to happen anyway.14
Anti-Eden propaganda in Italy had been so intense in the previous months 
that, despite Ciano’s order to the press not to talk about it, Eden’s resignation created 
the impression of a real shift in Anglo-Italian relations among part of the Italian 
population. Schoolteachers in Italy made the children pray to God to thank him for 
having eliminated the British Minister, ‘deadly enemy of Fascist Italy’.15 Former 
squadristi, universal Fascists, and ‘first hour’ revolutionary Fascists wrote letters to 
Grandi expressing their admiration, as though the ambassador had started a new era in 
the history of the regime. Eugenio Coselschi, president of the Action Committees for 
the Universality of Rome (CAUR), praised Grandi’s courage, ‘really worthy of a 
volunteer and of a Fascist’, and his ‘wisest and most inspired finesse’.16 Those who 
acknowledged Grandi’s role were drawn mainly from among British Conservative 
Italophiles and Italian former squadristi from the Romagna. The latter saw Grandi as 
the Fascist ambassador who continued the Revolution that had begun before the 
March on Rome. While to the British Conservatives Grandi was a moderate and pro- 
British diplomat, to his Italian supporters he was a Fascist revolutionary capable of 
imposing Italy’s rights over Britain. Old friends from the Romagna were proud that 
the Duce had chosen from among the men of his land - their own land - the one who 
could ‘keep high, above all coalitions of peoples, states, and parties, Italy’s flag’. The 
feeling that they somehow represented ‘the people’, that they came from a province 
that had given birth to the ‘chosen men’ who would lead Italy created a sense of 
comradeship between them and the ambassador.17 Camillo Pellizzi, the cleverest 
intellectual among the Italians abroad, who lived in London and worked with Grandi, 
acknowledged the measure among Grandi’s ‘enormous success’, but doubted that 
Britain intended to respect and continue the new friendly relationship.18
14 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ibid., sf. 2, ins. 3, pp. 20-24, entry for 21 February 1938.
15 See the pages of diary of a Piccola Italiana from Naples, who sent her diary to Grandi on 21 
February 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 126.
16 Coselschi to Grandi, 12 February 1938, ibid.
17 Letter sent from three old friends from Imola, 27 February 1938, ibid. See also Vittorio Gambillo to 
Grandi, 27 February 1938, ibid.
18 Camillo Pellizzi to Grandi, 28 Feb 1938, ibid.
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According to L ’Italia Nostra, a new era had indeed begun after Eden. Anglo- 
Italian relations were now different in the present, thanks to Neville Chamberlain, but 
also with reference to the past: the newspaper began once again to recall the 
Risorgimento and the traditional friendship of Britain and Italy, which it had declared 
dead until shortly before. Yet distrust of the British persisted, and friendship was 
conditional:
yet the Italian people expects that [...] all the rapid but profound evolution that 
occurred in recent years be acknowledged [...],years during which Italy had been 
able to find again its radiant European and world destiny [...], clenched in the fist 
of a Man who in himself contains, defines, and represents the most passionate 
strength of the Italic race and genius which had never been extinguished.19
One condition of that friendship was the relationship with Germany. L \Italia 
Nostra presented the news of the Anschluss on 18 March 1938 on the second page, in 
a short article and in a detached tone. Without having ever discussed the Austrian 
situation before, it assumed that Austria had always been part of German history. 
Mussolini’s favourable attitude toward Hitler showed that the Rome-Berlin Axis had 
overcome its most crucial trial. The Italian people, it was alleged, realised that the 
Anschluss was a historical necessity: unlike Britain and France at the time of the 
Ethiopian war, Italy had not acted in a hypocritical manner, but had accepted German 
expansion as inevitable: ‘history is made by the strong; we want and must be very 
strong’.20 In the same issue, the newspaper published the text of a letter Hitler had 
sent to Mussolini a week earlier:
Whatever the consequence of forthcoming events, I have drawn a clear German 
frontier facing France and I am now drawing an equally clear one toward Italy. It 
is the Brenner Pass. That decision is beyond doubt, and will not change. Nor did I 
take that decision in 1938, but immediately after the end of the Great War, and I 
have never been secretive about it.
The Fuhrer had concluded by apologising for the short notice and by declaring to the 
Duce his everlasting friendship.21
19 ‘Italia e Inghilterra’, L ’Italia Nostra, 11 March 1938, n. 475, p. 1.
20 ‘Le conseguenze’, ibid., 18 March 1938, n. 476, p. 2
21 ‘Asse Roma-Berlino - La lettera di Hitler al Duce’, ibid., 18 March 1938, n. 476, p. 3.
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Ciano knew that the Anschluss was not a great advantage for Italy. 
Nonetheless he believed that Italy should not ally itself with France and Britain 
against Germany, since such an attempt was anachronistic. He therefore rejected an 
appeal from France:
After sanctions, after failing to recognise the Empire, and after the misconduct 
against us from 1935 onward, do they want to rebuild Stresa in one hour, with 
Hannibal on the doorstep? France and England have lost Austria by their policy.
It is not good for us either. But in the meanwhile we have taken Ethiopia22
Only three weeks later, German propaganda in Alto Adige had begun to worry 
Mussolini and Ciano. Friction with Germany now favoured agreement with Britain. 
At the beginning of April Mussolini asked Ciano to start the talks with Perth.23 
However, Grandi continued to believe that it was his own initiative in London that led 
to the Anglo-Italian agreement signed in Rome on 16 April. On 26 April, he wrote in 
his diary that thanks to his diplomatic activity with Chamberlain he had managed to 
bring Mussolini and Chamberlain together (even by forging friendly messages from 
Mussolini to Chamberlain). Grandi had persisted despite Mussolini, who, according 
to Grandi, had never wanted an agreement with London. Grandi recalled that in the 
summer of 1937 Mussolini had thought it might be possible to ‘drag Germany into 
war against Britain’ in the Mediterranean.24 The British Foreign Office indeed 
suspected that Mussolini had such a plan in his mind as early as 1936, when 
information considered to be reliable suggested that Italy was increasing its 
armaments, and that the Fasci Abroad were warning Italians living in the United 
Kingdom to liquidate their investments there and to send their money to the United 
States. The main reason for this, the British gathered, was that Mussolini intended to 
attack Britain in the Mediterranean and in North Africa at the first favourable 
opportunity.25 However, after the Anschluss, Mussolini found it safer to accept Perth’s 
proposal for agreement with Britain, quite independent of Grandi’s activity in 
London. To Grandi Perth was ‘the ambassador of the enemy’,26 and Ciano the one
22 Ciano, Diario, p. I l l ,  entry for 11 March 1938.
23 Ibid., p. 120, entry for 3 April 1938.
24 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 3, pp. 10-14, entry for 26 
April 1938.
25 Wickham Steed to Sargent, 20 July 1936, PRO, FO, 371/20411, R4375/226/22.
26 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 3, p. 13, entry for 20 April 
1938.
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who cynically exploited the situation to achieve the honour of having made a pact 
with Britain. The ambassador received neither letters nor phone calls from the Duce. 
Grandi underwent a moral collapse, evident from the pages of his diaiy which are 
filled with expressions of sorrow, disappointment, and suffering caused by the 
apparent loss of the Duce’s trust and approval. He blamed Ciano for this outcome, 
because when the latter was not in Rome, Grandi still received letters of 
encouragement from Mussolini. Several weeks later, Grandi was still torturing 
himself with the unbearable truth: the Duce knew that one word from him would have 
made Grandi satisfied and happy, ‘he could have got away with it cheaply. Yet he 
uttered no word Nothing’. Grandi could never forget the way Mussolini received him 
on the night of the foundation of the Empire: ‘it was the last time’; a few weeks later 
he made Ciano Foreign Secretary; ‘after that, it was over’.27 However, Grandi did 
remain in personal contact with Mussolini during 1938/39, although these contacts 
were less frequent than during previous years.
The British Legate to the Holy See, Francis d’Arcy Godolphin Osborne, wrote 
to Grandi that although he had not taken part in preparing and signing the treaty, it 
would never have been possible without his diplomacy in London: ‘I think we all, in 
both countries, owe you a great debt of gratitude’.28 Grandi’s reply that ‘these three 
nightmare years are over and the skies are again blue and sunny, even in our misty 
London’ is, however, difficult to believe.29 Indeed, less than two months later, the 
Italian government made it clear that it would not withdraw the Italian volunteers 
from Spain at such a critical point in the Civil War. Perth sought to convince Ciano 
that Italy should propose an armistice in Spain, but the Italian minister considered that 
compromise was impossible in a civil war.30 Thus the agreement did not officially 
take effect until the following November, when Mussolini finally withdrew Italian 
troops from Spain, which was one major condition in the treaty.
Again, the letters of congratulations received from Italy came from Grandi’s 
loyal friends from Romagna and northern Italy (‘extremely few from Rome, of
27 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ibid., pp. 5-7, entry for 20 April 1938; 4 May, p. 4; 11 May, p. 5.
28 Osborne to Grandi, 27 April 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 126.
29 Grandi to Osborne, 3 May 1938, ibid.
30 Ciano, Diario, p. 150, entry for 20 June 1938.
181
course’).31 The camerati romagnoli and the Camicie nere della vigilia who wrote in 
Pedrazza’s newspaper II Resto del Carlino expressed ‘Fascist enthusiasm’ and 
gratitude for the former ras of Bologna. The use of Fascist slogans, such as alala, 
served to underline their belief that Grandi was in London as a camicia nera rather 
than as a traditional ambassador, and that his role in the creation of the Anglo-Italian 
pact had been a revolutionary role.32
The Italian community in London celebrated the treaty at the Casa del 
Littorio, where the consul relayed Grandi’s message because the ambassador could 
not be present in person. The main aspect of the treaty, went the message, was that 
Britain solemnly and finally acknowledged Italy’s empire and Italy’s interests as a 
great Mediterranean, European and world power. The agreement allegedly brought 
tension between Britain and Italy to an end, and sanctioned the beginning of a historic 
age of fertile and peaceful collaboration between the Fascist empire and the British 
empire.33 L ’Italia Nostra placed the agreement in the context of the change in Anglo- 
Italian relations already stressed at the time of Eden’s resignation. According to the 
newspaper, the treaty was based on the central assumption that for Britain the 
Mediterranean was merely ‘a highway’ while for Italy it meant ‘life’. The spirit of the 
agreement relied on a completely new form of friendship between the two countries. 
The ‘ancient friendship’ derived from a
sentimental and often sloppy inclination o f  the English for Italy as the most 
beautiful country o f  all [// bel paese], for its mandolin serenades, its spaghetti, its 
dolce fa r  niente and other similar rhetorical or nineteenth-century bits and pieces.
The new friendship was allegedly between two strong nations which had 
looked into each other’s eyes and shaken hands. The newspaper concluded 
optimistically that Britain ‘has now acknowledged this new Italy, resounding with 
factories and building yards, filled with bayonets and cannon, with a thousand prows 
and a thousand wings’.34 Grandi believed that Chamberlain was the first British Prime
31 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 3, pp. 1-2, entry for 1 May 
1938.
32 Piero Pedrazza (headed letter ‘D Resto del Carlino’) to Grandi, 11 May 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 
53, f. 126.
33 Grandi to Biondeffi, 30 April 1938, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2.
34 ‘Pasqua di pace’, L 'ItaliaNostra, 15 April 1938, n. 480, p. 1.
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Minister to overcome the usual commonplaces of the traditional friendship, and saw 
Italy as it was in the present, as remade by Mussolini.35 But L \Italia Noslra did not 
simply praise Britain for having understood Italy’s greatness. It even expressed 
admiration for Britain for the first time: no longer the decadent country of the 
‘average men’ of a few months before, Britain was reborn, in April 1938, as a great 
country run by steady and strong leaders. All this was due to Chamberlain, a 
‘wonderful type of dictator’. Chamberlain was great precisely because, despite the 
existence of a liberal parliamentary system, he was able to govern his country with the 
same style as if he was running a dictatorship. In order to understand British realism, 
it was enough to compare Britain with France, a country which continued to pursue a 
‘feminine policy’.36 L ’Italia Noslra thus anticipated the new line of Italian foreign 
policy, in which hostility to France took the place of anti-British sentiment.37
Ciano indeed informed Grandi shortly afterward in a long secret letter that 
Mussolini did not intend to rest, but had a new direction in mind for Italy’s foreign 
policy, moving from hostility to Britain to hostility toward France. The new situation 
needed to be analysed, Ciano explained, under the light of the new imperial 
achievements of the regime. Since the political, military, and geographical conditions 
of Italy had changed, future conversations with France could not continue as they had 
done in the past. The aims Italy had kept concealed in its breast for a long time could 
now be discussed openly: Tunisia, Djibouti, and the Suez Canal. In the case of 
Tunisia, Italian labour, Ciano explained to Grandi, was the only active white work 
force of the region. It was too early to ask for territorial cession, but it was time to 
establish a ‘sort of a joint ownership that could allow a safe and fertile development 
of our activities’. This was particularly evident in the case of Djibouti: ‘it is obvious 
that we cannot continue to feed French companies with our work and our commerce’. 
Mussolini intended to ask for control of the railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, 
while the harbour could be jointly operated by both Italy and France. Ciano relayed 
the Duce’s claim that without Italy’s co-operation Djibouti was bound to wither on 
the vine. As to the third question, Ciano pointed out that now Italy’s commerce in the
35 Grandi to foreign ministry, 5 May 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 55, f. 144.
36 Agostino Nasti, ‘La politica di Chamberlain’, L ’Italia Nostra, 15 April 1938, n. 480, p. 2.
37 See Virginio Gayda, Italia e Francia. Problemi aperti (Rome: il Giomale d’ltalia, 1938); Ettore Rota, 
Italia e Francia davanti alia storia: il mito della sorella latina (Milan: Industrie Grafiche Nicola, 
1939); Enrico Serra and Jean Baptiste Duroselle, Italia e Francia, 1939-1945 (Milan: Angeli, 1984).
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Red Sea area, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific had multiplied, and Italy no longer 
intended to accept its extreme exploitation by the Suez Canal Company. The reason 
why Grandi needed to know about these future developments was because Italy, 
again, required his contribution. Ciano now sought to flatter Grandi by saying that the 
Duce wished to enlist his very personal and particular abilities to inform the British 
about the changed direction of Italian policy. Mussolini wanted Grandi to talk about it 
with the British from time to time, ‘dropping the word at the opportune moment’, and 
if possible preparing British opinion to accede to Italy’s new requests. At the moment 
Ciano could not say when and how all this would happen: it depended on the course 
of events. But the Duce had these aims fixed in his mind, and that was enough, Ciano 
concluded, to be certain that they would be realised.38
Less than two months later, Ciano gave a similar warning to Ribbentrop. 
Other questions, which he had not mentioned to Grandi, were ‘historic in character’ 
and concerned those territories that ‘geographically, ethnically, and strategically’ 
belonged to Italy, namely Corsica and Nice. Such questions could not be solved by 
purely diplomatic means and therefore could not be made public at the moment. 
However, Italy’s interest in those French territories was made clear by Italian 
propaganda publications.39
Grandi had long shared these anti-French view. As early as May 1938, he had 
realised that Germany did not simply want the Sudetenland; Czechoslovakia was 
merely the beginning of expansion toward Romania and Russia. He was convinced 
that the Germans were going to achieve their aims, and that the British were not going 
to interfere. Grandi was convinced of this because British acquiescence appeared to 
be the only way to ensure peace in Europe. Indeed, in his view Britain did not merely 
accept German expansionism, but was actually assisting the development of German 
ambitions. Such a course was, Grandi felt certain, the only way to save Western 
Europe from the ‘German avalanche’. The choice was between the Germans in Paris, 
Flanders and the Adriatic Sea, or the Germans in the Ukraine, Budapest and perhaps 
even Romania. Russia was going to pay; one nation had to pay for the peace of the 
other nations, and Grandi felt it was better that it should be Russia. Grandi assumed
38 ‘Segreta’, Ciano to Grandi, 14 November 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 43, f. 107 (1935-38).
39 Ciano to Ribbentrop, manuscript - draft, 2 January 1939, ASMAE, Gab 29, f. 2. See in particular 
Gioacchino Volpe, Storia della Corsica italiana (Milan: ISPI, 1939) and Gayda, Italia e Francia.
184
that Chamberlain understood this reasoning. Unlike Britain, Grandi believed that 
France was on Russia’s side, since it was supporting ‘the Reds in Barcelona’. In this 
way, France was slowing down possible implementation of the Anglo-Italian 
agreement of April 1938, which was, according to Grandi, its ultimate aim. He had no 
doubt that an anti-Fascist plot existed between Left-wing British politicians, the 
French and Moscow, and as a result believed that ‘the Duce is right in attacking 
France’.40 The situation became more problematic at the beginning of June 1938. 
Grandi admitted that Chamberlain had been doing his best to keep the Italo-British 
agreement alive, while Italy had done nothing to support Chamberlain against the 
attacks of the British Left or to reinforce the Rome agreement. He reflected on 
possible reasons for Italian behaviour: ‘fear of irritating Berlin?’, he wondered. 
British friends of Italy appeared to be cooling day after day; they had now begun to 
regret that they had gone so far in establishing friendship with such an unreliable 
country.41
At the end of the summer of 1938 Grandi became convinced that Churchill, 
followed by the British Left, was taking part in an international Bolshevik plot against 
Chamberlain. In his mind, all the forces of anti-Fascism were seeking to exploit the 
Czechoslovak crisis in order to regain the initiative and cause a major European war. 
Instead of blaming Germany for its aggression, Grandi accused the French and the 
Czechoslovaks of threatening European stability, and believed that only by 
reinforcing Anglo-Italian relations and supporting Chamberlain was it possible to 
prevent the Communists from unleashing war. He was thus convinced that the 
ultimate chance for peace rested with Mussolini, since Mussolini did not want a war 
at that moment. Grandi intensified his connections with British Conservatives and 
Italophiles to convince them that an agreement with Italy was still possible. The 
outcome of the Munich conference convinced Grandi once again that he had been the 
major figure responsible for securing peace, since he had succeeded once again in 
bringing Mussolini and Chamberlain together. At the time of the conference he wrote 
in his diary: ‘Mussolini has triumphed. It is he whom millions and millions of mothers 
must bless today’. On that historic night, returning home after having been to the
40 Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 151, f. 199, sf. 2, ins. 3, entry for 14 May 1938, pp. 
1-3; entry for 16 May 1938, pp. 1-3; entry for 20 May 1938, pp. 1-3.
41Grandi, Diario di Londra, ibid., sf. 4, pp. 1-2.
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cinema with his wife and his children, Grandi walked among the crowds of London, 
who were celebrating in the streets, after the first newspapers came out announcing: 
‘it is peace’. Grandi concluded the page of his diary with the sentence: ‘Viva il 
Duce!...’.42
The Italian community in London celebrated the sudden outbreak of the peace 
at the Fascio and at the Dopolavoro Mazzini e Garibaldi. The authorities of the 
consulate, of the embassy, and of the Fascio cheered both Chamberlain’s wisdom and 
Mussolini’s greatness. Yet they warned the Italians not to cultivate illusions: the 
western powers now recognised Italy’s role, but this did not necessarily imply that 
they were ready to offer Mussolini the concessions Italy really deserved.43 As usual, 
Grandi received no thanks from Rome, although he did receive many letters from 
landowners and former squadristi from northern Italy.44 Ciano’s diary makes almost 
no mention of Grandi’s role; in his view, Munich had shown Italy’s crucial role 
among the great powers. To Mussolini, the crisis had demonstrated that ‘even at a 
high price, we could have crushed France and Britain forever. We now have 
overwhelming proof of that’.45
Although De Felice, Nello and Quartararo explain the period before Munich 
as an attempt by Mussolini to intensify friendship with Britain and to create a new 
relationship with France, Grandi’s diary, Ciano’s diary, and L 'Italia Nostra suggest a 
wholly different interpretation of the months between February and September 
1938.46 Although Grandi’s activity had been important in February in convincing 
Chamberlain that it would be possible, if Eden resigned, to improve Anglo-Italian 
relations, and that Mussolini could be persuaded to withdraw Italian troops from the 
Spanish Civil War, he certainly exaggerated when he claimed that his own role in the 
Easter agreement, and later at Munich, had been indispensable.47 On the one hand, as
42Grandi, Diario di Londra, ASMAE, ibid., entry for 30 September 1938, p. 24; p. 34; p. 41. As to the 
role played by the Italophiles, Grandi was particularly grateful to Graham for his help in the attempt to 
convince Chamberlain; see Grandi to Graham, 30 September 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 128.
43 ‘La celebrazione della pace al nostro Fascio e al dopolavoro Mazzini e Garibaldi’, L Italia Nostra, 14 
October 1938, n. 506, p. 1; see also ‘La parola della pace’, ibid., 30 September 1938, n. 504, p. I; ‘La 
vittoria della pace il trionfo del Duce’, ibid., 7 October 1938, n. 505, p. 1.
44 See in particular Marcello Cerioli to Grandi, 30 September 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 128.
45 Ciano, Diario, p. 186, entry for 28 September 1938.
46 Nello, Un fedele disubbidiente, p. 345; De Felice, Mussolini il Duce, H, p. 536; Quartararo, Roma tra 
Londra e Berlino, p. 404.
47 Grandi’s view has been supported by Ortona, ‘La caduta di Eden in 1938’; see also Nick Smart, The 
National Government, 1931-1940 (London-Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999), pp. 156-157.
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Grandi suggested, it was difficult to believe that Mussolini wanted to suddenly 
inaugurate a pro-British foreign policy, after he had been stoking the fires of anti- 
British resentment within Italy for at least the previous two years. On the other, 
German pressure at the Brenner Pass convinced the Duce that an agreement with 
Britain was nevertheless temporarily convenient. Mussolini did not help convene the 
Munich conference, as the ambassador liked to believe, because of Grandi’s action, 
nor because the Duce had become committed to Britain and France, but rather 
because Italy was not ready for war.48 When the Anglo-Italian agreement was finally 
implemented in November 1938, Mussolini told Ciano that such an agreement did not 
alter Italy’s foreign policy:
In Europe, the Axis remains fundamental. In die Mediterranean, co-operation 
with the British as long as it is possible. France is out: toward France our claims 
are now defined.49
Grandi, the BUF and the Italophiles
The relationship between the Italian embassy and the BUF never recovered 
after the Ethiopian War. From time to time, the embassy reported to the Italian 
foreign ministry on Mosley’s activities, which were not very successful. From 1938 in 
particular, the BUF was first and foremost committed to Germany, and wanted to 
avoid a war between Britain and Germany. British fascists spoke publicly against 
Eden, whom they considered responsible for Britain’s international isolation. As a 
consequence of his policy, the British empire was now facing a hostile Germany in 
the North Sea, Japan in East Asia, and a problematic situation in the Mediterranean, 
where there were no fewer than three enemies: the new fascist Spain, the Arab 
populations, and Italy between them. Mosley praised Chamberlain for recognising the
48 Giorgio Rochat, in Mario G. Rossi -  Angelo Del Boca -  Massimo Legnani (eds), 11 regime fascista 
(Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995), pp. 160-162. However, it is not at all clear if Mussolini realised that until 
later. See Enzo Collotti, Fascismo e politico di potenza. Politico estera 1922-1939 (Milan: La Nuova 
Italia, 2000), pp. 361-374.
49 Ciano, Diario, p. 213, entry for 16 November 1938.
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past mistakes of British foreign policy and for starting a necessary re-thinking.50 In 
1939, despite the efforts of some BUF members to create anti-war committees and to 
spread pro-German propaganda by emphasising that Britain did not need to fight for 
Poland, Mosley’s movement continued to enjoy little success in Britain. It also 
showed little interest in Italy, and was thus irrelevant to Italian Fascism in Britain. 
The British Council Against European Commitments, created in 1938 by BUF 
members, took the view that Britain and Germany were the two countries responsible 
for bringing world civilisation forward. A war between Britain and Germany, they 
believed, meant ‘Bolshevism in both countries, and the loss of everything for which 
both countries stand.... It is worth fighting to save civilisation, but not to kill it’.51
In 1939, the BUF position on British foreign policy thus demanded agreement 
with Germany. BUF propaganda focused on anti-Semitism and on the bizarre notion 
of an international Bolshevik plot organised in Britain by politicians such as Churchill 
and Baldwin, who supported ‘international Jewish finance’.52 While Mosley’s 
autobiography tended to explain his support for Germany as merely a question of 
foreign policy (Germany could expand into the East and Britain could reinforce its 
empire without need for war), the idea of a common British and German civilisation 
had at this stage become a central aspect in his movement’s propaganda. Unity 
Mitford, Mosley’s sister-in-law, gave the most dramatic example of loyalty to a 
German-British fascist ideal when she shot herself, after hearing that Britain had 
declared war upon Germany in September 1939.53
It was evident that propaganda of this sort from the BUF did not assist 
Grandi’s efforts toward rapprochement with Britain. The Italian government now 
considered BUF activity to be virtually useless, and no longer showed interest in it. As 
explained in Chapter 4, the relationship after 1935 between the Italian government 
and Mosley’s movement, which had been characterised by exchange and 
collaboration in the previous three years, swiftly cooled, and BUF offices in Italy shut
50 ‘Discorso di Sir Oswald Mosley a Leeds’, London embassy to foreign ministry, 28 February 1938, 
ASMAE, AP, GB, b. 34, f. 2, sf. 2.
5‘Viscount Lymington, Should Britain fight? (London: British Council Against European Commitments, 
1938), SUL, BU Collection, 3/LYM.
52 ‘Discorso di Mosley all’Earls Court’, London embassy to foreign ministry, 17 July 1939, ASMAE, 
AP, Gran Bretagna, b. 34, f. 2, sf. 2.
53 Mosley, My Life (London: Nelson, 1968), p. 366; Mosley: the Facts (Lonodn: Euphorion 
Distribution, 1957), p. 10; Diana Mosley, A Life o f Contrasts: the Autobiography o f Diana Mosley 
(London: Hamilton, 1977), p. 159.
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down as the result of a decision by the BUF in London. Although the BUF in Britain 
had supported the Italian campaign in Ethiopia both through public demonstrations 
and in the pages of The Blackshirt, life for British citizens in Italy became difficult 
during those months of intense anti-British propaganda. Very few documents exist 
about Anglo-Italian fascist relations after 1935; yet some British Foreign Office 
records for 1938 confirm what Italian foreign ministry records had suggested in 1935. 
From that year, the BUF in Italy no longer existed, but British fascists resident in Italy 
were still to be found and did not stop their efforts to organise Anglo-Italian fascism. 
In 1935, after BUF offices in Italy were closed, these British subjects founded a new 
group called the British Union of Friends of Italy. No evidence exists as to whether 
they continued to receive money from the BUF. The organisers were the same people, 
the most active of whom was John Celli, who had started his work for the BUF in 
Italy on behalf of Mosley in 1932. Their activity was convenient to the Italian 
government since it promoted pro-Italian activities and Anglo-Italian events. Even 
during the paroxysm of anti-British propaganda within Italy at the time of the 
Ethiopian war, these Britons continued to criticise British foreign policy publicly, an 
attitude which the British Foreign Office regarded as a form of treason: it was 
permissible behaviour for Englishmen living in Britain, but it savoured of disloyalty 
when conducted by Englishmen in the enemy’s countiy.54 Given the rationalist 
outlook of the BUF, it was likely that the British fascists shared this view. The British 
fascists in Italy were not very active, at least during the difficult months in Anglo- 
Italian relations which followed the conquest of Ethiopia. They genuinely believed in 
Anglo-Italian friendship, and reappeared in 1938 when, after Eden’s resignation, the 
relationship between the two countries appeared to improve. When Eden resigned, 
they wrote to Grandi assuming that his role in London had been essential:
Your work will never be forgotten by Englishmen who love Italy, and you will 
remain a lasting memory in our hearts. May old sores be wiped out and a happier 
era of better relations a better understanding of your Revered Chief by my People 
result from Mr Chamberlains [sic\ great Statesmanlike action [ric].55
54 ‘Activities of Mr John Celli’, Foreign Office minutes as comments to a letter by Perth to British 
Foreign Office, 5 May 1938, PRO, FO, 371/22434, R5157/395/22.
55 Ernest Platt, Vice-President of the British Union of Friends of Italy, to Grandi, February 1938, 
ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 126.
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They also organised public meetings, most of them in Milan, where Celli had lived 
since 1934. The Italian ministry of popular culture and the CAUR backed these 
events. At a crowded public meeting held in Milan shortly before the Easter 
agreements, Celli described the British press as not really free because it was owned 
by high finance and the Jews. A British Foreign Office informant reported that Celli 
depicted the British people as ‘good honest folk who had been led terribly astray but 
who were gradually beginning to see the light’. On the contrary,
Fascist Italy, secure in her great glory, was begged to be long-suffering and to 
exercise magnanimity towards a friend who had erred and astrayed (largely as a 
result of the pernicious influence of ‘one of the most dangerous men that had ever 
appeared on the European stage ....’) but who was well-meaning at heart and 
deserving of pity and good-will.
Celli, the report concluded, was in good faith but ‘too uneducated to be able to avoid 
a grotesque simplification of the issue involved’.56
After the Easter agreements, the British fascists in Italy sent a letter to 
Chamberlain praising the Prime Minister’s wisdom and courage; fifty-four British 
subjects who lived in Italy signed it. They believed that over the last eighty years the 
most stable element in European politics had been friendship between Britain and 
Italy. ‘It was indeed lamentable’, they remarked,
from the point o f view of both peoples, when events occurred which impaired 
that friendship and brought us almost within sight of hostilities .... We, who live 
in Italy, could see how deeply the Italians felt the change that had come about.57
The British Foreign Office believed that the British Union of Friends of Italy 
was genuine in its aim of improving Anglo-Italian relations, but also judged that its 
leaders were ‘ignorant’ and ‘idiots’, and therefore bound to fail. Other prominent 
figures in the movement included Captain Ernest Platt, Harry Brittain, the BUF 
universal fascist James Strackey Barnes and Colonel Rocke. The Foreign Office 
described them as not very clever individuals who had pursued an anti-British 
campaign throughout the previous years (Colonel Rocke was even on the blacklist of
56 Report by Mr Sedgwick on the meeting held in Milan on 7 April 1938, sent to the Foreign Office on 
22 April, PRO, FO, 371/22434, R4622/395/22.
57 Many British subjects living in Italy (54 signatures) to Neville Chamberlain, 1 May 1938, ASMAE, 
DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 126.
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the British embassy in Rome). Despite the leaders, the group secured the support of 
several distinguished Italophiles such as Charles Petrie and Leo Amery. That support 
was facilitated by a change of name in July 1938, from British Union of Friends of 
Italy to the Anglo-Italian Cultural Association. The reason for this change, in Celli’s 
view, was that Anglo-Italian understanding was now an accomplished fact and 
therefore required activities of a purely cultural nature. This belief sometimes gave 
Celli the confidence to seek support from the British consulate in Milan and even 
from the British embassy in Rome. For example, he suggested in September 1938 to 
the British consulate in Milan that it investigate the possibility of arranging for 
unemployed Britons to fill the positions left vacant by British Jews who might need to 
leave Italy in the next six months. The consul took the opportunity of making plain to 
Celli that he could not count on the support of the British government for any of his 
activities.58
Grandi no longer had contacts with the BUF, although he continued to work 
with Conservative Italophile MPs. They also believed that after Eden’s resignation a 
new era in Anglo-Italian relations could begin. They were particularly supportive of 
Grandi’s activities, which they considered had been fundamental in achieving Eden’s 
dismissal. One of the first to congratulate Grandi on that occasion was Mottistone. On 
behalf of Italy’s many English friends, he expressed gratitude for Grandi’s ‘ceaseless 
efforts in the cause of Italian-English friendship’ and expressed the hope that ‘all will 
go well, and if and when friendship is completely restored it will be in the first degree 
due to you’. Grandi replied that he too believed that ‘all will eventually be well 
between our two countries, and I am happy to think that our work will have helped to 
further the lasting friendship which is so near to both our hearts’.59 Kenneth de 
Courcy, on behalf of the Imperial Policy Group, wrote to Grandi to express the 
group’s collective view that Europe owed him a special debt for his ‘diplomacy, 
courtesy, and statesmanship throughout the last two years’. Grandi, de Courcy wrote,
58 British consulate in Milan to the Charge d’Affairs at British embassy in Rome, 9 September 1938, 
PRO, FO, 371/22434, R7656/395/22; British consulate in Milan to Perth, 25 July 1938, ibid., 
R6960/395/22.
59 Mottistone to Grandi, 11 February 1938 and Grandi to Mottistone, 18 February 1938, ASMAE, DeF, 
CG, b. 53, f. 126.
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had helped to safeguard the imperial interests of both countries, and had also 
demonstrated that they were ‘not incompatible with friendship’.60
The Italophiles likewise expressed gratitude for Grandi’s efforts in bringing 
about the Easter agreement in Rome. They thanked the ambassador for the ‘splendid 
Easter present you and Signor Mussolini have given us’.61 According to Petrie, Grandi 
was the individual who more than anyone else deserved to feel real satisfaction from 
the outcome. Sir Ronald Graham, Sir Edward Grigg, Admiral Taylor, Petrie himself 
and a few others were thinking about forming a new body to further good relations 
between Britain and Italy.62 Grandi’s English friends thus conveyed to the ambassador 
the gratitude and loyalty that he did not receive from Ciano and the Duce. While the 
latter had, in Grandi’s view, been ungrateful and unfair, the English Italophiles had 
shown themselves sincere friends who had rallied to his side at a difficult moment.63 
After the vote to approve the Anglo-Italian agreement, another pro-Italian MP, 
George Lambert, took the occasion in congratulating Grandi to also thank him for 
facilitating his visit to Italy the previous month. The favourable conditions he found 
in Italy made him even more convinced that he had acted rightly in voting in favour of 
the agreement: all social classes received him ‘with the most charming courtesy’ and 
he was greatly impressed by the vast improvement in Italian conditions: not only were 
the trains punctual, but the hotels were also admirable, ‘and there was an absence of 
those parasites on the streets who made the stranger’s life a burden in days gone by’.64 
At the beginning of April 1938 the Conservative MP Sir Philip Dawson, well-known 
for his pro-Italian feelings, organised a meeting at Westminster among Conservatives 
in order to constitute an Anglo-Italian Parliamentary Committee.65
The correspondence between the British Conservatives and Grandi during the 
weeks preceding the Munich conference were filled with tension, hope and anxiety, 
but also mutual expressions of solidarity and friendship. Neville Chamberlain realised 
that as long as the Spanish Civil War persisted it was impossible to implement the
60 Kenneth de Courcy to Grandi, 23 February 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 129.
61 Lloyd to Grandi, 18 April 1938 and Phillmore to Grandi, Easter Sunday 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 
53, f. 126.
62 Petrie to Grandi, 20 April 1938, ibid.
63 Grandi to Lord Phillmore, 19 April 1938 and Grandi to Petrie, 25 April 1938, ibid.
64 George Lambert to Grandi, 3 May 1938, ASMAE, ibid.
65 ‘Gruppo parlamentare anglo-italiano’, Grandi to foreign ministry, 8 April 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, 
b. 55, f. 144.
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Anglo-Italian agreement, but thought that thanks to Grandi’s help a chance existed 
that ‘reason would prevail’.66 The Italophiles regarded the prospect of Italy’s support 
for Germany in the event of war with terror and dismay. Their relationship with 
Grandi continued to be excellent, but the Axis was a daunting presence. In a dramatic 
letter preceding Munich, Petrie expressed to the ambassador his sympathy even in the 
current difficult circumstances and confirmed his devoted friendship with the promise 
that, whatever happened in the international situation, such feelings would never 
change:
If by an unhappy chance Italy adopts what, if  you will forgive me for saying so, I 
consider to be the suicidal policy of supporting Germany in the event of war, I 
can assure you that this will make no difference in the feelings o f affection which 
I have for so long entertained for yourself. I can say no more, but I think you will 
understand.67
Grandi maintained friendship with Petrie and with other Italophiles well into the 
period after the Second World War. Grandi, Petrie and Beaverbrook in particular 
continued to share their worries with each other: Grandi about the alleged advance of 
Communism in Italy, Beaverbrook and Petrie about the collapse of the British 
empire.68
However, while the Italophile MPs continued their work with the Italian 
embassy, the activity of the intellectuals, journalists and writers who had so earnestly 
supported Italy during the Ethiopian War by publishing articles and books, was 
becoming less intense. This was clearly because of Italy’s increasing closeness to 
Germany, since these Italophiles were and had always been anti-Nazi. The English 
Review, which was their principal publication, was pro-Italian but anti-German. 
Figures such as Petrie and Jerrold had always stressed the importance of the Roman 
tradition in Italian Fascism, and being Catholics they believed they belonged to the 
same civilisation. The Germans remained in their view little more than barbarians, 
and Nazism was the ultimate expression of their barbarism.69 In 1937 The English
66 Neville Chamberlain to Grandi, 19 September 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 127.
67 Petrie to Grandi, 28 September 1938, ASMAE, ibid.
68 Petrie to Beaverbrook, 16 April 1956, HLRO, Lord Beaverbrook Papers, Correspondence with 
Charles Petrie, 1929-1963, C/270; Grandi to Beaverbrook, 21 July 1960; Grandi to Beaverbrook, 31 
July 1962; Grandi to Beaverbrook, 15 January 1964, ibid., Correspondence with Dino Grandi, C/145.
69 Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers o f the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933-39 
(London: Constable, 1980), p. 23.
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Review was incorporated into The National Review, a right-wing publication but not 
specifically Italophile; the usual Italophile contributors then disappeared. In 1938 and 
1939, the only article signed by anyone connected to the Italophiles was by Luigi 
Villari, who explained the reasons for Italy’s intervention in the Spanish Civil War. 
He wrote it in May 1938, after the Anglo-Italian talks in Rome; only now that Anglo- 
Italian relations had improved, was it possible to set forth Italy’s position ‘in its true 
light’. In his opinion, every patriotic Briton should realise that Italy had fought for a 
British as well, because Britain did not want a ‘Russian colony’ in the 
Mediterranean.70 This notion was certainly common among the Italophiles, who 
obviously hoped for Franco’s victory against the Republicans. However, the Spanish 
Civil War also helped to move Italy closer to Germany, the power they dreaded above 
all others. The Bulletin o f International News, rather than the National Review, 
continued to express the Italophiles’ views over Italo-German relations, but after 
Hitler’s invasion of Austria, the Bulletin began to criticise Italy although only with 
regard to foreign policy. Even the racial laws of February 1938 raised no difficulties 
for the Italophiles. In March 1938 the Bulletin explained that Italy had emerged 
‘weakened and embarrassed’ from the Ethiopian conflict, and by no means ‘able to 
withstand German pressure in Austria without the friends who had been alienated’.71 
News of the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 1938 came as a momentary relief 
between the Anschluss and Hitler’s visit to Rome in May, on which occasion the 
Italian and the German dictators raised a toast to the ‘natural frontiers which 
Providence and history have visibly drawn between our two peoples’. The two leaders 
also drank to the meeting of two revolutionary countries, some two thousand years 
after Romans and Germans had met for the first time in history.72 The Bulletin 
remained pessimistic even during Chamberlain’s visit to Italy in January 1939. Beside 
the news that the Italian press wholeheartedly welcomed the Prime Minister, the 
article relayed information about Virginio Gayda’s anti-French declarations, ‘that the 
Italian claims on France were based on documentary rights as well as on essential 
political and moral reasons’.73 In March, the Bulletin condemned Germany’s
70Luigi Villari, ‘Italian - and other - intervention in Spain’, The National Review (incorporating The 
English Review), vol. 110, n. 663, May 1938, p. 593; p. 596.
71 ‘Austria and Germany’, Bulletin o f International News, vol. XV, n. 5, 5 March 1938, p. 177.
72‘The Speeches in Rome on May 7’, ibid., vol. XV, n. 10, 21 May 1938, p. 441.
73 ‘Mr Chamberlain’s Visit to Rome’, ibid., vol. XVI, n. 2, 28 January 1939, p. 60.
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destruction of Czechoslovakia, and emphasised that the Italian official position was 
that the Czechs had ‘asked to be annexed’. It also reported a speech by Mussolini in 
which the dictator had stressed that what happened in Eastern Europe was ‘fated to 
happen’ and that the Axis was a relationship not between states but between 
revolutions. Mussolini then added a number of violently anti-French remarks, 
mentioning the questions of Tunisia, Djibouti, and the Suez Canal. Among his 
Mediterranean claims, the Bulletin observed, the Duce included ‘that gulf which is 
called the Adriatic’, indicating future problems with the Slavs.74
Leo Ameiy believed that the German claims had represented a danger for the 
world’s stabilisation for a long time; in 1939 he recalled his visit to Germany as early 
as 1899, when he found the Germans already hostile to the Britons out of jealousy of 
the British Empire. Since then, he believed, Germany had always wanted to build an 
even greater empire, and Hitler was the ultimate expression of that aggressive spirit, 
which was typical of German history.75 He never mentioned Italy as a problem, 
although in the same year he contributed to a book on the German threat to Britain, in 
which the Axis powers, and not Germany alone, now figured as a challenge to the 
British empire.76
Among the Italophiles, only Francis Yeats-Brown continued to be optimistic 
even in 1939, when he published a book on European politics that confirmed once 
more his romantic and idealised view of ‘the Land of the Caesars’. His favourite 
region was the Duce’s Romagna, a land which besides bearing abundant fruits had 
given the world ‘so many saints and scoundrels’:
One expects to meet a condottiere or a poet round every comer, and one 
understands why a glory of great men have come out of Italy down the centuries.
Since the days o f Dante, she has produced a world-genius in almost every 
generations; and now, through Mussolini, himself so clearly Roman in shape and 
soul, she may have again set her course upon the steep and difficult path of 
Empire.
74‘The Economic Value o f Czecho-Slovakia to Germany’, ibid., vol. XVI, n. 6, 25 March 1939, p. 265; 
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He concluded that such thoughts came naturally to the traveller to Predappio.77 He felt 
certain that Mussolini was a sincere friend of Britain; Italians were ambitious and 
brave, but disliked the idea of being second to Germany in world conquest, and were 
not going to risk their own existence in a war in which Germany ‘would reap most of 
the profits’.78
The Axis in London
In 1938 and 1939 Grandi received a large number of letters from ordinary 
British citizens, both pro-Italian and anti-Italian. The pro-Italian letters came from 
British citizens and from organisations which worried about the possibility of war and 
hoped for a peaceful relationship with Italy. The correspondents generally believed 
that Hitler was a mystic and a criminal maniac, and that the German people had been 
kept in complete ignorance of his real aims. They hoped that Grandi would be able to 
convince Mussolini to try to bring Hitler to his senses before it was too late, and that 
Grandi should ensure that the Italian people were not kept in ignorance. They 
reminded Grandi that England, France and Russia were bound to intervention in case 
Germany invaded Czechoslovakia.79 After Munich, ordinary British citizens wrote to 
Grandi to thank him and Mussolini for their immeasurable service to humanity at the 
Munich conference; women wrote to him as ‘English mothers’ to thank Mussolini for 
purportedly saving the peace.80
At the same time, Grandi also received hostile letters from student unions and 
other organisations as well as from individuals. He collected all these letters in a file 
entitled ‘Anonymous. Fanatics. Envious...’. Left-wing clubs passed resolutions in 
favour of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and called Italy and Germany 
imperialist aggressors and murderers. They hated Chamberlain and demanded a 
stronger Prime Minister who would support the League of Nations and collective
77Francis Yeats-Brown, European Jungle (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939), p. 69.
78 Ibid., p. 89.
79 Adrian Brunei to Grandi, 28 September 1938; Orion S. Playfair (secretary of the ‘New Europe 
Group’) to Grandi, 29 September 1938, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 127.
80 See letters from Sheffield and from Middlesex, 30 September 1938 and 4 October 1938, ibid.
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security.81 Most letters indicated that the British complaints against Italy were its 
aggression against Ethiopia, which was considered a cowardly rape of a poor country, 
and its intervention in the Spanish Civil War. While some letters were signed by 
British organisations or gentlemen who clearly explained their reasons, others were 
written by less educated individuals who simply wished to protest. A hand-written 
anonymous note stated that ‘England will never be friendly to Italy, while you have 
old Mussolini we know him to (sic) well for what he is (bad to the core). He made 
war on the poor Ethiopians, but it was no victory’. In a more literate tone, a British 
soldier protesting against Italy’s behaviour in the Spanish conflict expressed a similar 
disgust:
A soldier can only view with die uttermost contempt the policy you have 
followed whilst the murderous excesses you have fostered in Spain deserves [szc] 
the sternest condemnation and is that of unmitigated blackguard .... the 
murderous crimes inflicted on harmless women and children in the cities of 
Spain, actions that apparently receive the blessing of the Vatican.82
Another major source of discontent was the racial laws, which occasionally gave rise 
to sarcastic comment:
Sir, You are probably not aware that Hoare-Belisha Secretary for War - in this 
country - is a Jew, so watch him!!! The right thinking people of this country have 
no use for Jews - They are the world’s trouble makers. I salute your Mussolini!! 
and heil Hitler!!! Fascist Supporter.
The racial laws were also a cause of deep disappointment for British travellers to 
Italy:
Dear Sir, I had arranged to spend my holiday in Italy with my wife as I have done 
during the past two years. As a self respecting Englishman however I cannot visit 
a country that indulges in the luxury of religious persecution. I hope others will 
express to you their disapproval and disgust.83
81 From a meeting of university students and Left-wing clubs on 18 March 1938; they sent a summary of 
their resolutions to Grandi, no date, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 53, f. 131; see also Windhill Co-operative 
Society to Grandi, date not readable, ibid.
82 Handwritten note, anonymous and without date, ibid; anonymous from Birmingham, 1 February 1938, 
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83 Handwritten, to Grandi, no date, ibid; John D. Hunt to Grandi, no date, ibid.
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Another British traveller thought it impossible to continue to visit because of the 
rumours about Italian atrocities in Spain:
These are grave insinuations and as one who cherishes happy memories of a 
recent visit to Italy and had, until recently, the intention of repeating the visit, I 
should be grateful if  you would inform me if  there is any substance in these
84rumours.
One letter in particular was significant on an issue likely to worry Grandi 
most, Italy’s fate should it continue its alliance with Germany. It was cast as a 
satirical letter from Hitler to Grandi, containing German stereotypes about Italy. The 
fact that it was written by a Briton obviously suggested that the British shared those 
stereotypes: Italy was unreliable, always changed alliances, based its policies on bluff, 
and was falling increasingly under German domination. The false ‘Hitler’ asserted 
that if Mussolini had had his former allies (France and Britain) still with him, he 
could certainly have stopped Hitler at the Brenner, despite the Axis. But without them 
he was too weak, since he had wasted all his forces in the Ethiopian and Spanish 
campaigns. Italy, the letter continued, was not trustworthy, and Germany was ready 
‘to wreak on Musso [s/c] and Italy as a revenge for Italy’s betrayal in the last great 
European War’. In fact what the Germans liked most about the capture of Austria was 
that they were now on the Italian border, ‘ready to deal Italy one death blow and make 
Italy and her Colonies part of our Great German Empire’. The Rome-Berlin Axis had 
been invented for Germany alone, and indicated what the conclusion would be: ‘We 
are going to put the Hypocrite Pope and Musso’, the ‘dirty double-crosser’, ‘in a 
Concentration Camp. We will turn the Berlin-Rome Axis Pact into a Berlin axes 
Roma fact’.85
Such notion about Italo-German relations clearly did worry Grandi, as well as 
other Fascist gerarchi such as Bottai, De Bono, and Balbo, and universal Fascists, in 
particular Asvero Gravelli and Camillo Pellizzi, who continued to see the alliance 
with Germany as good only so long as Italy’s primacy was respected.86 Throughout his
84 Mr S. G. Hum, from Essex, 3 Feb 1938, ibid.
85 Anonymous letter, without date but 1938, addressed to ‘Dear Dago Grandi’ and signed ‘Hail Hitler’, 
ibid.
86 Gentile, La grande Italia, p. 194; Ruggero Zangrandi, II lungo viaggio attraverso il fascismo (Milan: 
Feltrinelli, 1976), p. 217.
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diary, Grandi emphasised that the relationship with Britain was the only possibile way 
to avoid war; he saw alliance with Germany as a favourable option only if it brought 
advantages to Italy. This perception remained present not only in his diary but also in 
L Italia Nostra, and marked Grandi’s activity in London from 1937 onward.
The celebration of the Munich agreement in London coincided with the 
celebration of the March on Rome and of victory in the Great War. In November 
1938 L Italia Nostra, unlike its practice in previous years, described the celebration 
of victory in the Great War in terms of foreign policy rather than as an Italian 
community event. This was due both to the crisis of the community after September 
1938 and to Grandi’s hopes for an improvement in Anglo-Italian relations, which 
L Italia Nostra continued to support. The celebration in November 1938 brought 
together Italian and British organisations, and Grandi’s speech to the community 
focused on the new friendship between two countries which had been allies in the 
Great War. The period of crisis and difficulty between Italy and Britain, Grandi 
argued, had lasted four years, but was ended with British recognition of the Italian 
empire. A new era of loyal friendship between the two nations was now beginning. As 
he had done in 1936, he now praised the Italians in Britain for their contribution to 
foreign policy; they had shown themselves to be the ‘new Italians’ that Mussolini 
wanted, at home and abroad:
Every time I took my children to the Italian school, I stopped to watch the 
children of Italians in London: they are able to march with the same confident 
smile with which their elder brothers, the Legionari d ’Africa, marched under the 
tropical sun toward the enemy and onward to the conquest o f empire.87
L ’ltalia Nostra saw Mussolini’s meeting with Chamberlain in Rome in 
January 1939 as the re-consecration, on the soil of Rome, of an ancient Anglo-Italian 
friendship. The newspaper expressed the pious wish that Italians would now forget 
the events of the recent difficult years. Chamberlain and Mussolini were 
‘distinguished men who founded their policies on reality’. One sentence by Mussolini 
was reported in huge characters, and underlined the historic meaning of that meeting 
for the Italian people: ‘We do not govern the nation for today’s Italians alone, which
87 ‘La serata dei combattenti al Criterion. H discorso di S. E. l’ambasciatore’, L ’ltalia Nostra, 11 
November 1938, n. 510, p. 4; London consulate to foreign ministry, ASMAE, AL, b. 1015, f. 2, 8 
November 1938.
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would be remarkable in itself, but also for future generations, because the Fatherland 
will live for centuries and millennia’.88 During the same period, the newspaper was 
filled with photographs of Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War and of the 
crowds in Rome listening to Mussolini’s speech celebrating the event.
Italy’s invasion of Albania in April 1939 must have been completely 
unexpected to readers of L ’ltalia Nostra, since the newspaper had never before 
mentioned either Albania or Italian interests in that region. The average reader of 
L ’Italia Nostra must have been puzzled by the explanation that the event was a ‘fated 
conclusion of a natural and historic process, caused by the very condition of Albania’. 
The newspaper claimed that the invasion had not been decided on the spur of the 
moment, although the policy leading to it had developed over a short period of time. 
In its account, Italy had been invited there by Albanian patriots who disliked their 
government and by Italian citizens who lived there and were continuously threatened 
by groups of armed Albanian bandits. Italy intended now to contribute directly ‘to the 
elevation of the Albanian people on the paths of work and of civil progress’.89 Unlike 
the invasion of Ethiopia, which the newspaper had publicised in advance by 
publishing maps and articles, the invasion of Albania did not receive the patriotic and 
unanimous approval of the Italian communities in Britain. The newspaper coverage 
suggests that in the case of Albania the Fasci did not even attempt to make a similar 
appeal to the communities. The embassy organised only one public meeting for the 
celebration of the event at the Casa del Littorio. There the authorities explained how 
the invasion of Albania had been a peaceful gift of civilisation to a country that 
aspired to link its destiny to the fate of immortal Rome. The supposed absence of 
violence and cruelty during the conquest did not mean that Italy had refrained from 
using military means: ‘when one needs to break a chain, one must have the courage to 
break it’. Although only one battalion was employed in the operation, L 'Italia Nostra 
claimed that Italy’s military campaign had been so extensive, precise and perfect that 
the whole world admired it: ‘things never seen before, not even in dreams: an entire 
army coming to Tirana from the air’. The freedom and independence of Albania,
88 ‘L’esito del convegno di Roma’, L ’Italia Nostra, 20 January 1939, n. 520, p. 1.
89 ‘L’ltalia in Albania’, ibid., 14 April 1939, n. 532, p. 1
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rather than being diminished, was now beginning once it had become part of the 
ancient and imperial Roman family.90
During the last months of Grandi’s work in London, the Fascws newspaper 
no longer mentioned Anglo-Italian relations and ignored the Axis, but instead 
continued to report on autarchy, summer camps and schools. The paper described the 
invasion of Albania as a logical event, but never referred to the possibility of war in 
Europe. German aggression against Czechoslovakia was ignored and the broader 
German threat never mentioned. Yet this was not the view of the general secretary of 
the Fasci Abroad. Unlike L \Italia Nostra, II Legionario continued to propagate news 
about the Italo-German alliance and about Germany’s alleged right to expand in the 
East. The bulletin of the Italian Fasci Abroad went so far as to explain that 
Czechoslovakia was a mere invention of Versailles diplomacy.91 Reporting on the 
Pact of Steel included an attack against Britain for its failure to understand the wider 
perspective of the new alliance, which was the expression of a spiritual change in the 
world.92 The divergence between the newspaper of the Fasci in Britain, controlled by 
the Italian embassy, and the organ of the Italian Fasci Abroad, controlled by the 
foreign ministry, reflected the divergence between Grandi and Ciano, which was not 
simply a personality clash but had become a political issue.
This was particularly evident after the signature of the Pact of Steel. On 22 
May 1939 Grandi simply noted in his diary without comment: ‘signature in Berlin of 
Italo-German Pact’. A day later he sent an invitation to the German ambassador for 25 
May asking him to a reception to celebrate the Pact. According to Grandi, a number 
of journalists knew about the event and sent the news to Rome. Grandi claimed in his 
diary that this happened by chance, but it is likely that Grandi wanted Mussolini to 
know about it. The following day Ciano phoned Grandi to tell him that Mussolini was 
pleased to be told about such an invitation. The Duce took the occasion to order 
Grandi to extend the invitation to the representatives of the Italian and German 
communities in Britain and to prepare a speech to mark the occasion. The speech, 
Mussolini emphasised, had to be violent, it had to attack directly the democracies,
90 ‘L’Unione dell’Albania all’Italia - La celebrazione dell’awenimento aLondra’, ibid., 21 April 1939, n. 
533, p. 1.
91‘La parola dell’Italia fascista per la risoluzione della questione dei Sudeti’, II Legionario, 20 
September 1938, n. 26, p. 8.
92 ‘Dal discorso di Cuneo al patto italo-germanico’, ibid., 30 May 1939, n. 15, p. 1.
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especially France. Ciano, to the immense annoyance of Grandi, added: ‘you have seen 
[...] what French newspapers have written about you and your opposition to Axis 
policy even during the last few days’; and concluded by ordering Grandi to be 
extremely tough and explicit. Grandi replied that he had not read the French 
newspapers, and concluded by saying that the Duce would simply be obeyed. A day 
later he knew that Mussolini had ordered the Italian press to attach great importance 
to what he was going to say. Grandi thus extended the invitation to all Italian and 
German Fascist and Nazi organisations in London, to the personnel of the Italian and 
German embassies, and to Italian and German journalists, gathering in total about 300 
people. Before giving the speech on 25 May, he sent a written draft to Rome so that 
Ciano and Mussolini had time to check it.93
Grandi began with the usual explanation of the alliance as the necessary 
corollaiy to Axis policy, as a sign of the ‘indivisible communion of two States, two 
Peoples and of two Empires’, but also of two leaders and of two revolutions. Grandi 
even referred to the Italian Risorgimento, which he had previously used to 
demonstrate traditional Anglo-Italian friendship, but which he now used to recall that 
the first alliance of the newly unified Italy had been concluded with Prussia. 
Following that (and forgetting about the Italo-German clash in the First World War), 
he emphasised that the first alliance of the reborn Roman empire had been concluded 
with Nazi Germany. Grandi, as he always did in his speeches, then turned his thoughts 
to the Italian community, which was now becoming an Italo-German community:
Italians living in London wish to-day, together with their German friends and in 
unison with our comrades living in the Motherland, to express their sentiments of 
solidarity, of joy for the historic event and of gratitude to the Duce .... Italians 
living in Great Britain [...] perhaps more and better than any other, are in a 
position to appreciate the value of the deep significance and decisive importance 
that the Italo-German Pact has for the future of our two countries.
Grandi then attacked the alleged campaign of the democracies against Italy and 
Germany, and in particular the purported lies of the Western press. For example, he 
continued, French newspapers had recently presented Grandi himself as the most 
resolute adversary of the Italo-German alliance. He insisted that the French had lied,
93 Grandi, ‘Appunto circa mio discorso alTambasciata, ordinatomi da Mussolini, dopo Patto alleanza 
italo-tedesca (Maggio 1939)’, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 56, f. 153.
202
and accused them of acting in bad faith. He then extended his polemic to the whole 
period between 1918 and 1935, attacking Versailles and Geneva, and warning that 
Italy would never forgive or forget. In conclusion, he claimed that the Italo-German 
pact had already been successfully tested both in the political field with the Rome- 
Berlin Axis, and in the military field with the Spanish Civil War.94
After the speech, the German journalists present appeared most embarrassed. 
They could not understand the reason behind Grandi’s anti-French diatribe, which at 
that point ran the risk of embarrassing German diplomacy. The German journalists 
indeed asked Grandi not to publish the speech, and informed him that they themselves 
did not plan to report it. Grandi replied that the decision rested with Mussolini alone. 
The following day, Ciano phoned Grandi to tell him that the Duce liked his speech 
immensely; it was exactly what the dictator had wanted.95 Yet Grandi was not 
convinced that the speech had been such a good idea, and as a result nothing appeared 
in L Italia Nostra. However, II Legionario came out on 30 May with a long article 
about Grandi’s speech, showing again the different perception of foreign policy 
between Ciano and Grandi. The article included the attacks against the democracies 
in general and France in particular. It also emphasised the Italo-German character of 
the London gathering, giving the impression of the existence in Britain of a strong 
Italo-German community, whose members felt themselves to be part of a common 
revolution and a common destiny. The meeting concluded, ran the report, with the 
two communities acclaiming both the Duce and the Fuhrer, and singing the Italian 
and German national anthems.96
Nevertheless, the British Italophiles understood Grandi’s intentions and were 
still eager to co-operate. Grandi again saw himself as the man who could rescue Italy 
- and therefore Europe - at the eleventh our, and despite Mussolini. But this time 
Mussolini gave him no chance.Without consulting him, the Duce declared Grandi’s 
mission in London at an end. Although Grandi officially left the embassy in July, 
Mussolini’s decision came after the speech at the embassy, when Ciano asked Grandi
94Grandi, speech of 25 May 1939, attached to the notes o f Grandi’s diary, ibid.
95Grandi, ‘Appunto’, ibid.
96 ‘Londra - Manifestazione italo-tedesca all’Ambasciata d’ltalia. Vibrato discorso di S. E. Grandi’, II 
Legionario, 30 May 1939, n. 15, p. 21.
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to return to Rome, where Grandi learned from Mussolini that he was to be appointed 
Minister of Justice.97
Conclusion
In 1939 the divergence between Grandi’s and the Italophiles’ beliefs on the 
one hand and Italy’s propaganda and foreign policy on the other persisted. The 
attitude of the Fasci Abroad reflected this divergence. Despite the increased 
centralisation of the Fasci under the control of the foreign ministry from 1938 
onward, L ’Italia Nostra continued to reproduce Grandi’s views on Italian foreign 
policy. The London newspaper became pro-British after Eden’s resignation, and 
avoided giving excessive weight to news about Italy’s aggressiveness and closeness to 
Germany.
Two years after Grandi had left London, while Britain was at war with Italy, 
Douglas Jerrold insisted that even at the eleventh hour Italy would have preferred an 
alliance with Britain and France but was ‘committed, by virtue of her fear and hatred 
of Bolshevism, to the cause of General Franco’, in which Jerrold had shared.98 His 
view was widespread among the Italophiles during the Second World War. For Muriel 
Currey, Charles Petrie, and Harold Goad Italy remained an ideal second country, and 
they regretted that events such as Ethiopia, the League’s sanctions, and the Spanish 
Civil War had allegedly dragged Mussolini toward a purportedly unwanted alliance 
with Germany.99 In the same year, their Italian friend Luigi Villari published a book in 
which he sought to demonstrate that the British had never really been able to 
understand Italy, and how the Anglo-Saxon struggle in the Second World War was 
‘essentially a struggle against Western civilisation and patriotism’.100 Contemporary 
anti-British Italian publications reiterated Villari’s perception. A book by Virginio
97 Grandi, Memorie: i sette anni a Londra, ASMAE, DeF, CG, b. 153, f. 200, sf. 1, ins. 3, pp. 184-194.
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Gayda about Italy’s foreign policy aspirations was, despite its Italian title, actually 
written in German.101
101 Gayda, Che cosa vuote I'Italia (Rome: il Giomale d’ltalia, 1940).
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Conclusion
Grandi’s era in London had began with a novel attempt to transform the Italian 
communities in Britain. The ambassador’s activity toward fascistisation of the Italians 
was symbolised by his visit to the children gathered in London for departure to 
summer camps in Italy in July 1932. After seven years, the conclusion of his mission 
coincided with another gathering: that of an Italo-German community celebrating the 
Pact of Steel at the Italian embassy in July 1939. That development poses some 
crucial questions, in particular about Grandi’s role in the transformation of the Italian 
communities, the role of the Fasci Abroad, the manipulation of those communities in 
the service of Italian foreign policy, and consequently the relationship between Rome 
and London during those years. When Grandi began his mission, neither he nor the 
London Fascio had a plan to transform the Italian community into an Italo-German 
community. Yet although an Italo-German community in London in fact did not and 
never had existed, that was the image given by the Italian press for the Fasci Abroad 
at the end of the 1930s.
The role of imagery was fundamental to the fascistisation of the communities 
abroad. The Fascist press, public rituals and the organisation of programmes for the 
education of the Italians were all elements that contributed to the creation of a new 
image of the Italians in Britain. The thesis attempts to measure the gap between such 
Fascist aspirations and their success among the communities, namely the actual belief 
of the Italians in Fascist ideology, and the extent to which such education of the 
Italians created a microcosm of what Fascism did to Italian society as a whole.
The Italian Fasci Abroad did not simply attempt to fascistise the emigrants. 
One of their main roles was to transform them into new Italians, but their interest was 
not only in the Italians themselves. They wanted to expand fascism in other countries 
and, by creating Italian Fascist communities, they played a part in Italy’s foreign 
policy: by creating fifth columnists in crucial areas, and by disseminating Fascist 
ideology. Mussolini’s declaration in 1933 that fascism could be exported abroad, 
together with the more general expansion of European fascism, transformed the Fasci 
Abroad into an important instrument in the attempt to create a fascist international. It
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was therefore only when Mussolini became interested in expanding fascism abroad 
that the Fasci became an essential element in fascist foreign policy. Although fascist 
international meetings were organised by ‘universalists’ and groups such as the 
CAUR, the Fasci joined their efforts by creating networks of contacts and activities 
between them and foreign fascist movements.
The British-Italian case is a clear example of this, since contacts between 
Italian and British fascism were organised by the Fasci in Britain, and in Italy by the 
local BUF branches, which hoped to develop into an equivalent institution. These 
contacts also occurred in other countries in the 1930s because it was only during that 
decade that foreign fascist movements began to appear in any number. The increased 
relevance of the Fasci for Italian foreign policy is also demonstrated by the large 
number of publications about the Fasci Abroad in the 1930s, compared to the 1920s. 
Their work in the 1930s, as the British case demonstrated, remained a revolutionary 
one: the development of schools and summer camps meant the realisation of 
Mussolini’s plans for the education of the new Italians.
When Italy’s foreign policy became openly aggressive from 1935 onward, 
these institutions played an even greater role. The mobilisation of Italians abroad 
during the Ethiopian campaign was an example of the transformation of emigrant 
communities into totalitarian colonies. The accent on totalitarianism coincided with 
the explosion of anti-British propaganda. The separation of community life from the 
rest of British society appeared to realise the Fascist dream of the new Italians abroad. 
In Britain in particular, L Italia Nostra claimed to represent a community which was 
supposed to be living after 1935 in a metaphorical trench, surrounded by enemy 
territory.
The myth of Rome also played an important role in Fascist imagery of the 
community. For emigrants from small villages who had probably never visited Rome 
even when they had lived in Italy, the celebration of the new Rome represented a step 
toward nationalisation. The identification of the new Rome with Mussolini served the 
creation of the myth of the Duce as a new Augustus, and was reflected in London by 
the creation of a subsidiary ‘myth’ surrounding Grandi. The ambassador was the 
visible link between the community and Mussolini; at the same time, Grandi had been 
one of the founders of Fascist Italy. He mixed with Italian Londoners, sent his
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children to the Italian school, and acted as a local ‘duce’ at public events. It was also 
the case that when Grandi first arrived in London, a new secretary of the Fascio was 
appointed: the incoming secretary, Camagna was not only young, but self-consciously 
saw himself as a squadrista.
Summer camps were the most important point of identification with the 
regime for many Italian families, because it was also an institutional link, recognised 
by the authority of the Fascio and of the regime. The Fascist press described the 
Italians in Britain as heroes who were required to act in a revolutionary manner, but 
also to observe local laws and pursue private rather than public interests: a dichotomy 
between Fascism and family - between being pioneers and warriors, and being good 
fathers and mothers. This imagery tended to change from 1935 onward, when the 
whole community was called upon to mount a major battle against sanctions. 
Mussolini’s slogan ‘many enemies much honour’ was reflected in the renewed pride 
of a community living in an enemy country and facing local hostility. By that point, 
the Fasci Abroad considered integration into British society almost as a sort of a 
treason. II Legionario and L Italia Nostra worked in unison to persuade Italians to 
strengthen their links with each other, and never to mix with the native population. In 
1935 all were required to act as heroes: the war volunteers, the women, who had to 
support the war through propaganda and education, and the children who had to act as 
little soldiers, in schools, in sport activities after school, and in the summer camps, 
the colonie. The imperial image was widespread. While volunteers left for the colonia 
in Africa, Italian children left for their own colonie in Italy itself.
The myth of repatriation after the conquest of empire seemed to reward 
Fascism for its fight against sanctions and against the great powers. That myth was 
deeply felt in Britain: allegedly, Italians could now leave the country which had 
exploited them and had attempted to deny Italy its living space. The illusion was 
sustained that Italy had actually won a war against Britain, and that Italians had at last 
obtained their own living space. They were able to move there and live as employers 
rather than employees.
The belief that Italy had won a war against the British empire was linked with 
the idea of the Italian as a proletarian. In that case, another major dichotomy was 
involved. Italians were always described in the Fascist press as working-class
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communities, people who worked all day every day of their lives, and who sacrificed 
themselves for their families and for the wealth and reputation of their fatherland. At 
the same time, while continuously celebrating Ha comunita lavoratrice\ L ’ltalia 
Nostra reported daily on a social life in London which was evidently restricted to an 
Italian elite. The community was supposed to be proud of those Fascist notables who 
had achieved success in British society. This clearly contradicted the regime’s 
propaganda on the classless society, that was alleged to be spreading from Italy into 
Italian communities abroad. The schools were meant to fill this gap, for example by 
teaching Italian to children of families who had never spoken Italian, but rather 
dialect. That conflict in the self-image of the Italians was again apparently solved 
with the conquest of empire: the new Casa d ’Italia in London symbolised the new 
status of the whole community. ‘Little Italy’ was once and forever destroyed. The 
belief that all this had happened through victory in a war against the British empire 
was in large part due to Grandi’s speeches to the community. He repeated the idea in 
his letters to Rome. He believed he had played a crucial role in challenging British 
pride. In 1938 he also came to believe in the importance of his role in bringing about 
agreement with the British Empire, which was presented to Italian communities as the 
re-establishment of an equal relationship between Italy and Britain.
The Ethiopian war was the most crucial event in the relationship between 
Fascism and the Italian communities. The rebirth of the Roman imperial dream and 
the myth of Italy’s power had a remarkable influence in creating a sense of belonging 
to a Fascist community. The use of the Fasci by the Italian government also involved 
the organisation of fifth columnists and the creation of an intense propaganda against 
the democratic states, which continued, against Britain in particular, after 1936, and 
spread throughout the British empire, mostly in the Mediterranean basin. By isolating 
Italian communities from British society and by organising espionage activity, the 
Fasci certainly contributed to Italy’s preparation for war against Britain. Yet the 
Italian community itself was not prepared to follow Fascism to that extreme end. In 
this sense, the community remained loyal to its ambassador rather than to Mussolini’s 
policies. It is possible to see in L ’ltalia Nostra and in Grandi’s diary for 1938, the 
anxities of a community which hoped that Italy would never go to war against Britain.
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The Fascio found itself in a difficult position from 1938 onwards. On the one 
hand, it was under the control of the Secretary of the Fasci in Rome, and, after 
Parini’s fall, under that of Ciano, and therefore effectively an instrument in the hands 
of Italy’s foreign policy. On the other, it had to deal locally with an Italian community 
worried from September 1938 about the serious prospect of war, a community whose 
members increasingly shrank from their Fascist mission and in some cases chose even 
to apply for British citizenship. The Fascio also had to deal with the lack of response 
from the Italians to the racial laws and to the alliance with Germany.
One attempt made by the Fascio was to call for radicalisation, which 
inevitably involved a small section of the London community, and returned the Fasci 
to the age of the pioneers, to the original idea of the Italians abroad, ready to make 
sacrifices for the Fatherland in difficult times. That raises the question of radicalism 
within the Fasci Abroad and within Fascism itself. It is simplistic to conclude that the 
founders of the Fasci were radical Fascists linked with the Party in the 1920s and that 
in the 1930s they were forced to accept a process of normalisation.1 Farinacci’s Party 
in 1925, and later the tendencies led by Roberto Farinacci, Pietro Marsich, and other 
supporters of intransigent Fascism (among which very different interpretations of 
Fascism nevertheless existed) were never really linked with the organisation of 
Fascism abroad, at least so far as the research on the Fasci Abroad has demonstrated. 
In the 1930s in particular, different views existed as to which was ‘the’ revolutionary 
current. Representatives of racism and supporters of the Axis who advocated a 
revolutionary foreign policy considered themselves to be extreme and intransigent, 
pure Fascists of the first hour. At the same time, after his efforts toward a 
rapprochement with Britain and a less pro-German foreign policy, Grandi was hailed 
by former squadristi from the Romagna as the true representative of Fascism ‘of the 
origins’, the revolutionary ambassador, under whose guidance Italy had been able to 
assert and maintain a position of parity with Britain. The London Fascio, whose 
major figure was the ‘revolutionary’ Camillo Pellizzi, was always on Grandi’s side. 
From this point of view, the thesis demonstrates that the idea of the pioneers never 
disappeared, and that its myth was crucial in the organisation of a revolutionary
1 As argued by Luca De Caprariis in ‘Fascism for export? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani 
all 'Estero\ Journal o f Contemporary History, XXXV, 2 (April 2000), 151-183.
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youth, through summer camps, schools and athletics training for young Italians. The 
fact that the Fascio expanded its members toward the mid 1930s was a consequence 
of the growth in the success of these activities and myths within the community, 
which reached its peak with the proclamation of the Empire in 1936 and with the 
splendid new Casa d'ltalia in 1937.
The threat of war and the general worsening of economic conditions in Britain 
sapped the vitality of the Fascist myth after 1938: the few who remained loyal to 
Fascism and were ready to risk their lives, for it recreated the myth of the pioneers 
and of the origins, a myth that had never really disappeared, perpetuated throughout 
the years by resistance to sanctions, propaganda for autarchy, and corporativism. Such 
attempt to build a micro-totalitarian Italy within British communities reflected the 
wider attempt to intensify totalitarianism within Italy.
Another aspect analysed by the thesis, the collaboration between Italian and 
British fascism, raises several issues about the nature of the fascist international and 
the existence of Anglo-Italian fascist relations. In 1933 Italian Fascist universalism 
considered it a duty to support British fascists, who professed to believe in the 
‘universality of Roman ideas’. Only two years later, the major representative of 
universal Fascism, Asvero Gravelli, began to distinguish between a Protestant 
(German and British) and a Roman (Italian) type of fascism. Such a variation in the 
Italian perception of British fascism clearly reflected a shift in BUF’s role model from 
Italy to Germany. The cultural origins of British fascism with its strong relationship to 
the Italian movement, ensured regular contacts between British and Italian fascists, 
which continued until the identification with a ‘Roman’ form of fascism became 
complicated by the growth of Nazi Germany. The violence at Olympia in 1934 was 
hardly comparable to what had happened in Germany during the ‘night of the long 
knives’, but rather showed a similarity to Italian squadrismo before the March on 
Rome. At the time, Italian imagery about the BUF represented the latter as a 
squadrista movement, and Mosley as a sort of ras, analogous to the provincial 
chieftains of the Italian Fascist movement. BUF propaganda up to 1934 reflected the 
belief that British fascism was part of universal fascism, and that Rome was its origin. 
The shift from Italophilia to admiration for National Socialism in 1935 was 
associated with two main issues: the role of British pride in the attempt to establish a
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fascism ‘better’ than the Italian, and the shift from a Roman to a Teutonic model of 
fascism, linked with the new concept of complementary Anglo-German roles in the 
creation of the New European Order. While Mussolini continued to favour the 
expansion of fascism in other countries, he made clear that the new European 
civilisation was Mediterranean, since it had developed from Rome and had once more 
been made universal by Rome. In October 1935, while Italy was unleashing 
aggressive anti-British propaganda and Anglo-Italian relations were worsening, the 
BUF decided to shut down all its offices in Italy.
Grandi’s shift from an anti-British attitude in 1935-36 to collaboration with 
the British Conservatives coincided with a worsening relationship with the BUF. 
Relations between the London Fascio and the BUF cooled. Hitler’s shadow always 
seemed to be present in Grandi’s mind as a threat to the European order, and also in 
the mind of British Conservative Italophiles. Like Mosley, the Italophiles were 
extreme nationalists and believed that Britain had to become ‘great again’, but 
through the organisation of a corporativist system which did not necessarily imply a 
dictatorship. At the same time, they recognised the Fascist rebirth of Italy as the 
rebirth of ancient Rome, which they continued to consider as the basis of European 
civilisation. Thus instead of working with Mosley for the growth of fascism in 
Britain, they worked with the Italian embassy in an attempt to support the cause of 
Italy and to improve Anglo-Italian relations. Although less interested in fascism in 
Britain, the Italophiles in fact supported the cause of Fascism and Mussolini more 
than the BUF did. Their role also grew after 1935 because of the BUF’s shift toward 
German Nazism. Their idealisation of Italy, which perpetuated nineteenth-century 
romantic images, did not fit in with the type of fascism that the BUF wanted.
When Grandi wrote his memoirs in 1943, Mussolini was no longer Italy’s 
dictator. Grandi had been one of the major figures responsible for the change in 
regime on 25 July 1943, and felt the need to explain his seven years in London as 
reflecting a clear anti-German and pro-British policy, which Mussolini, Ciano, and 
the Germans had brought to an end. That version was only partially true: Grandi’s 
activity was in fact anti-British during the period of the Ethiopian War, although in 
1938 and 1939 he became worried by the German alliance and by Rome’s continued 
hostility toward London. He became convinced that peace in Europe could only be
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maintained by agreement between Italy and Britain, which did not imply a withdrawal 
from the Axis, but could act as a balancing force between France and Russia on the 
one side and Germany on the other. According to his memoirs, after the Pact of Steel 
both he and British Conservatives believed that the possibility still existed that war 
could be prevented. However this plan could only have succeeded if Grandi had 
remained in London and continued his work with the British Conservative Italophiles. 
The storm began with Ciano5s phone call in May 1939 ordering Grandi to give his 
anti-French speech at the London embassy after the signature of the Italo-German 
alliance. Grandi saw no means of escape: he had to give the speech.
L ’Italia Nostra, even though strongly anti-British from 1935 onward, showed 
little enthusiasm for Nazi Germany and favoured rapprochement with Britain once 
Eden resigned in 1938, proclaiming that Chamberlain was almost a fascist. The 
London Fascio, despite the attempts from Rome to reorganise it in a more centralised 
way, continued to follow Grandi rather than Ciano. The centralisation of the Fasci in 
Rome after the Ethiopian War gave an indication of the direction of Italian foreign 
policy; the move toward totalitarianism with the direct control of the Fasci by Ciano 
from 1938 was the final blow. The fact that the Italian Fascist press in Britain tended 
to talk about Germany as little as possible indicated that Grandi had a different plan 
in mind. His removal from the London embassy was final confirmation of the division 
between the London embassy and the Italian foreign ministry. In contrast, 11 
Legionario showed Italy’s foreign policy as it actually was, suggesting what was 
evident both in Ciano’s diary and in the correspondence between Ciano and Grandi, 
that the Axis was Italy’s fundamental alliance. Ciano’s pro-German position in 
1938/39, at least until Grandi’s resignation, made Grandi the most important figure in 
Anglo-Italian relations; even though he failed, and could not possibly have succeeded 
since Mussolini no longer approved of his policy in London, he remained for the 
British Italophiles and those who wanted peace with Italy the only viable way to 
collaborate with Italy.
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